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Abstract 
 
Gaming Disorder has been included in the 11th revision of the World Health 
Organization’s International Classification of Diseases as a recurrent gaming 
behaviour with a lack of control from the gamer. One important aspect of gaming 
disorder, and gaming in general, is the time loss effect which can be defined as the 
underestimation of the time spent on an activity (i.e., gaming in this case). Since 
this process may lead the gamers to experience multiple negative consequences 
(e.g., conflicts with education and occupation, relationship problems, etc.) due to 
the increased time spent on videogames, the main objective of this thesis was to 
explore a potential underlying mechanism of time loss: time perception. This thesis 
contributed to knowledge by (i) systematically reviewing the variables commonly 
associated with both gaming (i.e., healthy and disordered) and time perception, 
allowing a deeper understanding of these two variables’ interaction; (ii) testing the 
Dual-Process Contingency Model of time perception within durations above one 
minute; (iii) testing both the prospective and retrospective time perception of the 
gamers in comparison to non-gamers in a neutral setting; and (iv) testing how 
emotion and cognition affect the gamers’ retrospective time perception. 
The new primary data from this thesis were collected using quantitative approaches, 
utilizing both experimental (i.e., computer tasks) and psychometric (i.e., online 
survey) data collection. These data from three experimental studies and one 
psychometric study were analysed through multiple types of analysis such as 
ANOVAs, regressions, or general linear models. The results first indicated that the 
Dual-Process Contingency Model of time perception, unifying RTP and PTP, was 
not valid for longer time durations. Second, the results showed that the gamers 
exhibited a better PTP (but a similar RTP) than non-gamers when estimating time 
in a neutral setting. However, the gamers underestimated time when processing 
gaming pictures, this effect being stronger when the task to complete was more 
complicated. In conclusion, it appears from the studies carried out that the reason 
underlying the observed time loss effect experienced by gamers was impaired 
retrospective time perception occurring when aroused by gaming stimuli. 
  
  
2 
Chapter 1: Time perception 
  
  
3 
1.1. Chapter overview 
This thesis aims to explore gamers’ time perception to understand time loss 
(i.e., the underestimation of time spent on an activity) within Gaming Disorder. 
Before exploring time perception within this population, it is crucial to understand 
its underlying mechanisms and how it can be impaired/affected. Numerous 
variables have been demonstrated to interfere with time perception (e.g., drugs, 
fatigue level, and age), from which two main factors emerged: emotion and 
cognition.  
Therefore, the aim of this chapter is to describe and define time perception, 
as well as how both cognition and emotion interfere with it. This chapter will be 
divided into the following sections: (i) models of time perception (i.e., defining the 
concept of time perception and the dominating models), (ii) measures of time 
perception (i.e., explaining the main measures), (iii) method (i.e., explaining how 
the databases have been searched), (iv) results (i.e., divided in emotional 
interference and cognition), and (v) discussion.  
1.2. Models of time perception 
 Despite its importance in any sentient life form, scholars currently have 
limited knowledge on time perception, especially on time itself. Indeed, time is an 
intricate and indefinable concept, as it cannot be explained without resorting to a 
word belonging to semantic field of time itself (e.g., minute, instant, and period). 
Regardless of this obstacle, time perception has been studied for centuries, from the 
Greek philosophers of the antiquity such as Aristotle, to the most recent 
neuropsychological studies exploring its neural basis. Relentless research and 
reflection have led to numerous theories which constitute the basis of current 
knowledge, such as the distinction between retrospective and prospective time 
perception (Levin & Zakay, 1989). In prospective time perception (PTP), 
individuals are aware that they have to measure a duration. In an experimental 
design, the investigator tells the participant the aim of the experimental study 
beforehand, so that the participant can focus on time itself. Consequently, their 
perception is ad hoc. In retrospective time perception (RTP), individuals are 
unaware of the duration assessment until the very end of the experimental trial to 
be measured, which makes it more ecologically valid, as in real life individuals 
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rarely use PTP. In the RTP experimental setting, the participants’ temporal 
evaluation is post-hoc.  
In the first modern studies attempting to explain how time is perceived, a 
physicochemical model of time perception was introduced, a type of biological 
mechanism determining how durations are estimated. These models postulated that 
temperature would affect the time perception of individuals (François, 1927; 
Piéron, 1923). For example, Hoagland (1933) tested the effect of influenza – and 
thus of fever – on his wife’s time perception. The author replicated the previous 
results and postulated the existence of a chemical clock located in the nervous 
system, a clock which would become the basis of numerous models of time 
perception later (i.e., timer models), even though its form and behaviour vary 
substantially. For example, the counting model (Creelman, 1962) postulates the 
existence of a mechanism emitting pulses, these being recorded by a mechanism in 
order to allow a time estimation. The number of pulses would be a direct function 
of the duration to be evaluated. These types of models will be described as ‘timer’s 
models’ from this point onwards. 
As neuropsychological studies failed to find an organ or a neural system 
which could account for the pulsing mechanism, it was suggested that time 
perception should instead be explained by cognitive mechanisms (Ornstein, 1969). 
According to Ornstein’s ‘Storage Size’ metaphor, the perceived duration is a 
function of the information processed during an interval. Consequently, it can vary 
by both the number of the stimuli and their complexity. And, according to the same 
hypothesis, the way the stimuli are coded into storage impacts the perceived 
duration too. For instance, a logical number series (e.g., 2468) would take less 
‘space’ than an illogical random one (e.g., 2864). The following experiments 
performed by Ornstein all took place in an RTP design, and thus are not 
generalisable to PTP. Through two first experiments, Ornstein (1969) established 
the basis of his theory, the number of items presented to the participant, and their 
complexity – to a certain extent – lengthened the perceived duration. Moreover, a 
third and fourth experiment (respectively including auditory and visual stimuli) 
explored the complexity of the coding and not of the stimuli themselves. These 
showed that when the stimuli were more easily processed and analysed, the duration 
appeared to be shorter than when it was more complicated. This meets Ornstein’s 
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hypothesis, as the ‘easily codable’ items would use less storage space than the 
complicated ones. These results’ explanations were confirmed in a fifth experiment, 
where he explored the effect of habit on RTP. In this experiment, participants could 
either receive related or unrelated training before performing a task, the hypothesis 
being that if the participant was used to the task, it would be more easily codable, 
and as a result perceived as shorter. The hypothesis was confirmed, since the trained 
participants perceived the task as shorter than the participants who performed 
unrelated training.  
Moreover, Ornstein (1969) explored the importance of different coding in 
several other experiments. A sixth experiment examined the segmentation effect on 
duration evaluation. This study showed that when a participant was first exposed to 
a video split in several core parts (i.e., important sections of a dance movement), 
the duration of the actual video was perceived as longer when viewed as a whole 
(meaning that the ability to observe more details of a video would lengthen the 
perceived duration of an interval). Two final studies explored how the arrangement 
of a figure affecting its coding in memory could change its perceived duration. For 
this purpose, participants were presented a series of curves which could either form 
the shape of an insect, spell the word ‘man’, form a coherent figure, or be placed 
randomly and not form any shape or word. The study showed that the more easily 
codable the curves were, the shorter the perceived duration, the easiest being the 
word, followed by the insect shape. All these studies tend to confirm Ornstein’s 
‘Storage Size’ metaphor of time perception. However, even if he implied that this 
explanation was true for all kinds of time perception, the findings only relate to 
RTP. 
PTP better fits timer’s models such Creelman’s (1962). The first complete 
model including a timing processer was developed by Treisman (i.e., 'Internal 
Clock' Model, 1963). In this model, a pacemaker emits a regular pulse through a 
pathway, these pulses being recorded by a counter which transfers these to a ‘store’. 
The last timer component is the comparator which will allow the contrasting of two 
measures of time to allow an appropriate response. Treisman, Faulkner, Naish, and 
Brogan (1990) improved the model by including an oscillator into his model. This 
improvement came from an attempt to understand how the pacemaker should be 
composed to account for its functioning. The authors first state that there should be 
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multiple pacemakers to permit flexible time perception and motor action. There 
should also be a unified functioning of these pacemakers when they are required to 
work at the same pace, and there is a need for a hierarchical distribution overseen 
by a controller. This controller would be the aforementioned oscillator which would 
be coupled with a calibration unit receiving this pulse, and emitting a function of it 
(i.e., either increasing or decreasing the pulse rate). Such a configuration would 
allow different body parts to move at different paces (i.e., two different functions 
of the calibration unit) or at the same pace (i.e., one unique function, allowing a 
global acceleration of the pace). For this complex ‘Internal Clock’ model to work, 
a series of assumptions were made by the authors. First, the oscillator would be 
constituted of a small network of units (i.e., conceptual neurons) exerting either an 
excitatory or inhibitory effect on one another (i.e., allowing a slowing or an 
acceleration of the pulse). Second, the calibration unit would vary depending on the 
arousal level that can be induced from a sensory input (i.e., a high level leading to 
an increase of the calibration factor and the opposite for a low level). Finally, the 
main oscillator would be protected from such input. Nonetheless, Treisman and 
colleague’s experiments (1990) only partially supported their oscillator model, 
indicating that this model is not entirely reliable. Still, according to the authors, this 
type of model remains appropriate to explain PTP. 
These two models (i.e., the ‘Storage Size’ Metaphor and the ‘Internal Clock’ 
model) were competing when they were first developed, but it is now known that 
they are not exclusive, as they both define RTP and PTP, respectively. Based on 
Ornstein’s (1969) work, a new model was developed to describe RTP – the 
Contextual-Change Model (CCM; Block & Reed, 1978). To develop the model, 
Block (1974) conducted two experiments exploring how both the number of stimuli 
and the complexity of their sequences affected RTP. These experiments replicated 
Ornstein’s (1969) results (i.e., a lengthened perceived time duration when the 
number of stimuli rose) with a simpler complexity of the sequence associated with 
a longer perceived duration (i.e., probably due to a higher number of stimuli 
retained in memory due to the simplicity of the coding). Later, Block (1978) 
explored the complexity of the sequence in more depth, showing that while the 
complexity of a pattern does not affect time estimation, its predictability does (i.e., 
less predictable figure leading to an overestimation). These results still adhered to 
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several pre-existing theories and hypotheses on top of Ornstein’s (1969), leading 
Block and Reed (1978) to run several experiments to find out which theory was the 
most capable of explaining RTP. Four main hypotheses were constructed to account 
for RTP comprising event-memory (i.e., duration as a function of the retrievable 
data in memory), attentional (i.e., lengthening of duration estimation with an 
increased attention to the passage of time), informational (i.e., the amount of 
information lengthens the duration only if there is no response required for that 
information), and contextual-change (i.e., duration is a function of the number of 
changes observed, or of which the observer is aware). The first experiment 
demonstrated that the level of processing in the task performed by the participants 
did not influence their perception of time, thus ruling out both the event-memory 
and attentional hypotheses. In the second experiment, participants were confronted 
with either a mixed level of processing or a constant level of processing when 
performing several tasks. Participants estimated the mixed processing level as 
longer than the constant one. In conclusion, the authors concluded that the 
Contextual-Change Model (CCM) was the most likely model to explain RTP.  
PTP, on the other hand, is more appropriately described by the timer’s 
models. The current leading model in this field is the ‘Scalar Expectancy Theory’ 
Model of time perception (SET, Church, 1984). Performing three experiments on 
rats, Roberts and Church (1978) defined six main properties of the internal clock of 
the rats, and compared these properties to a man-made clock: (i) it can be stopped 
temporarily; (ii) the duration before and after the break can be added to achieve a 
total duration; (iii) it can measure different durations; (iv) it can time different 
modalities (e.g., visual vs. auditory); (v) timing is absolute because it can measure 
different lengths with the same rate; and (vi) it can be reset quickly. Later, Church 
(1984) described a model of time perception by reviewing previous studies led on 
animals’ PTP. This model comprises four main parts: a clock, working memory, 
reference memory, and a comparator. The clock part is composed of a pacemaker, 
a switch, and an accumulator. The pacemaker emits a pulse into an accumulator via 
a switch. These stocked pulses are compared to a remembered amount of pulses in 
reference memory. This comparison is operated by the comparator. If the two values 
(i.e., accumulator and stored value) are close enough, a response will be made (i.e., 
the two values are equal). In some cases, the value in the accumulator can be 
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transferred to working memory, the comparator can then compare it to the value in 
reference memory (e.g., when two successive durations are compared). This model 
presents several properties: (i) the pacemaker can be influenced by various external 
stimuli (e.g., drugs); (ii) the switch can be operated in different modes (e.g., when 
a break is operated in the middle of a stimulus, the switch can retain the pulses, 
allowing the inclusion of only the first and last part of the duration); (iii) the switch 
can open only at the beginning of each stimulus too (event mode); and (iv), working 
memory allows a quick reset, which permits a comparison between a first event and 
a given duration (e.g., 2s) and the second one to another one (e.g., 8s). These models 
were later tested on humans, and showed that PTP relied on a SET model as well 
(e.g., Allman & Meck, 2012; Church, 2003).  
Nonetheless, compared to the cognitive models of RTP, the timer’s models 
do not account for the observed effects of attention on time perception. While in 
RTP the effects of attention are studied towards the stimuli (i.e., being aware or not 
of the stimuli to be processed) due to the participant not being aware of time itself; 
in PTP, the effect of attention is studied with regard to timing itself. The details of 
the studies on time perception and attention are explored later in this chapter. 
Nonetheless, it can already be noted that most of the studies exploring the effect of 
diverted attention on time perception lead to an underestimation of duration (e.g., 
Brown & Perreault, 2017; Osugi, Takeda, & Murakami, 2016). The current 
prominent model accounting for this relationship is the Attentional Gate Model 
(AGM), which postulates the existence of a gate between the pacemaker and the 
accumulator (Zakay & Block, 1995). The gate is a cognitive mechanism which 
opens according to the attention to time. The more attention is allocated, the wider 
the door is opened. Therefore, more pulses reach the accumulator and thus lengthen 
the perceived duration. Finally, the model includes a switch, allowing the opening 
or closing of the door. The switch operates in an ‘all-or-none’ design which allows 
the door to open at the beginning of a relevant interval, and to close at the end of it. 
There is one model that attempted to unify both RTP and PTP despite these 
two paradigms being systematically separated before, the Dual-Process 
Contingency Model (DPCM, Thomas & Weaver, 1975). In the DPCM, both time 
perception paradigms rely on time processing (i.e., comparison of perceived time 
and recorded duration in working memory) and information processing (i.e., 
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estimating time via perceived changes in the environment). The importance of such 
processes varies depending upon the paradigm (i.e., time processing will be more 
important in PTP, and inversely for information processing). This model is 
determined by nine postulates: (i) timing can be determined by a timer or by 
information (i.e., timer’s or cognitive models), both being integrated; (ii) the 
importance of each temporal source depends on the attentiveness towards it (e.g., if 
attention is focused on time, the timer will prevail); (iii) the timer produces pulses, 
and the duration is a function of the number of these; (iv) when the timer cannot be 
retrieved, the information processed during the duration will determine the 
perceived duration through contextual changes; (v) the timer can produce pulses at 
all times if attention is focuses on it; (vi) if not stored in long-term memory, the 
duration measured by the timer has to be retrieved immediately, or it will be set 
back to zero with a new interval; (vii) when the timer is used, and attention is 
brought to time, the estimation is prospective; (viii) as information can be processed 
at any time, it can be retrieved easily too, but its degree of attention will decrease 
with more non-temporal information processing; and (ix), in a retrospective design, 
attention is allocated to the memory-based processes. To date, the model has only 
been validated twice with very short duration that is inferior to the second in 
Thomas and Weaver’s (1975) research and between 12 and 15 seconds in research 
led by Zakay (1993). 
1.3. Measures of time perception 
Throughout the decades of experimental testing on time perception, a few 
tasks have been frequently used. They explore different facets of time perception 
and rely on different components of it. To facilitate understanding of the following 
sections of this chapter, these tasks are briefly described below. 
Estimation Task (ET): In this task, the participant has to process a stimulus 
(e.g., a video, an image, or a series of words) for a random duration. Once the 
stimulus has been displayed, the experimenter asks the participant how long the 
stimulus lasted. This type of task is particularly efficient for longer durations (i.e., 
several seconds or minutes), although participants tend to round up their estimation 
(i.e., 10s, 2min) and consequently, a precise duration should be chosen (e.g., 17s, 
168s).  
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Temporal Reproduction Task (TRT): This type of task is relatively similar 
to the ET. Here, the participant must process a stimulus for a random duration. 
However, when the stimulus is over, instead of having to estimate its duration, the 
participant is asked to reproduce it. The way the participant has to reproduce the 
duration can vary greatly. Many of the studies make the participant press a button 
for a duration judged as equal to the stimulus’. This type of task is particularly 
efficient for durations longer than one second, although it becomes harder to use in 
longer durations (e.g., several minutes).  
Temporal Production Task (TPT): In these tasks, participants are told a 
duration that they have to produce. The production process can either be as in the 
TRT (i.e., pressing a button), or performing a task for the requested duration. The 
testable duration under this paradigm varies depending on the production means 
used. For example, when the participant has to press a button, the experimenter is 
confronted with the same time limits as the TRT. However, when the participant 
has to perform a task, the duration can be longer (i.e., several minutes). 
Temporal Comparison Task (TCT): In this task, the participant is either 
presented with two stimuli or has to perform two subsequent tasks. The tasks and 
stimuli can present the same duration, or two different (close) durations. 
Afterwards, the participant has to decide which stimulus was longer. If the studies 
use stimuli, it is more suitable to test short durations (i.e., less than a second, or only 
a few seconds). As with TPT, if the participant has to perform two tasks, it can be 
of a longer duration. Nonetheless, since this method uses working memory, a 
duration that is too long can affect the memory of the first duration. 
Temporal Generalization Task (TGT): This kind of task is close to the TCT 
in its functioning. Instead of being presented with two successive stimuli and having 
to compare them, the participant first familiarises themselves with a given duration 
in a training block. Afterwards, the participant is presented with stimuli with 
random durations and must decide whether these durations are shorter or longer 
than the previously memorized duration. This method is neither suited for task 
performing nor for long durations and is usually preferred for durations either under 
a second or just a few seconds. 
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Temporal Bisection Task (TBT): In this task, the participant first familiarizes 
themselves with two different durations (i.e., called anchors) during a training 
block. Afterwards, the participant will be presented stimuli with random durations 
between these two anchors (i.e., never of the same duration as the anchors) and will 
have to decide to which anchor they are closer. These tasks are not suitable for long 
durations and are usually preferred for durations either shorter than one second or 
of a few seconds. 
1.4. General method 
An extensive literature research was conducted using four different 
databases accessed from Nottingham Trent University: Google Scholar, 
ScienceDirect, PubMed, and PsycINFO. All searches included a common set of 
search words (i.e., time perception, timing), and other words to specify the 
particular domain studied (i.e., emotion, cognition, attention, difficulty, memory, 
inhibition, executive functions). Studies were included if they: (i) dated from the 
year 1964 (as the first extensive model of time perception was published in 1963 
by Treisman), (ii) included an experimental design, (iii) included healthy 
participants, (iv) were published in English or French (the languages spoken by the 
co-authors), and (v) were peer-reviewed. 
The search undertaken on ScienceDirect, PubMed, and PsycINFO included 
the same type of research terms. The only difference was that ScienceDirect 
allowed searching research terms in the title, abstract, and paper keywords at the 
same time, while PubMed only allowed searches in the title and abstract, and 
PsycINFO only in the abstract. Using the words ‘time perception’ and ‘timing’ 
associated with the specific area sought (i.e., words describing either emotion or 
cognition) led to the following number of published papers. On ScienceDirect, there 
were 34 papers on emotion and 208 on cognition. On PubMed, there were 67 papers 
on emotion and 337 on cognition. On PsycINFO, there were 52 papers on emotion 
and 228 on cognition. Due to the inability to search terms only in the abstract or 
keywords on Google Scholar, the terms used were searched only in the titles. This 
led to 21 papers on emotion and 94 on cognition, leading to a total of 930 papers 
when the database searches were combined. After collating the results of the 
different databases to merge the duplicated papers, sorting the unrelated papers, and 
  
12 
adding new papers cited in the ones selected, the final number of selected papers 
was 86.  
 
1.5. Emotional interference 
After reading the papers selected in the literature search, four types of study 
related to emotional interference of time perception were emphasized: (i) studies 
exploring visual stimuli (i.e., pictures, videos; n=9); (ii) studies including social 
stimuli (i.e., faces or postures; n=13); (iii) studies using auditory stimuli (i.e., 
sounds and music; n=8); and (iv) studies exploring how the feeling of control, the 
unconscious effect of emotion, or the awareness of the emotional interference affect 
time perception (n=4).  
1.5.1. Visual stimuli 
Introduction 
Studies exploring emotional stimuli in a visual modality have yielded mixed results. 
Some of them indicated that watching an emotional picture or video led to an 
overestimation of their duration (e.g., Grommet et al., 2011; Grondin, Laflamme, 
& Gontier, 2014; Shi, Jia, & Müller, 2012), while other studies tended to find the 
opposite trend (e.g., Smith, McIver, Di Nella, & Crease, 2011; Tipples, 2010). 
These results can either be explained by an arousing or attentional effect. An 
arousing effect accelerates the pulses produced by the pacemaker, thus increasing 
the number of pulses in the accumulator and the perceived duration. This hypothesis 
would be verified by a multiplicative effect with duration (i.e., a stronger effect for 
longer duration), as the pacemaker would keep emitting more pulses during the 
whole duration. Alternatively, an attentional effect could lead to two outcomes. A 
first one is participants divert their attention from the task, and thus focus on the 
time it takes to open the attentional gate (i.e., AGM) and increase the number of 
pulses recorded. This hypothesis would then lead to an additive effect (i.e., not 
varying with the duration), with the gate opening only when the participants divert 
their attention from the task, as an isolated effect. The second possibility is 
participants orient their attention more actively toward the stimuli, the task itself, 
thus closing the attentional gate, and limiting the number of pulses recorded, leading 
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to an underestimation of the duration. A deeper analysis of these studies is required 
to achieve any conclusion regarding the underlying processes determining the 
interaction of emotion and time perception. Accordingly, the following section 
summarises the studies yielding a lengthening or shortening effect separately in 
order to allow a comparison of the stimuli and methods used. 
Lengthening effect 
 The literature on the lengthening effect of emotion is currently struggling to 
exhibit either an arousal or attentional interference on time perception. For example, 
while both Grommet et al. (2011) and Fayolle, Droit-Volet and Gil (2014) showed 
a lengthening effect it their studies, their conclusions differ concerning its cause. 
Using pictures depicting fear (e.g., bear, shark, or dogs) in a TBT (anchors either 
250-1000ms or 400-1600ms), Grommet and et al. (2011) showed that lengthening 
did not vary with the duration. Therefore, it would appear that the lengthening effect 
observed is due to an attentional effect (i.e., additive effect, or isolated effect). On 
the contrary, Fayolle et al. (2014), using fear-evoking videos rather than pictures, 
showed that the lengthening effect observed varied alongside the duration, contrary 
to Grommet et al.’s study (2011). Pointing out that pictures may only elicit a 
pinpoint emotional effect and thus prevent any multiplicative effect, Fayolle et al. 
(2014) asked their participants to perform a first TBT (anchors either 200-800ms or 
500-1600ms), then made them watch an emotional video, and then asked them to 
perform the same TBT. The participants overestimated the duration after watching 
the fear-evoking video, with an overestimation which was larger for the longer 
duration (i.e., 500-1600ms), supporting the arousal hypothesis.  
 Further supporting the arousal hypothesis, Gil and Droit-Volet (2012) 
explored the temporal estimation (i.e., within 200-800ms or 400-1600ms) of 
participants observing pictures extracted from the International Affective Picture 
System (IAPS, Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1999). The purpose of this research was 
to study the interaction between arousal, valence, and the type of emotion (i.e., 
disgust, sadness, and fear). High-arousing disgusting pictures were overestimated 
more than the low-arousing disgusting ones, both being overestimated compared to 
neutral pictures. Although there was only a significant difference between both 
types of sad pictures compared to neutral pictures, a trend was observed for the 
difference of estimation between the low- and high-arousing sad pictures. The 
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direct effect of arousal on the estimation is a testimony of the importance of 
arousing in time perception. Following the same assumption, Grondin et al. (2014) 
compared the effect of low-arousing disgusting pictures (i.e., disgusted faces) or 
high-arousing disgusting pictures (i.e., mutilation) on time perception. In the TCT 
used, the durations (i.e., 482ms vs. 400ms) were demarcated by two pictures either 
from the same category (i.e., neutral, mutilation, or disgusted face) or not. The 
results showed that the participants tended to overestimate the duration when one 
of the stimuli included a mutilation picture; the overestimation was increased when 
both the pictures depicted mutilation. Therefore, this study confirms the previous 
study by Gil and Droit-Volet (2012) and tends to support the arousal hypothesis.  
Shortening effect 
 To the best of the author’s knowledge, only four studies have reported a 
shortening effect when including visual emotional stimuli. The first study explored 
the joint effect of arousal (i.e., low- and high-arousing pictures) and valence (i.e., 
pleasant, unpleasant, and neutral) on time perception through an analog task (i.e., 
comparing two duration lengths by crossing a straight line) and a TRT (2s, 4s, and 
6s) (Angrilli, Cherubini, Pavese, & Mantredini, 1997). The results showed that the 
main effects of valence and arousal were not significant, but that their interaction 
was. When the pictures were highly arousing, the positive pictures were 
underestimated compared to the negative ones, with an opposite trend when the 
pictures were not as arousing. These results are of interest and could indicate the 
existence of two different mechanisms for the high and low arousing pictures. An 
approach-avoidance mechanism would be at stake for the highly arousing pictures. 
The participants would avoid the negative pictures and as a result overestimate their 
duration (i.e., due to their attention being used for time estimation). On the other 
hand, they would approach the positive ones, underestimating their duration (i.e., 
their attention to time being limited). With regards to the low-arousing pictures, it 
would instead be an attentional effect, as the more analysed negative pictures would 
be more underestimated than the less analysed positive pictures.  
Smith at al. (2011) replicated these results using a TBT (i.e., 100-300ms and 
400-1600ms), including pictures varying in term of arousal (i.e., high and low) and 
valence (i.e., positive, negative, and neutral). Interestingly, while the highly 
arousing negative pictures were globally underestimated in the shorter duration 
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(i.e., 100-300ms), the pictures underestimated in the longer duration (i.e., 400-
1600ms) were the low-arousing negative ones. Although there is an effect of 
valence, as the negative pictures were systematically underestimated, the effect of 
arousal is less clear due to its opposite effect depending on duration. Apparently, a 
long aversive stimulus would elicit a defensive system, the lengthening effect 
allowing the participant to explore the stimuli deeper to prepare a defensive 
response. On the contrary, a short aversive stimulus would elicit an attentional 
effect, the negative stimuli being processed faster for the same purpose than the 
longest ones. 
Instead of using pictures, Tipples (2010) included words varying in terms 
of arousal (i.e., high and low) and valence (i.e., positive, negative, neutral, and 
taboo) in the TBT used (i.e., 400-1600ms). Even though the words have been 
controlled for numerous variables (i.e., valence, arousal, imageability, personal use, 
offensiveness, ‘tabooness’, and familiarity), this study’s results should be taken 
cautiously due to the complexity of this type of stimuli compared to pictures. The 
study showed that taboo words were systematically underestimated compared to 
other types of words, indicating an attentional effect as these words would gather 
more attention than the other words, limiting the attentional focus on time.  
Only one study directly tried to explore whether the emotional interference 
observed in time perception was due to an attentional or arousal effect (Lui, Penney, 
& Schirmer, 2011). Their research piece included five experiments exploring 
potential confounding variables. The first experiment included a TCT with either 
negative or neutral pictures in which the participants first saw a baseline duration 
(i.e., 1200ms), then the picture, then another duration either shorter (i.e., 1040-
1200ms) or longer (i.e., 1280-1360ms). The results showed that negative pictures 
tended to be underestimated, which could be due to an attentional bliss (i.e., not 
noticing the onset of the second duration due to inattention). In order to eliminate 
this possibility, the second experiment used the same task with a longer delay 
between the picture and the second duration, replicating the first experiment’s 
results. The author’s third experiment aimed to explore the different effect of 
positive pictures on the participant’s time perception. First, it showed the same 
trend of results for previous experiments; second, their analyses showed that the 
effect was of the same magnitude as that for the negative pictures. The fourth 
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experiment replicated the previous results with musical tunes instead of visual ones. 
Finally, to ensure that it was the stimuli after the picture which was underestimated 
and not the previous ones being overestimated, a fifth study used only one duration 
after the picture was showed. In this experiment, a TRT (1100, 1700, 2300ms) was 
preferred to the previous TCT. The results showed that participants underestimated 
the duration of the negative stimuli, thus confirming the results of the previous 
experiments.  
Visual stimuli – conclusion 
 Despite the mixed results and the relative lack of studies, some similarities 
arose from these experiments. All of the research using pictures found a lengthening 
effect when exploring durations between 200 and 1600ms. Indeed, the studies 
demonstrating a shortening effect either used longer durations (i.e., between 2 and 
6 seconds; Angrilli et al., 1997) or found it in shorter durations (i.e., around 130ms; 
Smith et al., 2011). This overestimation effect appears to be due to increased 
arousal, even though only one study found a multiplicative effect (i.e., Fayolle et 
al., 2014). According to the same authors, the multiplicative effect was only 
achieved with long lasting emotion (i.e., mood change), the pictures in the other 
studies only achieving a punctual, brief change in emotion. Furthermore, studies 
showed that the most arousing pictures depicting the same emotion elicited a longer 
duration perception (Gil & Droit-Volet, 2012; Grondin et al., 2014).  
Regarding the shortening effect, the study by Angrilli et al. (1997) using a 
longer duration noted that two types of mechanisms were at stake depending on the 
level of arousal. In the high arousing pictures, the positive ones tended to be 
underestimated more than the negative ones, the opposite trend being observed for 
the low arousing pictures. Consequently, it appears that over two seconds, highly 
arousing pictures engage an approach-avoidance mechanism, while the low 
arousing ones engage an attentional mechanism. Finally, the study by Smith et al. 
(2011) showed an interesting interaction regarding duration, because the negative 
pictures were underestimated in very short durations (i.e., up to 130ms), contrasting 
with the overestimation for longer durations. Referring to Electroencephalography 
(EEG) studies, the authors suggested that the shortest duration effect would be due 
to the earliest stage of attention processing, with the stimuli recognized as 
‘threatening’ being processed faster to allow a swift reaction of the body. With 
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regards to the longer duration, in order to prepare the most adapted reaction, the 
neural system would permit a thorough analysis of the stimuli, consequently 
diverting attention from time, hence the overestimation. 
1.5.2. Emotional expressions 
The studies in this category mainly used pictures or animated pictures in 
order to examine participants’ temporal responses to varied emotional expressions. 
These studies could arguably be associated with the previous section on visual 
stimuli. Nevertheless, exploring the emotional expressions separately appears more 
appropriate due to their complex nature compared to the simple visual stimuli 
described in the previous section. Contrary to the previous section that yielded 
mixed findings, the studies examining emotional expressions all showed the same 
trend of results, that is, an overestimation of temporal duration when investigating 
emotion (e.g., Gil & Droit-Volet, 2011; Lee, Seelam, & O’Brien, 2011; Tipples, 
2011), especially when faces exhibited anger (e.g., Droit‐Volet, Brunot, & 
Niedenthal, 2004; Tipples, 2008). Due to the globally clear effect of emotional 
expressions on time perception, the following paragraphs will explore the variable 
affecting this association.  
Stimuli dynamism 
The first variable explored stimulus dynamism which would affect the 
association between facial expression and time perception. Most of the studies on 
the topic included static stimuli (i.e., pictures of an expressive face), while an 
individual will mostly encounter dynamic/mobile faces in real life. Despite this fact, 
only two studies explored the effect of these more ecologically valid stimuli on time 
perception. First, Fayolle and Droit-Volet (2014) explored how faces shifting from 
a neutral toward an emotional expression (i.e., anger and sadness) would affect the 
participants’ results on a TBT (i.e., 400-1600ms). The results showed that while 
only the angry emotion was overestimated in the static group, both emotions were 
overestimated in the dynamic group. In a second experiment similar to the first one 
(i.e., with only the removal of the neutral expressions), the authors showed that the 
angry faces were overestimated compared to the sad expression, despite the lack of 
difference in the participants’ estimation of these emotions’ arousal levels. Li and 
Yuen (2015) led a similar study which included dynamic (i.e., morphing from a 
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neutral expression) version of emotional expressions (i.e., neutral, happiness, 
sadness, and anger) in their TBT (i.e., 400-1600ms). Moreover, the authors included 
faces from both genders to control this effect. Despite the lack of a gender effect, 
there was a significant effect of dynamism. While the static emotion did not reach 
significance, the presentation duration of the pictures morphing from a neutral 
expression were overestimated, this effect being stronger for anger. To verify that 
the effect observed within the dynamic group was not solely due to morphing but a 
direct effect of emotion, Li and Yuen (2015) led another experiment where the 
stimuli morphed between two emotions rather than from a neutral expression. The 
results showed that only switching towards a happy or angry emotion lengthened 
the duration, thus excluding the sole effect of morphing in the previous experiment. 
Model’s gaze 
 The second variable explored in this section is gaze, which is known to 
affect the behaviour of an individual depending on its orientation (i.e., direct or 
averted). Doi and Shinohara (2009) observed how gaze (i.e., straight or averted) 
affects the effect of an emotional expression (i.e., happiness and anger) on a TBT 
(i.e., 600-1400ms). There was an interaction between the emotion and gaze where 
the presentation of an angry straight face was estimated as lasting longer than that 
of an angry diverted face, this result not being significant for the happy expression. 
Extending these results, Kliegl et al. (2015) included three different gazes (i.e., 0°, 
45°, and 90°), different emotions (i.e., anger, sadness, and neutral), and a systematic 
gender comparison (i.e., same or opposite gender between the participant and the 
stimulus) within a TBT (i.e., 400-1600ms). The results showed a main effect of 
emotion (i.e., only angry faces being overestimated) and a main effect of gender 
(i.e., females judging male faces to last longer and vice versa). Finally, as in the 
previous study, gaze influenced the estimation of angry faces (i.e., diminishing 
when the model was not facing the participant), with no effect for sad faces.  
Embodiment effect 
The embodiment effect is the unconscious imitation of an individual by 
another individual in front of them. This effect can influence cognition, even by 
simply asking participants to hold a pen in their mouth, which inhibits their facial 
expressions (Lobmaier & Fischer, 2015). Replicating this method, Effron et al. 
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(2006) explored how the embodiment effect influences the effect of facial 
expression (i.e., neutral, happiness, and anger) on a TBT (i.e., 400-1600ms). The 
results showed that when the facial expressions of the participants where inhibited, 
there was no difference between the different stimuli. However, the participants not 
holding a pen in their mouth overestimated the duration of angry and happy 
expressions. To explore how ethnicity may affect the embodiment effect, a study 
compared whether being confronted with another ethnic group than their own 
affects the participants’ processing of emotional faces and accordingly its impact 
on time perception (Mondillon, Niedenthal, Gil, & Droit-Volet, 2007). In a first 
experiment, Caucasian participants observed Chinese models, while the opposite 
order was used in the second experiment. Using a TBT (i.e., 400-1600ms) with both 
angry and neutral faces, the authors showed that the Caucasian participants only 
overestimated the duration when confronted with their own ethnicity. On the other 
hand, Chinese participants overestimated the presentation duration of angry faces 
with both ethnicities, which could, according to the author, be due to the Chinese 
participants being more familiar with Caucasian faces as the former lived in France.  
Participant’s age 
The final variable which may affect this relationship is the age of the 
participants since it has been shown that time perception differs between children 
(e.g., Droit-Volet, Clément, & Wearden, 2001; Droit-Volet, Delgado, & Rattat, 
2006) and elderly participants (e.g., Coelho et al., 2004; Ferreira, Paiva, Prando, 
Graça, & Kouyoumdjian, 2016). Especially, it has been noted that emotion affects 
these groups differently (e.g., Gil, Niedenthal, & Droit-Volet, 2007; Nicol, Tanner, 
& Clarke, 2013). Concerning the children, Gil et al. (2007) adopted a developmental 
exploration of the relation between time perception and expressions by comparing 
different age groups (i.e., three, five, and eight years old). Participants were asked 
to complete a TBT (i.e., 400-1600ms and 600-2400ms) including both neutral and 
angry expressions. There was no interaction between the emotional expression and 
age, only a main effect of emotion (i.e., angry faces overestimated), meaning that 
the effect of emotional expression does not differ between the children.  
Regarding elderly people (i.e., between 65 and 85 years old), it has been 
shown that they tend to focus more on positive emotions instead of negative ones 
(e.g., Coelho et al., 2004; Ferreira, Paiva, Prando, Graça, & Kouyoumdjian, 2016). 
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Since emotion can affect time perception, it was assumed that positive emotions 
interfere more among older participants, while negative emotions would have the 
same effect among younger participants (Nicol et al., 2013). In their study, Nicol et 
al. (2013) compared young participants (i.e., about 22.3 years) to older participants 
(i.e., 67.6 years) on a TBT (i.e., 400-1600ms) including emotional expression (i.e., 
anger, sadness, happiness, and neutral) as well as on the Positive and Negative 
Affect Scale (PANAS, Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). The results showed that 
the older participants had higher scores on positive affect and estimated the happy 
expression to last longer than the other ones. On the other hand, younger 
participants had higher scores for negative affect and judged the angry expressions 
to last longer. An unexplained result is the older participants estimating the sad 
expression to last longer than neutral expressions. More interestingly, the older 
participants estimated the happy expression to last longer than the young 
participants did, further supporting the effect of positivity. 
Emotional expression – conclusion  
In this section, four main variables were explored: dynamism (i.e., static vs. 
morphing faces), gaze (i.e., straight or diverted faces), embodiment (i.e., emotion 
mimicry), and age. First, dynamic expressions elicited a stronger effect of 
emotional interference than static expressions (Fayolle & Droit-Volet, 2014; Li & 
Yuen, 2015). Additionally, while Li and Yuen (2015) failed to find any effect of 
emotion using static faces, dynamic expressions still yielded significant results. 
Second, a straight gaze will lead to an overestimation of angry faces, and the effect 
will diminish, if not disappear, with a diverted gaze, pointing to a ‘fight-or-flight’ 
effect (Doi & Shinohara, 2009; Kliegl et al., 2015). If someone’s anger is not 
directed toward an individual but another person, they are not threatened and there 
is no need for the body to prepare for protection. Third, studies exploring the 
embodiment effect yielded two findings. The first one is that when holding a pen in 
one’s mouth, and thus being unable to mimic an emotional expression, the 
lengthening effect of both happy and angry emotions was nullified (Effron et al., 
2006). The second finding is that when participants observed someone from another 
unfamiliar ethnic group, the effects of emotional expressions were cancelled 
(Mondillon et al., 2007). Finally, the impact of age was explored among both 
children and elderly participants. Even though there was no difference between the 
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different children’s age groups in Gil et al.’ study (2007), no conclusion can be 
drawn on the difference between children and adults due to the absence of adults in 
this experiment. Regarding the elderly participants, they appeared to overestimate 
positive expressions compared to younger participants, which may be an effect of 
their overall positivity (Nicol et al., 2013).  
1.5.3. Auditory stimuli 
 Studies using auditory stimuli fall into two main types: experiments using 
basic sounds (i.e., tones) and experiments using music. The first type yields the 
same kind of results as simple visual stimuli (i.e., mixed and contradictory results) 
with half the studies exhibiting an overestimation of emotional stimuli (Droit-Volet, 
Mermillod, Cocenas-Silva, & Gil, 2010; Wackermann, Meissner, Tankersley, & 
Wittmann, 2014) and the other half showing the opposite (Fallow & Voyer, 2013; 
Noulhiane, Mella, Samson, Ragot, & Pouthas, 2007). With regards to musical 
studies, despite the varying results, these may be directly dependent on the 
experimental paradigm used. While RTP studies systematically exhibit an 
overestimation of duration (Bisson, Tobin, & Grondin, 2009; Bueno & Ramos, 
2007), PTP studies show incongruent results which require further research (Droit-
Volet, Bigand, Ramos, & Bueno, 2010; Droit-Volet, Ramos, Bueno, & Bigand, 
2013).  
Basic sound 
 Two studies exhibited an underestimation effect with these types of stimuli. 
First, Noulhiane et al. (2007) explored the impact of sounds varying in terms of 
arousal (i.e., high and low) and valence (i.e., pleasant and unpleasant – neutral) on 
their participants’ TRT (i.e., 2, 4, 6s) results. Both low-arousal sounds were 
underestimated compared to the neutral sound (only for 4 and 6s). In addition, 
within the shortest duration, the positive sounds were estimated to last shorter than 
the negative ones and the highly arousing sounds as shorter than the low arousing 
ones. Fallow and Voyer (2013) replicated these results by using the word ‘Bower’ 
pronounced either angrily or neutrally within a TBT (i.e., 260-440ms). Like the 
previous study, the emotional stimuli were underestimated compared to the neutral 
ones. 
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 As for the underestimation studies, two pieces of research observed an 
overestimation of duration with emotional stimuli. A first one included two 
experiments with aversive sounds (i.e., 50ms burst of 95 dB white noise) and non-
aversive sounds (i.e., 50ms beep of 50dB) in a TBT (i.e., 400-800ms, 800-1600ms). 
In the first experiment, the sounds followed the interval while they preceded it in 
the second experiment. Both designs elicited similar results (i.e., an 
underestimation effect), although this effect was stronger in the second experiment. 
This potentially indicates an expectation effect where the participants being stressed 
about the upcoming sound overestimated the duration. The second study compared 
positive sounds (e.g., boy laughing, erotic sounds), negative sounds (e.g., person 
vomiting, baby crying), and neutral sounds (e.g., animal noises, rain) within a TRT 
(i.e., 5s) (Wackermann et al., 2014). The positive sounds were systematically 
overestimated and the negative ones were only significantly overestimated when 
incorporating the first author’s own model of time perception (Wackermann & 
Ehm, 2006).  
Musical stimuli 
 The complexity of the musical stimuli (e.g., varying tempo, rhythm, tone) 
may account for the varying results observed in the PTP studies. Taking into 
account these variables, Droit-Volet, Bigand, Ramos, and Bueno (2010) used a 
single music piece solely varying in tone (i.e., major-positive, minor-negative, and 
sine wave-neutral) within their TBT (i.e., 500-1700ms and 2000-6800ms), allowing 
the control of the other aspects of the music extract. Both emotional pieces (i.e., 
major and minor) were underestimated compared to the neutral one (i.e., sine wave), 
with no difference between them. The authors led two extra experiments exploring 
other durations or the absence of neutral stimuli, not altering the results. Building 
up from the previous results on valence, the same authors explored the combined 
effect of arousal (i.e., varying tempo) and pleasantness (i.e., backward or forward 
music) on time perception (Droit-Volet et al., 2013). The first experiment using a 
TBT (i.e., 500-1700ms and 1100-4400ms) showed that the fast tempo stimuli were 
overestimated compared to the slower ones. The tempo also interacted with the 
pleasantness of the music as the tempo effect was stronger in the forward version 
than in the backward music. To confirm that the tempo effect was due to arousal, 
the authors led another experiment with four pieces of music sharing the same 
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tempo but varying in terms of arousal levels (i.e., simple or complex timbre) and 
pleasantness (i.e., forward or backward). The results indicated no effect of timbre 
on estimation, indicating that the previous results were not due to arousal (i.e., 
resulting from tempo only). Finally, since the structure of music is affected when 
played backward, the authors manipulated the pleasantness of the music excerpts 
by comparing tonal (i.e., pleasant) and atonal (i.e., unpleasant) music. In this study, 
the pleasant music was estimated as shorter than the unpleasant one.  
 The studies in an RTP design all show a lengthening effect of music on time 
perception. Bueno and Ramos (2007) compared consonant, pleasant music (i.e., 
Ionian and Aeolian music) to dissonant, unpleasant music (i.e., Locrian music) on 
a single ET measure (64.3s). The unpleasant excerpt was overestimated compared 
to the pleasant ones, which were both more accurately estimated by the participants. 
Bisson, Tobin, and Grondin (2009) replicated the previous study with longer 
duration (i.e., 180s, 300s, 420s) and music varying in terms of valence (i.e., joy, 
sadness, neutral). The participants had to compare the three durations between each 
other and to a standard duration as well as estimating them. Participants tended to 
judge the duration of the joyful song as longer than the sad one when comparing 
them (with no difference in terms of verbal estimation) and both emotional pieces 
were overestimated compared to the neutral one.  
Auditory stimuli – conclusion  
 The first thing to note from studies including auditory stimuli is the small 
number (n = 6) of them compared to the studies using visual stimuli (either pictures 
[n=9] or emotional expressions [n=13]). Therefore, any conclusions must be treated 
cautiously, as more studies are needed in this specific field. Regarding the studies 
using basic auditory stimuli, the results are mixed as half the studies showed that 
negative sounds were underestimated (Fallow & Voyer, 2013; Noulhiane et al., 
2007), while the two other studies showed the opposite effect (Droit-Volet, 
Mermillod, et al., 2010; Wackermann et al., 2014). It is noteworthy that the studies 
by Droit-Volet et al. (2010) used aversive sounds rather than actual emotional 
sounds, and these might explain the differing results. Besides, the fact that the 
durations were more overestimated when the aversive sound followed the interval 
indicates that the participants may have overestimated the duration due to their 
negative expectations.  
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With regards to musical influence on time perception, results demonstrate an 
overestimation effect in retrospective designs (Bisson et al., 2009; Bueno & Ramos, 
2007); less coherence is observed in prospective designs. This lack of clarity in PTP 
studies may simply be due to the way the authors modified the music to achieve 
emotional valence. Indeed, the studies in this section either changed the music mode 
(i.e., major, minor, and sine-wave; Droit-Volet, Bigand, et al., 2010) or tone (i.e., 
tonal or atonal; Droit-Volet et al., 2013). The main difference between these two 
methods was that the first one made the participants feel an emotion, to change their 
moods, while the second one made the music either pleasant, or unpleasant to hear. 
Consequently, it could be that actual emotionally charged music leads to an 
underestimation of temporal duration, whereas an unpleasant one leads to an 
overestimation effect. 
1.5.4. Control and consciousness 
 Two other processes stood out when analysing the papers extracted from the 
database search (i.e., perceived control of the situation and consciousness of the 
interference). First, it is a known fact that emotion can be processed unconsciously 
(i.e., Damjanovic, Meyer, & Sepulveda, 2017; Doi & Shinohara, 2016) and that 
RTP is unconscious. Despite these facts, only one study has explored the effect of 
unconscious emotion (i.e., neutral, positive, and negative pictures) processing on 
time perception (Yamada & Kawabe, 2011). In this study, half the participants 
performed a TRT (2700ms) in a masked condition (i.e., unconscious perception of 
the stimuli), while the other half performed the same task in an unmasked condition 
(i.e., conscious perception). Only the negative pictures led to a significant 
overestimation effect, the positive pictures not affecting the participants’ time 
perception. Furthermore, this overestimation remained significant in the masked 
condition, supporting an unconscious effect of emotion on time perception. 
 Interestingly, it appears that having knowledge about emotional interference 
on time perception may affect this same interference (Droit-Volet, Lamotte, & 
Izaute, 2015). In their study, the authors used a TBT (i.e., 400-1600ms) including 
emotional expressions (i.e., anger and neutral). Part of the participants did not 
receive any extra information, other participants were told the true effect of emotion 
(i.e., overestimation of time), and the last group received false information (i.e., 
underestimation of time). This study showed that only the false information and no 
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information groups exhibited an impaired time perception. In a second experiment 
the authors explored more emotions (i.e., anger, disgust, shame, and neutral) and 
either told the participants no information, or false information (i.e., low-arousing 
pictures leading to overestimation), not including a true information group. The 
only significant effect was observed with angry faces where there was a significant 
interaction between the group and emotion. This interaction showed that there was 
a lengthening effect in the group without information, while there was no effect in 
the group given false information. These results suggest that participants can 
partially control the interference caused by emotion because the interference 
disappeared once they were informed of its existence.  
Other studies explored how individuals can control emotional interference 
on time perception through the perceived control one has over the situation itself. 
Buetti and Lleras (2012) compared arachnophobes and non-arachnophobes in five 
experiments which included pictures varying in terms of arousal (i.e., low- and 
high-arousal) and valence (i.e., positive and negative), as well as spider pictures. 
All the experiments included a TBT (i.e., 400-1600ms) and showed that the spider 
pictures were judged as more arousing and negative than the highly arousing 
negative pictures (i.e., for the arachnophobes). In the first experiments, non-
arachnophobes saw 75% negative pictures, diminishing their perceived control over 
the situation. This showed an interaction between valence and arousal, high-
arousing negative pictures being overestimated compared to positive ones and the 
opposite effect for low-arousing pictures. The second study replicated the previous 
results with arachnophobes; the more phobic the participant was, the longer were 
the spider pictures’ durations estimated. The authors started manipulating perceived 
control in the third experiment where the participants were told that by pressing a 
button, more positive pictures would appear. On top of this, the proportion of 
negative pictures dropped to 25%, which increased the participant’s perceived 
control. The results showed no significant effect of the negative pictures, spider 
pictures included. In the fourth study, the proportion of negative pictures remained 
at 25% to the exception that participants were not told that pressing a button would 
change the proportion of pictures, diminishing their perceived control. The results 
showed that negative pictures were overestimated, showing that the lack of 
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significance in the third study was not solely due to the diminished proportion of 
negative pictures.  
 Similar to the previous study, Mereu and Lleras (2013) manipulated their 
participants’ perceived control over the appearance of negative pictures while 
performing a TBT (i.e., 400-1600ms). The participants were split between three 
groups: (i) 75% of positive pictures who were deceptively told that their action was 
impacting the next picture’s valence; (ii) the opposite percentage with the same 
false information given; and (iii) 75% of positive pictures without being deceived. 
The latter group showed lower perceived control, which did not vary between the 
two other groups. Concerning time perception, only the group with 25% positive 
pictures and the not-deceived group with 75% positive pictures overestimated the 
duration of negative pictures. Although the difference between the 75% and 25% 
group could be explained through the sole proportion of pictures, the difference 
between the two “75%” groups can only be explained through the perceived control 
effect. 
1.6. Time perception and cognition 
In relation to the associations between cognition and time perception, 52 
papers were identified. These studies explore numerous facets of cognition both in 
retrospective and prospective designs, the second paradigm being more prominent. 
For clarity’s sake, these studies will be separated into six different sub-headings in 
this section: (i) coding simplicity (n=10), (ii) cognitive load (n=14 papers), (iii) 
attention (n=9), (iv) executive functions (n=7), and (v) ageing (n=12). The areas of 
coding simplicity, cognitive load, and ageing are sub-divided into further sub-
sections.  
1.6.1. Coding simplicity 
 Coding simplicity refers to the ‘Storage Size’ hypothesis which states that 
time perception relies on the number of items stored in memory, their complexity, 
and how they are coded (Ornstein, 1969). Since Ornstein published his experiments, 
several authors have tried to replicate his results, extend them, or challenge them 
(e.g., Bi, Yuan, & Huang, 2013; Block, 1974). These studies showed that while in 
RTP, the number of stimuli and their complexity lead to an overestimation of 
temporal duration (Block, 1974; Vitulli & Shepard, 1996), the results from PTP 
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studies being less consistent (e.g., underestimation effect, Bi et al., 2013; 
Overestimation effect, Macar, 1996). 
In PTP, Macar (1996) first explored the complexity (i.e., words or strings of 
“X”) and periodicity (i.e., appearing periodically or aperiodically) of the stimuli and 
also explored the effect of quantity (i.e., 12, 18, or 36 stimuli) in a TRT (i.e., 18s). 
The participants either watched the strings of “X” passively, counted the words 
ending in ‘e’, counted the animal words, or counted both kinds of words. A control 
series with a straight line was created (i.e., simply observing a straight line for the 
whole task). There was no significant difference between the straight lines or X-
letter conditions, all the other conditions being underestimated compared to these 
two (i.e., the animal condition being judged the shortest). While aperiodicity 
significantly reduced the perceived duration of the series, the number of stimuli 
lengthened it (only significantly between the 12- and 18-word conditions). Even 
though this appears to fit Ornstein’s theory, and the results found in RTP, the 
opposite trend of results was found by Bi, Yuan, and Huang (2013). In this study, 
the participants were asked to perform a memory task (i.e., set of stimuli of 2, 4, or 
6 items) and a TRT (i.e., 2500ms). The results showed that when the set of stimuli 
included 4 or 6 items (i.e., compared to 2), the participants tended to underestimate 
duration which directly contradicts the previous results.  
On the same topic, Fortin et al. (1993) carried out a series of experiments 
on the association between working memory and time perception, showing that the 
number of stimuli was positively associated with the temporal estimation. In their 
first paper, participants had to decide whether a probe was presented in a previous 
set of images or not while producing regular 2-second intervals (Fortin, Rousseau, 
Bourque, & Kirouac, 1993). The participants produced shorter intervals (i.e., 
overestimation of time) when more items were included in the first set of pictures. 
These results were replicated when the participants had to find a previously 
introduced picture in a set of random pictures only if the picture was not part of the 
new set. In a further piece of research, Fortin and Rousseau (1998) reproduced the 
previous results with a TRT (i.e., 1600ms, 2000ms, and 2400ms). In this 
experiment, participants saw a set of stimuli, were presented an interval, and then 
saw another stimulus (i.e., either part of the previous set or not). The participants 
then had to wait for the same duration as the interval to decide whether the word 
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was previously presented or not. Although this study showed that the more stimuli, 
the longest the estimation, their second experiments showed the opposite results 
when the stimulus appeared within the interval to be measured. A final paper 
replicated the previous study’s results with more durations (i.e., 1850ms, 2150ms, 
3700ms, 4300ms, 5550ms, and 6450ms) (Fortin & Couture, 2002). 
Stimuli complexity 
 Regarding complexity, Ornstein (1969) postulated that more complex 
stimuli would take more space in the storage and as a consequence would lengthen 
the duration. In his second experiment, participants evaluated figures varying in the 
number of interior angles and compared the duration of two different figures (i.e., 
both lasting 30s). Only the presentation duration of the simplest figure was 
underestimated compared to the most complex ones, the difference being non-
significant between all the other figures. In conclusion, the hypothesis on the 
complexity of the figure itself was only partially supported.  
Block (1974) tried to replicate these results in his second experiment where 
participants listened to three segments (i.e., music for 200s, blank for 160s, and 
music for 140s) while observing slides with four words (i.e., either of the same 
category or from different ones – coding complexity). When participants compared 
the second duration to the first, the group who observed the complex slides 
estimated the time as longer than the participants processing the simpler slides. 
However, Block (1978) failed to replicate these results in another experiment where 
the participants had to process either a complex (i.e., irregular black block 
distribution) or simple (i.e., regular distribution) stimuli pattern and compare their 
duration. This would indicate that for complexity to affect RTP, the level of 
processing would need to be higher than a figure structure.  
Coding complexity 
 Ornstein (1969) postulated that the more complex the coding of a stimulus 
would be, the longer its duration would be estimated. The author supported this 
hypothesis by making participants listen to either simply coded stimuli (i.e., each 
sound repeated 20 times before passing onto the next one) or complexly coded 
stimuli (i.e., all the sounds repeated 20 times but placed randomly) for five minutes. 
The participants judged the presentation of the complexly coded stimuli as lasting 
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longer than the other tape. These results were replicated in Ornstein’s other 
experiment (1969) in which participants observed a series of curves which could 
either be placed randomly (i.e., complex), structured in a random shape (i.e., 
moderately complex), or form the word ‘man’ (i.e., easy). The easier configurations 
of the curves were estimated as shorter, results which were replicated in the last 
study led by Ornstein (1969) where he replaced the random shape with an insect 
shape. Similarly, Block (1978) exposed his participants to series of black and white 
figures either coded in a predictable pattern (i.e., a black block going through a 
white line) or unpredictable one (i.e., random pattern). The less complex coding 
(i.e., predictable pattern) was judged as shorter than the other one, supporting 
Ornstein’s theory.  
Coding simplicity – conclusion  
In this section, coding simplicity was divided into three main sections 
(quantity, stimulus complexity, and coding complexity). Duration estimation in 
RTP is a direct positive function of the number of stimuli (Block, 1974; Ornstein, 
1969). These results are not as consistent in studies exploring PTP, as one study 
showed that the time estimation increased with the number of stimuli as in RTP 
(Macar, 1996), while another showed the opposite results (Bi et al., 2013). This 
difference could be due to the method used, Macar (1996) using a TCT while Bi et 
al. (2013) used a TPT. This hypothesis is supported by Fortin et al.’ studies showing 
that when the memory set size of working memory tasks increased, time perception 
lengthened (Fortin & Couture, 2002; Fortin & Rousseau, 1998; Fortin et al., 1993). 
When TCT relies on working memory (i.e., participants comparing a new duration 
to a stocked one), it appears logical that the number of stimuli lengthened the 
duration as in Macar’s study (1996). On the contrary, since TPT does not rely on 
working memory, it would explain the lack of significant results in Bi et al.’s (2013) 
paper.  
The results varied for the stimulus complexity as well with either an 
overestimation for complex stimuli (Block, 1974), partial results (i.e., 
underestimation of one condition; Ornstein, 1969), or no results (i.e., Block 1978). 
These differences of results could be due to words in Block’s (1974) study requiring 
more resources than the figures in the two other studies. Finally, it appears that a 
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higher complexity of the stimuli’s coding leads to an overestimation of duration in 
RTP (Block, 1978b; Ornstein, 1969).  
1.6.2. Cognitive load  
 Studies exploring the impact of varying cognitive load on time perception 
have used two principal methods to manipulate the difficulty of the experiment. The 
first one asks participants to perform different tasks with different levels of 
cognitive requirement (e.g., either reading or memorizing words), while the second 
uses the same task with different levels of processing (e.g., multiplying 2 and 6, or 
24 and 6). Both these experimental methods appear to show similar results, i.e., an 
underestimation of time perception (e.g., Baldauf, Burgard, & Wittmann, 2009; 
Marshall & Wilsoncroft, 1989).  
Variation of the task 
 Words are stimuli of choice when one wants to create several tasks using 
the same stimuli (e.g., observing the words, count the letters, memorize the words). 
For example, McClain (1983) asked his participants to either rewrite words (i.e., 
15, 30, 45 items), semantically encode these, or to do both these task for 120s. 
Afterwards, they were asked to estimate this duration either prospectively or 
retrospectively. There was a significant interaction between the type of task and 
number of words in the PTP, while no significant effect was observed in the RTP. 
This interaction shows that the number of words was negatively associated with the 
estimation when participants had to encode the words and positively when they had 
to rewrite them. This extends the previous section’s conclusion, as the level of 
processing directly affected the number of items’ effect on time perception. In 
another study, participants were asked to either read words, perform a naming task, 
or to provide synonyms for 14 seconds before reproducing this duration 
prospectively (Zakay, Nitzan, & Glicksohn, 1983). The participants underestimated 
the duration when the task was more complex (i.e., synonym). Using numbers 
rather than words, Burnside (1971) made participants either perform multiplication, 
addition, or reading for varying durations (i.e., 10s, 12s, 14s, 16s, 18s, and 20s). 
Participants underestimated the duration of the arithmetic conditions compared to 
the reading one.  
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The other way to manipulate the level of processing that does not control 
the stimuli is to include different tasks. In a first study, participants were asked to 
perform an experiment varying in terms of complexity (i.e., only a TPT, TPT and 
tracking task, listening to the radio, observing and counting the movement of a 
stimulus, arithmetic problems, and long-term memory questioning). The results 
showed that the accuracy of the production significantly decreased as the cognitive 
demand of the task increased. In another study by Wilsoncroft and Stone (1975), 
participants were asked to perform a first task (i.e., mirror-drawing, simple 
arithmetic, or reading) for varying durations (i.e., 12s, 14s, 16s, 18s, or 20s). After 
a sound, they were asked to perform either the same task or another one for a 
duration they estimated as the same as the first task. When the arithmetic task was 
first, it was underestimated and in contrast, it was overestimated if it was the second 
task (no other comparison reached significance). More recently, Marshall and 
Wilsoncroft (1989) explored the effect of timing strategy within three different 
temporal tasks (i.e., TPT, TRT, and ET) with the same duration of 30 seconds. 
Participants performed four tasks: listening to two sounds delimiting an interval, 
trying to tap regularly during the same interval (i.e., counting strategy), reporting 
the hue of dots, or performing a Stroop task. The counting strategy only improved 
the ET accuracy. Also, the Stroop and colour tasks were underestimated in 
comparison to the simple task in all the temporal tasks, and shorter than the strategy 
task in the TPT. 
Variation of the difficulty 
 In this section, the different studies varying the difficulty of their tasks will 
be separated based on their temporal task (i.e., TPT, TRT, and ET), the two RTP 
studies being explored separately. Irrespectively of the method, it has been observed 
that an interval is systematically underestimated with higher complexity utilizing a 
prospective paradigm (e.g., Brown & Smith-Petersen, 2014; Zakay, 1998), while 
only one of the RTP studies showed similar results (Hicks, Miller, & Kinsbourne, 
1976). 
Temporal Production Task 
Baldauf et al. (2009) asked their participants to drive in a virtual 
environment with three difficulty settings (i.e., easy, medium, hard) while 
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producing regular intervals (i.e., 17s). This study showed that the participants 
underestimated time in the hard setting, but overestimated it in the medium and easy 
ones. The two following studies led by Brown (1997, 2000) explored a bidirectional 
interference effect between a temporal and non-temporal task. In this kind of design, 
both tasks were performed alone first and then altogether (i.e., dual-task setting) by 
the participants. In the first experiment by Brown (1997), the participants performed 
a TPT (i.e., 2 and 5s) and a Pursuit Rotor Tracking (i.e., difficulty based on the 
speed of the item to track). The results showed that the variation of the production 
was higher in the dual-task paradigm, with no difference between the two levels of 
difficulty. In Brown’s second experiment, participants were asked to find a specific 
letter among distractors either looking like the letter (i.e., hard setting – e.g., X and 
K) or looking different (i.e., easy setting – e.g., X and O). The participants 
underestimated the duration in the dual task setting, and the underestimation was 
stronger in the hard setting. Finally, the last experiment within this study replicated 
the results with subtraction problems, with a bidirectional interference (i.e., lower 
performance in the subtraction task). In their later study, Brown and Merchant 
(2007) replicated the same results by using a Sequence-Reasoning task (e.g., A 
follows B) varying in difficulty (i.e., either positive or negative sentences). 
Although there was no effect of difficulty, the participants had diminished 
performance on the sequencing task when in the dual-task paradigm (i.e., 
bidirectional interference). In this study’s second experiment, the participants were 
asked to observe stimuli evolving in a logical order (i.e., 1A, 2B, 3C) and press a 
button if one of these did not fit. In the easy setting, participants only observed the 
letter, observing both stimuli in the hard setting. Only the hard task led the 
participant to underestimate the duration and a bidirectional interference. 
Temporal Reproduction Task 
 In the following two studies, the participants first performed a task for a 
specific duration and were asked to press a button for the same estimated duration. 
In the first study (Wilsoncroft, Stone, & Bagrash, 1978), participants performed 
arithmetic problems including numbers with either one or two digits varying in 
difficulty (i.e., numbers between 2 and 5 or 6 and 9) for varying durations (i.e., 8s, 
12s, 16s, and 20s). Both single digit arithmetic tasks were underestimated, the easy 
version being the most underestimated. The other task using TRT included a 
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temporal order task (i.e., stimuli order of appearance) with 10, 15, and 20 words 
(14s, 21s, and 28s, respectively). Moreover, participants either only observed the 
words or were asked to do oral arithmetic at the same time (i.e., either subtracting 
3 or 7 from digits). A bidirectional interference between the temporal order task and 
the TRT was observed, with participants being less accurate in both tasks in the 
dual-task setting. 
Retrospective Time Perception 
 Both studies in this section explored PTP as well as RTP, the PTP sections 
showing the same results as before. In the first study by Hicks, Miller, and 
Kinsbourne (1976), participants were asked to sort cards (for 42s) by either piling 
them into one deck, two decks based on their colour, or four decks based on the 
colour and shape. When asked to estimate the duration, there was no difference 
between the three conditions in RTP. The results in the PTP were significant, the 
participants underestimating the duration when the task was more complex, results 
replicated in another study (Hicks, Miller, Gaes, & Bierman, 1977). In the second 
study (Brown, 1985), participants were asked to either observe a figure, follow its 
line with their finger, or follow its line through a mirror. Participants were asked to 
both reproduce and estimate the durations (i.e., 16 and 32s). The author did not 
separate PTP and RTP in his analysis and showed that participants underestimated 
the 32-second duration when following the line (both conditions).  
Cognitive load – conclusion  
 This section separately evaluated studies varying the task and the studies 
manipulating same task difficulty. The first experimental designs yielded consistent 
results, which was a clear underestimation of the duration in the PTP design when 
the task required deeper processing levels (e.g., Marmaras, Vassilakis, & Dounias, 
1995; Wilsoncroft & Stone, 1975; Zakay et al., 1983). The only study using this 
method under the RTP design found no effect (Mcclain, 1983). Studies 
manipulating the difficulty of the task in PTP showed that the participants 
systematically underestimated durations when performing a concurrent non-
temporal task (Baldauf et al., 2009; Brown, 1997; Wilsoncroft et al., 1978). In RTP, 
the results were inconclusive, as the only study showing a significant 
underestimation did not analyse RTP and PTP separately (Brown, 1985). Finally, 
  
34 
three studies yielded bidirectional interference, meaning that both the temporal and 
non-temporal tasks were affected by the dual-task design. These experiments 
showed that time perception via a PTP design share the same attentional pool as the 
processes for both sequence reasoning and monitoring (Brown & Merchant, 2007) 
and arithmetic problems (Brown, 1997; Brown & Smith-Petersen, 2014). 
1.6.3. Attention 
 Attention plays a crucial role in time perception, even if it is hypothesized 
that it affects RTP and PTP in an opposite way. In RTP, a task requiring more 
attention would lead to overestimation due to the larger number of events happening 
within the interval, while in PTP, attention will be diverted from time (i.e., 
underestimation effect). Studies exploring the effect of attention on time perception 
can be classified into studies using a dual-(multi)task design (conscious attention 
allocation), and studies cuing the stimuli (i.e., spatial and transient attention). 
Despite the discrepancies, the main finding was that in PTP, the duration appears 
to be underestimated when attention is diverted from time perception. Concerning 
RTP, only one study fits this descriptor, and for this reason nothing definitive can 
be concluded, even though the study showed that with more required attention, 
participants were less precise in their estimation (Brown, 1985). 
To measure the impact of attention on PTP, experimenters need to divert 
participants’ attention from time itself, mostly by making them perform another 
non-temporal task. In their study, Burle and Casini (2001) explored a dual-task 
paradigm and its interaction with activation levels (i.e., hearing clicks in an intense 
or slow rhythm). The participants were asked to produce a regular interval (i.e., 
1100ms) either alone or while performing a reaction time task. In the dual-task 
paradigm, the participants overestimated the duration, with no interaction with the 
activation levels. While this study used a non-temporal concurrent task to divert the 
participant’s attention, Brown and West (1990) explored how two concurrent 
temporal tasks would interfere with each other. The participants were asked to 
observe either one, two, three, or four stimuli simultaneously with either short 
durations (i.e., 6, 8, and 10s) or long ones (i.e., 12, 14, and 16s). After observing 
the stimuli, the participants were asked to reproduce one of the durations observed. 
The experiment showed that the more stimuli the participants were asked to attend 
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to, the more errors there were in their time judgment. The authors further replicated 
these results using a TPT instead of a TRT with the same method and durations.  
Basing their thoughts on these results, several authors explored whether 
individuals could consciously direct their attention away from time. For example, 
in a study by Kladopoulos, Hemmes, and Brown (2004), participants either only 
performed an ET (i.e., 40 and 60s), an ET while reading words, or an ET and a 
memory task. This showed the classical underestimation when the participants also 
performed a memory task in spite of not showing any difference when reading the 
words. In their second experiments, in addition to making the participants perform 
both the memory task and the ET, the authors asked the participants to focus solely 
on the ET, the memory task, or on both equally. The results showed that the 
participants overestimated the duration when focusing on the ET compared to the 
two other conditions. Using a similar design, Macar, Grondin, and Casini (1994) 
made their participant perform both a word categorization task (i.e., words 
distributed either periodically or aperiodically) and a TRT (i.e., 12 and 18s). 
Besides, participants were asked to focus on the non-temporal task at 100%, 75%, 
50%, 25%, or 0%, and to focus on the TRT for the remaining percentage. The more 
attention was directed to the categorization task, the more error there was in the 
TRT and the less error there was in the categorization task, results which were 
replicated in two other experiments using a discrimination task. In another study, 
participants were asked to observe a Light Emitting Diode (LED) and judge its 
duration and intensity variation while distributing their attention between the tasks 
in the same way as the previous study (Casini & Macar, 1997). For the duration, 
participants were asked to decide whether the light lasted 2.5s or 3.5s. Regarding 
the intensity variation, the LED was either getting brighter toward the beginning or 
the end of the interval, the participant having to decide if the change in luminosity 
was important or not. Participants underestimated the duration when they focused 
on the light intensity or when the increment occurred at the end of the interval.  
Another way of testing the attentional effect is the use of cues, exploring the 
attention orientation. In these cases, participants received a cue with regards to the 
following stimulus (e.g., its duration, location, and modality), which helps them to 
focus on the stimulus because they were prepared. For example, Mattes and Ulrich 
(1998) cued the upcoming type of stimulus (i.e., auditory or visual) to their 
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participants, the cue being either right or wrong. Participants tended to overestimate 
the duration when the cue was right. In their following experiment, the authors cued 
the position of the stimuli rather than their modality, replicating the previous results. 
Osugi, Takeda, and Murakami (2016) replicated these results in their own study. 
Finally, this cueing effect has been explored within transient attention (i.e., attention 
driven by sudden change in the visual field) which operates in very short duration 
(i.e., around 100ms) by Yeshurun and Marom (2008). Two discs (i.e., lasting 
between 23 and 94ms) appeared in front of the participants, one of them being cued 
about where and when it would appear, while the other one was only cued about 
when it would appear. The results showed that the disk cued on its location was 
perceived as lasting longer than the other disk (i.e., only for duration shorter than 
94ms). These results fit the activation of transient attention (i.e., around 100ms), 
especially because the author replicated these results with longer durations (i.e., 
23ms to 165ms), showing that it remained significant up to 118ms only.  
Attention – conclusion 
 As stated earlier, studies exploring how attention can affect time perception 
fall into three types: studies using a simple dual-task design, studies asking 
participants to distribute their attention consciously, and studies using cues to direct 
the participants’ attention. The simple dual-task studies all showed similar results, 
an underestimation when participants performed a non-temporal task while 
estimating a duration (Burle & Casini, 2001; Chinchanachokchai, Duff, & Sar, 
2015; Kladopoulos et al., 2004). Similarly, Brown (1990) showed that when 
performing two concurrent temporal tasks, participants were less accurate and 
underestimated the duration. Regarding endogenous attention, several authors 
showed that when participantsconsciously diverted their attention from time, they 
underestimated the duration (Casini & Macar, 1997; Kladopoulos et al., 2004; 
Macar et al., 1994). Finally, the studies exploring exogenous attention (i.e., 
uncontrolled diversion of the attention from time through cuing on a non-temporal 
stimulus) showed that stimuli that were cued were perceived as longer in 
presentation duration than uncued stimuli, (Mattes & Ulrich, 1998; Osugi et al., 
2016). In addition, Yeshurun and Marom (2008) showed that time perception can 
be influenced in the earliest stage of cognition based on the significant effect of 
transience on time perception.  
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1.6.4. Executive functions 
 Although the following studies manipulated the effect of cognitive load on 
time perception too, they were separated from the previous section due to the 
specific exploration of executive functions. These studies exhibited a bidirectional 
interference between time perception and executive functions, indicating the use of 
the same attentional pool (i.e., time perception as an executive function). The 
following studies based their research on two pre-existing models of executive 
functions (i.e., Baddeley’s working memory model and Miyake’s executive 
function model). Miyake’s (2000) model of executive functions includes three main 
components: (i) shifting (i.e., the ability to switch between two different tasks), 
updating (i.e., the ability to replace outdated information by new useful 
information), and inhibition (i.e., the ability to retain a response, to stop a 
behaviour). Baddeley’s (1992) model of working memory includes three main 
components: (i) the Central Executive (i.e., supervising and coordinating the two 
following components and managing cognitive skills), (ii) the visuospatial 
sketchpad (i.e., stores visuospatial information and processes it), (iii) the 
phonological loop (i.e., constituted of the phonological store and articulatory 
control process, handles auditory and written stimuli). 
Despite the two following studies not mentioning Miyake model’s in their 
manuscript, they can be associate to this model based on their exploration of 
inhibition which is included in it. In Brown and Perreault’s (2017) study, 
participants performed a Go/NoGo task (i.e., pressing a button in front of a specific 
stimulus, but not in front of another) with two levels of difficulty (i.e., either 75% 
of NoGo trials or 25%) and a TPT (i.e., regular 5s intervals). The participants were 
asked to perform all the tasks individually, as well as the TPT and Go/NoGo (with 
both levels of difficulty) in a dual-task setting. The study showed a bidirectional 
interference with the participants underestimating time in the TPT and having a 
slower reaction time (RT) and lower sensitivity in the Go/NoGo task. The second 
study on inhibition explored it among children (Meaux & Chelonis, 2003) with both 
a TRT (i.e., 3s, 6s, 12s, and 24s) and the Conners’ Continuous Performance Task 
(i.e., inhibition measure; Conners, 1995). Besides, the participants’ parents filled in 
a questionnaire on their children’s time perception and organisation of behaviour in 
relation to time (i.e., the Conners ADHD/DSM IV Scale, Conners, Sitarenios, 
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Parker, & Epstein, 1998). The results showed that both the questionnaire and the 
measure of inhibition negatively correlated with time perception, indicating that 
these two variables are associated among children. Nevertheless, this was not an 
indication of a bidirectional interference like the previous study, as it was not set in 
a dual-task design. Another study indirectly associated with Miyake’s (2000) model 
explored the interaction between time perception and shifting (Fortin, Schweickert, 
Gaudreault, & Viau-Quesnel, 2010). In their study, participants had to undergo a 
task-switching task simultaneously with a TPT (i.e., 2s). The authors found no 
difference in time perception between the switching and non-switching trials and 
reproduced these results in two other experiments varying the interval between the 
stimuli or type of trials present within a block. 
The only study exploring the entirety of Miyake’s model (i.e., the three 
components) was split into three different experiments exploring a single 
component along a TPT (i.e., 5s) (Brown, Collier, & Night, 2013). The participants 
performed both tasks alone, then simultaneously, by either focusing on both or one 
of them. The focus of their first experiment was the shifting component, the authors 
showing that the participants underestimated time and that the RTs in the shifting 
task were higher in the dual-task setting, indicating a bidirectional interference. In 
the experiment on the updating component, the previous results on shifting were 
replicated with the Mental Counters Task (Larson, Merritt, & Williams, 1988). 
Nonetheless, the interference on the updating only occurred when the participants 
solely focused on the TPT. Finally, the last experiment exploring inhibition (i.e., 
through a Stroop task) showed the same results as the shifting study, that is, a 
bidirectional interference with time perception. 
 Only one study has explored Baddeley’s model (Baddeley, 1992) by using 
a single task investigating the central executive component (i.e., a random number 
generation task; Brown, 2006) coupled with a TPT (i.e., 5s). The participants were 
asked to perform both tasks alone before performing them in a dual-task setting, 
showing the same trend of results as for Miyake’s model, that is, a bidirectional 
interference. Basically, the participants underestimated time and produced more 
redundant and less random numbers in the dual-task. The two following studies 
exploring Baddeley’s model incorporated Miyake’s model to reach a deeper 
understanding of executive functions.  
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The first study (Ogden, Wearden, Gallagher, & Montgomery, 2011) 
included a TPT (i.e., 2s) plus the four following tasks exploring executive functions: 
(i) the Random Letter Generation (i.e., RLG, exploring the central executive 
component in Baddeley’s model), (ii) the Serial Subtraction of Sevens (i.e., SSS, 
measuring the updating component in Miyake’s model), (iii) the Controlled Oral 
Word Association (i.e., COWA, testing access to semantic memory), and (iv) the 
Plus-Minus Task (i.e., PMT, testing the shifting component from Miyake’s model). 
Among the previous tasks, only the RLG did not affect the time perception of the 
participants (only a higher variability of the production was observed) which 
contradicts Brown’s (2006) study. Concerning the non-temporal tasks, only the 
RLG and SSS were affected by the dual-task setting, indicating that solely the 
updating component exhibited bidirectional interference. The previous authors led 
further studies exploring the difference in interaction between different temporal 
tasks (i.e., TGT – 100 to 700ms, TRT – 400, 600, 800, and 1000ms, and ET – 77, 
358, 582, 767, 958, and 1183ms) and executive functions (Ogden, Wearden, & 
Montgomery, 2014). The executive functions explored were shifting (i.e., Number-
Letter Task), the central executive (i.e., Random Letter Generation), access (i.e., 
Chicago Word Fluency Test), and working memory (i.e., Computation Span). 
Compared to the previous studies, this one explored the interaction through a 
correlational approach rather than a dual-task setting due to the numerous tasks (i.e., 
7 tasks). There was a positive correlation between the correct responses in TGT and 
both updating and access measures as well as between reproduction accuracy and 
shifting. There were also negative correlations between the variability of the 
reproduction and both updating and access measures. After comparing the high and 
low scores in access and updating, all the participants in the high group performed 
better in TGT. Regarding ET, only the group with higher scores in the access task 
performed better. As for TRT, none of the groups performed better on this task. 
Executive functions – conclusion 
 The studies exploring executive functions based their theories on either the 
Miyake and/or Baddeley model. With regards to Miyake’s model, the two studies 
exploring the interaction between inhibition and time perception appear to indicate 
a bidirectional interference, one of these studies only showing a correlation (Brown 
& Perreault, 2017; Meaux & Chelonis, 2005). Even though Fortin (2010) failed to 
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find any effect of a shifting task on TPT, Brown (2013) studied the entirety of 
Miyake’s model’s effect on time perception, every participant having to produce a 
regular interval while performing either a shifting, updating, or inhibition task. This 
study showed that all the executive function tasks not only impaired production 
(i.e., underestimation of duration), but were impaired with regards to accuracy or 
longer reaction time when performed at the same time as a temporal task.  
The only study focusing solely on Baddeley’s model explored the central 
executive component, the other components concerning storage abilities (Brown, 
2006). Like Brown (2013), this study showed a bidirectional interference effect. 
Finally, Ogden explored the executive functions by merging both Miyake’s and 
Baddeley’s models in order to achieve a deeper understanding of executive 
functions (Ogden et al., 2011, 2014). These studies showed deep relationships 
between time perception and executive functions, even though these varied 
depending on the temporal task used. The almost systematic bidirectional effect 
between temporal and executive functions tasks points towards a common 
attentional pool between these processes. Since these two functions share a 
common attentional pool, this would mean that time perception is an executive 
function.  
1.6.5. Age 
Studies investigating the effect of age on time perception fall into two types. 
The first one is a developmental approach among children, while the second one 
tests the impact of cognitive aging among elders (i.e., aged around 60 to 70 years 
old). The first approach is based on the observation that time perception is not 
inborn, since children only start to discriminate time at the age of four months, 
exhibit the same properties of adult time perception by the age of three years, and 
start being as sensitive as adults at the age of eight years (Droit-Volet, Clément, & 
Wearden, 2001; Droit-Volet, Delgado, & Rattat, 2006). Regarding studies on older 
participants, they are based on the fact that cognitive functions deteriorate with old 
age (e.g., Giulioli & Amieva, 2016; Petersen, 2016). Since time perception greatly 
relies on cognitive function, authors tested whether time perception deteriorated as 
much among older participants, and if this was due to their dulled cognition.  
 
  
41 
Children 
It appears that cognition impairs time perception among children in similar 
ways as it does for adults (i.e., underestimation of time; Arlin, 1986a, 1986b). 
Separating the effect of stimulus quantity and the level of processing required, Arlin 
(1986a) explored how cognitive load affects 12-year olds’ time perception (i.e., 
TCT – 8s). The children were observing pictures (i.e., either 4 pictures of 2s, or 8 
pictures of 1s) and either were asked to decide if the drawing represented a living 
or non-living thing (i.e., deep processing) or were simply asked to repeat their name 
(i.e., shallow processing). There was a main effect of quantity (i.e., leading to an 
overestimation) and processing depth (i.e., leading to an underestimation). In order 
to explore a developmental trend, the second experiment used the same design with 
four groups of children from different age groups (i.e., 6-year olds, 8-year olds, 10-
year olds, and 12-year olds). Because the experiment included younger participants, 
the previous method was adapted to include fewer pictures (i.e., 3 and 6). The 
experiment replicated the previous effect of quantity and depth of processing with 
a main effect of the children’s age and an interaction between age and processing 
level. The study demonstrated that processing depth was stronger among older 
participants than younger ones. In his second study, Arlin (1986b) explored the 
effect of quantity and complexity of the stimuli (i.e., single line or three-line figures) 
among children (i.e., 6-, 9-, or 12-year olds) to investigate attentional level. 
Participants faced either four screens lasting 3s or two screens of 6s (both lasting a 
total duration of 12s) and either compared the figures actively or simply watched 
them to fluctuate the attentional level. Although there was a main effect of age, 
attentional demand (i.e., underestimation of time with more attentional demand), 
and quantity (i.e., overestimation with higher quantity), there was no effect of 
complexity (contrary to adults’ studies). Additionally, there was an interaction 
between age and both attentional and quantity effects, the two older groups showing 
an important attentional effect which was almost non-existent in the youngest 
groups. The effect of quantity, on the other hand, showed the opposite effect (i.e., 
being stronger among the youngest group than the other groups).  
 The following studies replicated with children the attentional effect 
observed among adults (i.e., underestimation when attention diverted from time in 
PTP). Exploring this effect in RTP and PTP, Zakay (1992) made 8-year olds 
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estimate the duration of a lightbulb (i.e., 3 or 6s) varying in terms of light intensity 
(i.e., low or high). The participants could either do it twice prospectively, or once 
retrospectively followed by a second time prospectively. The results showed that 
the intense light was estimated to be shorter in duration in the group performing the 
prospective task twice, while the opposite effect was observed for the group 
performing the retrospective task. In the second experiment, Zakay explored the 
effect of distraction on the previous results, by making the RTP group do the same 
task in a TPT with longer duration (i.e., 6 and 10s). The participants were asked to 
perform three productions, the second one being interrupted by a noise for 1.5s. On 
top of replicating the results regarding the light intensity, the author showed that 
the distraction led to an underestimation of time. Gautier and Droit-Volet (2002a) 
also explored attentional interference on time perception, opting for a 
developmental approach by comparing 5- and 8-year olds in a dual-task paradigm. 
Participants were asked to perform a TRT (i.e., 6 and 12s) either in a single task 
paradigm or while naming pictures (i.e., easy – entirely drawn pictures, hard – 
degraded pictures). The dual task was systematically underestimated compared to 
the single task, with the effect being stronger in the longer duration. However, there 
was no effect of age, its interaction with task being marginally significant (p=.059). 
When comparing the task effect in the two age groups, it was observed that in the 
5-year old group, both dual tasks were underestimated more than the single task, 
while in the 8-year old group, only the hard dual-task was underestimated. In 
another study, the same two authors tested how distraction affected time perception 
(i.e., TBT – 2 and 8s) among children (i.e., 5- and 8-year olds; Gautier & Droit-
Volet, 2002b). There was no main effect of distraction, yet there was an interaction 
with age group, the younger children exhibiting an overestimation effect on the 
distractor trials, the opposite effect being observed among older children.  
In addition, studies on children explored the interaction between executive 
functions and time perception. For example, Rattat (2010) explored separately the 
central executive and the storage components among 5- and 8-year olds. In the first 
experiment, they performed both a TRT (i.e., 6 and 12s) and a random two-choice 
reaction time task (i.e., CRT-R to measure the central executive component; 
Szmalec, Vandierendonck, & Kemps, 2005) either simultaneously or separately. In 
addition, the participants performed the CRT-R either in an auditory or visual 
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modality. The children under-reproduced the duration in the dual-task setting, the 
younger participants only showing this effect in the longer duration. The 
performance in the CRT-R equally worsened in the dual-task, indicating a similar 
bidirectional interference as observed among adults. In the second experiment 
testing the storage components, the children (i.e., 5- and 8-year olds) were asked to 
perform the same TRT (i.e., 6 and 12s) as well as a digit memory task and a 
visuospatial memory task (i.e., either in a single-task or dual-task paradigm). As in 
the first experiment, the storage tasks could either be performed in visual or auditory 
modality. In the visual modality, the participants under-reproduced the interval in 
the dual-task condition, especially for the 12s duration as this difference was 
stronger for this duration in the visuospatial task. The same under-reproduction was 
observed in the auditory modality with no difference between the durations. 
Regarding the non-temporal tasks, there was an interaction between task condition, 
memory task, age, and modality. For the visual modality, the accuracy of the 
visuospatial task worsened in the dual-task paradigm for all the participants, but the 
digit task variables worsened only among the 8-year olds. In the auditory modality, 
only the digit task accuracy dropped in the dual-task setting, with a stronger effect 
in the 12s duration. 
Exploring the interaction between time perception, memory, and attentional 
levels, Zélanti and Droit-Volet (2011) recruited children (i.e., 5- and 9-year olds) 
and adults (23-year olds). The participants were asked to perform a TBT (i.e., 0.5-
1s, 1.25-2.5s, 4-8s, and 15-30s), and to complete the Wechsler Memory Scale 
(Forward Digit Recall for short memory, and Backward Digit Recall for working 
Memory; Alloway, Rajendran, & Archibald, 2009), the Auditory Attention and 
Response Set Tasks from the Developmental Neuropsychological Assessment 
(NEPSY) for Attention (i.e., measuring both attention and executive function; 
Korkman, Kirk, & Kemp, 1998), and the attention/concentration index of the 
Children Memory Scale (CMS) with the Numbers and Sequences test (Cohen, 
1997). The results showed that for the durations shorter than a second, the short-
term memory measure predicted the variability improvement associated with aging, 
while for longer durations, this improvement was predicted by NEPSY tasks scores. 
Hallez and Droit-Volet (2017) explored which cognitive skill may explain 
the difference in time perception between the single and dual-task paradigms among 
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children. For this purpose, children (i.e., 5-, 6-, or 7-years old) performed a TRT 
(i.e., 6 and 12s), a colour discrimination task, and both these tasks simultaneously. 
Next, the participants were asked to complete tasks assessing short-term and 
working memory (Corsi Block-Tapping Test; Corsi, 1972), information processing 
speed (Code and Symbol from the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children, WISC; 
Wechsler, 2005), divided attention (i.e., listening to two things at once from the 
Test of Everyday Attention for Children - TEACh; Manly, Robertson, Anderson, & 
Nimmo-Smith, 1999), and selective and sustained attention (i.e., Sky search from 
the TEACh; Manly et al., 1999). There was an under-reproduction in the dual-task 
condition which was stronger in the 5-year olds compared to the 7-year olds. In the 
6s condition, both attention tasks correlated significantly with the reproduction 
difference between the single and dual-task, only the selective and sustained 
attention correlating significantly in the 12s duration. Furthermore, when the author 
added the age groups in the previous model, only the selective attention remained 
significant in predicting the difference between the single and dual task. 
Interestingly, Droit-Volet, Wearden, and Zélanti (2015) designed a 
comprehensive model of time perception among children (i.e., 5- and 8-year old) 
and adults (i.e., 24-year old) which included several measures of cognition and how 
it interacted with time perception. The participants performed three temporal tasks 
(i.e., a TBT, TGT, and TRT – 0.4-0.8s and 8-16s) and three cognitive tasks. To 
assess their working memory, the participants completed the Block-Tapping test 
Backward version (Wechsler, 1998) and the attention-concentration index of the 
CMS (Cohen, 1997). Participants completed the Selective Visual Attention Test 
from the NEPSY (Korkman et al., 1998) to assess selective attention and the Stroop 
test to measure both selective attention and inhibition. Finally, they completed the 
Trail Making Test Part A (Reitan, 1992) to assess information processing speed. In 
the long condition (i.e., 8-16s) the accuracy of the TRT was systematically lower 
and the accuracy of the TGT and TBT was lower only among children. Concerning 
the short duration (i.e., 0.4-0.8s), there was a lengthening effect for all age groups, 
with the effect being stronger for the 5-year olds (these effects were not found in 
the TGT, and only among the 5-year olds for the TBT). Furthermore, the TBT 
accuracy was predicted by the inhibition score while the TGT and TRT accuracy 
was predicted by attention. For the short duration accuracy, it was only significantly 
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predicted by the processing speed score, and only in the TRT. Regarding the time 
perception variability, the TRT was more variable than the TGT and the adults were 
more constant than the children. Moreover, the variability was significantly 
associated with the inhibition score in the TBT for both duration range, while the 
TGT variability was predicted by the selective attention score in the short duration 
and the inhibition in the long duration.  
Elderly 
Only three studies explored the effect of aging among older participants 
compared to children or adults (Baudouin, Vanneste, Pouthas, & Isingrini, 2006; 
Brown, Johnson, Sohl, & Dumas, 2015; Ranjbar Pouya, Kelly, & Moussavi, 2015). 
Basing their thoughts on the negative impact of aging on memory, Pouya et al. 
(2015) hypothesized that elderly participants (i.e., 60-year olds) would have a worse 
RTP. For this purpose, the participants were asked to perform a ET (i.e., 40s) while 
navigating in a virtual environment and completing the Montreal Cognitive 
Assessment (MoCA; Nasreddine et al., 2005). The participants overestimating the 
duration (i.e., 14%) were significantly older and exhibited worse MoCA scores. 
Furthermore, participants older than 70 years tended to overestimate the duration 
compared to younger participants; and participants with a high score in the MoCA 
significantly overestimated duration compared to the other participants.  
Basing their thoughts on attention rather than memory, Brown et al. (2015) 
explored time prospectively instead of retrospectively. In their study, young adults 
(i.e., 20-year old) and old adults (i.e., 69-year old) performed both a TPT (i.e., 5s) 
and a Flanker Task (i.e., measuring the ability to control a distractor’s influence – 
interference control). The participants performed the TPT alone, then while 
performing a simple Flanker Task (i.e., no incongruent flankers), and finally while 
performing a complicated Flanker Task (i.e., incongruent flankers). Although the 
study showed that dual-task settings increased the production variability, there was 
no main effect of age or any interaction with other variables.  
The last study on old age explored how executive functions (i.e., according 
to Baddeley’s model) could explain the difference between young (i.e., 28-year old) 
and old (i.e., 72-year old) people’s time perception (Baudouin et al., 2006). 
Participants either only performed a TRT (i.e., 3, 8, and 14s) or performed the TRT 
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alongside a simple task (i.e., decided if a number is odd or even). To explore 
Baddeley’s model, the participants completed the N-Back Letter Test (i.e., central 
executive; Baddeley, 1996) and the Alphabetical Span as well as the Computation 
Span tasks (i.e., storage components; Salthouse & Coon, 1994). Again, there was 
no main effect of age although it interacted with the condition, showing that the 
older participants were less accurate in the dual-task in comparison to the young 
ones. This difference was significantly linked to the storage components of 
Baddeley’s model.  
Age – conclusion 
Studies on the effect of age on time perception comprise developmental 
studies exploring the effect among children, and studies testing the impact of 
cognitive aging on time perception among older participants. Three important 
results among adults have been replicated among children, namely the effect of 
quantity and cognitive load (Arlin 1986a, Arlin 1986b) and attentional interference 
(Zakay, 1992; Gautier 2002a, Gautier 2002b). Concerning attention, it is 
noteworthy that while distraction led to an underestimation similar to adults with 
older children (i.e., 8-year old), it led to the opposite effect with younger ones (i.e., 
5-year olds). However, these results are contradicted by Arlin’s (1986a) results 
which showed that the children around 6-years old actually underestimated duration 
more than 9-year olds when distracted. Finally, the children exhibited a 
bidirectional interference between time perception and the central executive 
component of Baddeley’s model (Rattat, 2010). With regard to the storage 
components of the same model, the results are more complex even if an interference 
on the temporal task was observed. Other studies including children used a 
correlational approach to examine which neuropsychological measures best explain 
their time perception. These showed that the improvement of duration estimation 
sensitivity with age was explained by short-term memory for durations under a 
second, and by attention and executive functions (i.e., NEPSY score) for durations 
over a second (Zélanti & Droit-Volet, 2011). Additionally, when tested using a 
dual-task paradigm, 5-year old children’s time perception was more affected than 
that of 7-year olds, this difference being predicted by selective attention (Hallez & 
Droit-Volet, 2017).  
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A study comprising both adults and children developed a comprehensive 
model of time perception including three different time perception measures, as 
well as working memory, selective attention, inhibition, and processing speed 
measures (Droit-Volet, Wearden, et al., 2015). The authors observed that time 
perception accuracy and variability interacted differently with different durations, 
tasks, and age groups. Accuracy was shorter for long durations (i.e., 
underestimation effect) and longer for short durations (i.e., overestimation effect). 
With regards to an age effect, accuracy was only higher for the 5-year old children, 
while variability was higher for all children compared to adults. In the long 
duration, accuracy was predicted by the inhibition measure for the TBT and by the 
attentional measure in the TGT and TRT; while, for the short duration, it was 
predicted by processing speed (i.e., only for the TRT). Variability was predicted by 
the inhibition measure in the long duration (i.e., only in TBT and TGT) and by 
inhibition in the TBT and selective attention in the TGT for short durations.  
 Among older participants, one study did not show any difference between 
older (approximately 69 years old) and younger (approximately 20 years old) 
participants (Brown et al., 2015), contrasted by other studies yielding interesting 
results (Baudouin et al., 2006; Pouya et al., 2015). The first one showed that the 
storage components of Baddeley’s model were significantly linked to worsened 
time perception in a dual-task setting among older participants compared to young 
ones (Baudouin et al., 2006). The second study showed that a lower score on a 
validated measure of cognition (i.e., MoCA) led to overestimation of duration 
among old participants (Pouya et al., 2015).  
In summary, these studies showed that for both developmental and cognitive 
aging, cognitive functions such as memory, attention, and executive functions are 
important in reaching a better understanding of how age affects time perception. 
Since these studies explored numerous different concepts with various measures, 
no definitive conclusions can be reached, and more research in this area is needed 
in order to achieve a more complete understanding. 
1.7. Discussion  
 Emotion, a cognitive skill developed in the earliest stages of development, 
can easily be disturbed by both cognition and emotion. The effect of emotion is 
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complex and includes studies exploring its interference through both auditory (i.e., 
sounds or music) and visual stimuli (i.e., pictures or emotional expressions). The 
studies exploring the impact on emotion with auditory stimuli did not yield any 
consistent results, with the exception of an overestimation of duration when 
listening to emotional music in a RTP design (Bisson et al., 2009; Bueno & Ramos, 
2007). 
At first glance, it would appear that the effect of emotional pictures on time 
perception would be due to arousal. Indeed, it appears that when inducing a mood 
change (instead of a pinpointing emotional effect), there is a multiplicative effect 
observed (Fayolle et al., 2014). Further supporting this point, studies showed that 
when two pictures depict the same emotion (e.g., disgust), the most arousing one 
will lead to more underestimation (Grondin et al., 2014). Contrarily, it appears that 
durations under 200ms are governed by other mechanisms, as Smith et al. (2011) 
found out that for these durations, emotional pictures led to an underestimation. 
This indicates an attentional process helping the individual to react promptly when 
faced with threats.  
When it comes to emotional expressions, there was a main overestimation 
trend observed (i.e., especially for aggressive expressions) which was mediated by 
dynamism, gaze, and embodiment. While adding dynamism (i.e., morphing 
between two emotions, or shifting from neutral to emotional expressions) 
strengthened the effect (Dymond et al., 2014; Fayolle & Droit-Volet, 2014), the 
opposite results (i.e., nullifying the effect) were achieved by preventing the 
embodiment effect (i.e., Effron et al., 2006; Mondillon et al., 2007) or an averted 
gaze (Doi & Shinohara, 2009; Kliegl et al., 2015). The fact that an averted gaze 
nullifies the effect suggests a ‘fight-or-flight’ effect, an aggressive face being non-
threatening when not directly targeting participants.  
It was also shown that participants did not need to consciously process 
emotional stimuli to interfere with time perception (Yamada & Kawabe, 2011), but 
that when consciously processing stimuli, interference could be nullified by 
knowledge of the actual interference (Droit-Volet, Lamotte, et al., 2015). In 
addition, when participants felt in control of the situation, even when entirely 
fictitious, the impact of emotional pictures disappeared (Buetti & Lleras, 2012; 
Mereu & Lleras, 2013). 
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Regarding cognition, several authors tested Ornstein’s storage size 
hypothesis (1969), which states that time perception is governed by the number of 
stimuli, their complexity, and the way they are coded into memory. Although the 
number of stimuli systematically increased the perceived duration in a retrospective 
design (Block, 1974; Ornstein, 1969), studies on PTP showed either a lengthening 
effect (Macar, 1996) or a shortening effect (Bi et al., 2013). It is noteworthy that 
Macar’s study (1996) used a TCT which relies on working memory (i.e., comparing 
a memorized duration to a new duration), while Bi et al.’ study (2013) used a TPT, 
a difference that may explain the results. This concurs with Fortin et al.’ (1993; 
1998; 2002) results showing that when the number of stimuli increased in a memory 
task, the duration was perceived as longer. Despite the lack of research, it appears 
that measures involving working memory in PTP (i.e., TGT, TCT, and TRT) result 
in a lengthening of duration when participants are asked to process more stimuli, 
while other measures lead to a shortening effect (i.e., TPT, ET). Stimuli complexity, 
on the other hand, led to diversified results (i.e., either partial or total overestimation 
or no results) probably due to the stimuli included. The only study which achieved 
an overestimation used words (Block, 1974), while the other two studies used more 
or less complex figures (Block, 1978a; Ornstein, 1969). Consequently, it could be 
hypothesised that only more complex stimuli requiring deeper processing (e.g., 
words and complex numbers) elicit the complexity effect. Finally, the complexity 
of coding in memory has demonstrated incontestable results, with all studies 
showing that the stimuli coded in the hardest ways were systematically estimated 
to be longer in RTP (Block, 1978b; Ornstein, 1969).  
Distancing themselves from Ornstein’s theory (1969), several authors have 
explored the effect of cognitive load on time perception, either by changing the task 
or changing the difficulty of a task. While studies varying the task systematically 
led to an underestimation of duration using a prospective design (e.g., Marmaras et 
al., 1995; Wilsoncroft & Stone, 1975; Zakay et al., 1983), no effect was found in 
RTP. The absence of effects in RTP is logical, because such perception relies on 
memory, which was not affected in these tasks. The same underestimation effect 
was achieved in PTP when using the same task with different difficulty settings 
(Baldauf et al., 2009; Brown, 1997; Wilsoncroft et al., 1978). Only one study 
varying the difficulty of a same task found the same effect between RTP and PTP 
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(Brown, 1985). Nonetheless, since the study did not analyse these paradigms 
separately, it is not possible to conclude that RTP is affected by deeper processing. 
And since Hicks et al., (1976) failed to report significant results concerning RTP 
and task difficulty, it is likely that RTP is simply not affected by cognitive load. 
Based on the same design, several studies explored the associations between 
executive functions and time perception (Brown et al., 2013; Fortin et al., 2010; 
Meaux & Chelonis, 2003), basing their research on both Miyake’s model (i.e., 
updating, shifting, inhibition; 2000) and Baddeley’s model (i.e., central executive, 
visuospatial sketchpad, and the phonological loop; 1992). These studies almost 
systematically demonstrated bidirectional interference between the temporal and 
non-temporal concurrent tasks, indicating that both executive functions and time 
perception rely on the same attentional pool (e.g., Brown et al., 2013; Brown & 
Perreault, 2017; Ogden et al., 2014). Therefore, the authors implied that time 
perception was an executive function, to the same extent as the other skills (e.g., 
inhibition, shifting).  
In relation to the effect of attention on time perception, findings concurred 
with the Attentional-Gate Model of time perception (AGM, Zakay & Block, 1995). 
According to this model, if attention is diverted from time perception, perceived 
duration is shortened, the opposite effect appears when focusing on time. This effect 
was found using three different methods: using a dual-task paradigm, asking 
participants to consciously direct their attention (i.e., endogenous attention), or grab 
the participant’s attention via cues (i.e., exogenous attention). All the studies with 
a dual-task design demonstrated this effect (Burle & Casini, 2001; 
Chinchanachokchai et al., 2015; Kladopoulos et al., 2004) with Brown (1990) using 
a noteworthy design. In this experiment, participants were asked to perceive the 
duration of several concurrent stimuli, not knowing which one they would have to 
process afterwards. The participants exhibited an effect of attention on both stimuli 
with their accuracy dropping in the concurrent condition. In the endogenous 
attention studies, when participants were asked to focus on the non-temporal task, 
rather than the temporal one, they underestimated duration, the opposite effect 
being observed when they focused on the temporal task (Casini & Macar, 1997; 
Kladopoulos et al., 2004; Macar et al., 1994). When participants were cued on either 
the modality or the location of the next stimulus, they overestimated duration, 
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indicating that exogenous attention plays a crucial role in PTP too (Mattes & Ulrich, 
1998; Osugi et al., 2016). Finally, it has been shown that transient attention – 
attention driven from sudden change in the visual field (i.e., around 100ms) – affects 
time perception in the same way (Yeshurun & Marom, 2008). 
Due to both time perception and cognition varying in the early stages of 
child development as well as among elderly people (e.g., Coelho et al., 2004; Droit-
Volet et al., 2006), several studies explored how these are related across age groups. 
The first studies with children simply replicated the already known effect of 
cognition among adults with younger participants, and demonstrated the effects of 
quantity, cognitive load, attention, and executive functions. More complex studies 
explored how neuropsychological measures either interact with the difference 
between age groups in time perception or explain the difference between single-
task and dual-task performances. For example, these studies showed that time 
sensitivity improvement with age among children is explained by the short-term 
memory for sub-second durations, while supra-second duration relies on executive 
functions (Zélanti & Droit-Volet, 2011). In another study, five-year old children 
were more affected than seven-year old children by a dual-task paradigm, with the 
difference of performance partially explained by selective attention (Hallez & 
Droit-Volet, 2017). Finally, Droit-Volet et al. (2015) created a comprehensive 
model of time perception for both adults and children, including several measures 
of time perception. The study showed that five-year old children tended to 
overestimate duration compared to older children (eight-year olds) and adults, and 
that all children had a more variable time perception than adults. Furthermore, 
several neuropsychological measures interacted with time perception, the accuracy 
being predicted by inhibition, attention, and processing speed. The variability was 
predicted by inhibition and selective attention.  
 Studies recruiting elderly participants have elicited much less interest from 
researchers than those regarding children. Only three such studies have been 
conducted. One of these studies failed to find any difference between age groups 
(Brown et al., 2015), two other studies showed that age, and its relative cognitive 
levels, impacted time perception significantly. The first study showed that the 
storage components of Baddeley’s model explained the difference between old and 
young participants (Baudouin, Vanneste, Pouthas, et al., 2006). This is of interest 
  
52 
as the storage components of this model represent memory performance, which is 
often impaired among older participants (Kirova, Bays, & Lagalwar, 2015; Tromp, 
Dufour, Lithfous, Pebayle, & Després, 2015). Ranjbar Pouya et al. (2015) showed 
that participants with a lower score on the Montreal Cognitive Assessment (MoCA) 
and older participants overestimated the duration compared to other participants.  
The studies reviewed in this chapter demonstrate that time perception relies 
on both cognitive and emotional processes. Unfortunately, none of these studies 
explored how these processes interact in their interference on time perception. It is 
noteworthy that one experiment mixed attention and arousal, failing to find any 
interaction between the variables (Curton & Lordahl, 1974). This could be due to 
this study not exploring emotion per se but physical arousal (i.e., shock threat and 
physical exercise). This lack of research is surprising given that it is established that 
cognitive functions can be affected by emotions, and that both are shown to interact 
in numerous domains. For example, executive functions from Miyake’s models 
have been shown to be significantly impaired when tasks include emotional stimuli 
(e.g., Paulitzki, Risko, Oakman, & Stolz, 2008; Segal, Kessler, & Anholt, 2015; 
Wante, Mueller, Demeyer, Naets, & Braet, 2017). Inhibition has been more 
thoroughly explored as it was assumed that individuals would exhibit poorer self-
control when confronted with intense emotions, which would subsequently be 
reflected in inhibition measures (Lynam, Smith, Whiteside, & Cyders, 2006; 
Whiteside, Lynam, Miller, & Reynolds, 2005). In addition, several models of 
emotional regulation have included executive functions, although Sperduti et al. 
(2017) found that only the updating component of Miyake’s model predicted 
implicit emotional regulation.  
In other research fields, the interaction of cognition and emotion has been 
thoroughly studied using dual-process models (Lannoy, Billieux, & Maurage, 2014; 
Mukherjee, 2010). According to these models, there are two systems which interact 
in order to influence a specific process (for a selective review in the domain of 
decision-making, see Brocas & Carrillo, 2014). The first one is the ‘affective 
system’ which is implicated in the emotional evaluation of stimuli and initiates 
automatic-appetitive responses based on associative learning (i.e., stimulus-
response link). The second system is the ‘reflective system’, involved in cognitive 
evaluation of the stimuli relying on memory and executive functions, and initiating 
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the controlled-deliberate responses by evaluating long-term consequences 
(response-consequences link). In time perception, the situation might be more 
complex, because the effect of cognition and emotion on time perception varies 
depending on the variable, method, or paradigm used (i.e., retrospective or 
prospective). Depending on how the duration is evaluated by the person, the 
interaction might change entirely. Consequently, it is complicated, maybe 
impossible, to predict how an interaction between emotion and cognition affects 
time perception. Nonetheless, some hypotheses can be made, for example, given 
participants should remember more emotional stimuli, the number of words effect 
should increase in the retrospective paradigms, leading to more overestimation. 
Moreover, it has been shown that emotion can direct one’s attention in an 
exogenous way (Hartikainen, Ogawa, & Knight, 2000; Tipples & Sharma, 2000). 
In the time perception context, this means that emotional stimuli may increase the 
effect of attention, leading to more overestimation if the participants have to 
estimate the duration of the emotional stimuli or more underestimation if they have 
to estimate the duration of the non-emotional stimuli. Studies exploring different 
aspects of this interaction are needed in order to achieve a deeper understanding of 
time perception and its interaction with cognition and emotion. 
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Chapter 2: The effect of gaming on cognition 
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2.1. Chapter overview 
This thesis explores the time perception of gamers in order to understand 
the time loss effect (i.e., underestimation of the time spent on an activity) observed 
in gaming disorder. The first chapter of this thesis depicted the complexity of the 
time perception construct as well as how different factors may influence it (i.e., 
cognition and emotion). This better grasp of time perception highlights the 
importance of knowing how cognitive skills may be affected by gaming (both 
within a disordered or healthy use).  
Therefore, the main aim of this chapter is to explore how gaming, whether 
disordered or healthy, can affect an individual’s cognition. This chapter will be 
divided in an introductive section (i.e., defining what gaming and its associated 
disorder are), a method section (i.e., how the databases have been searched), a result 
section (i.e., summarising the research highlighted from the selected papers), and a 
discussion. Based on these results, the methodology of the thesis will be adapted, 
the potentially important variables in time perception affected by gaming being 
measured as covariables. 
2.2. Introduction 
Since the first commercial videogame in 1972 (i.e., Pong) and the arrival of 
console gaming, videogames have become an important leisure activity worldwide. 
As videogames evolved, a multitude of different genres were developed varying in 
the strategy, skills, and attention required, or in the gameplay and commitment 
needed by gamers. This involvement can lead to an addictive behaviour, a 
pathological use, of these games (e.g., Billieux et al., 2015a; Griffiths & Davies, 
2005). Early studies of videogame addiction used criteria adapted from pathological 
gambling criteria in the third edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders (e.g., Griffiths & Hunt, 1998). Here, gamers experiencing four or 
more of the indicated symptoms (e.g., chasing, relapse, and salience) were 
considered addicted. During the two last decades, numerous psychometric scales, 
addiction models, and proposed criteria have been created to assess this potentially 
addictive, and/or pathological behaviour leading to great disparity in the field. 
Recently, the American Psychiatric Association included ‘Internet Gaming 
Disorder’ (IGD) in the latest (fifth) edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
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of Mental Disorders (DSM-5; American Psychiatric Association, 2013) in the 
Appendix that includes possible diagnoses that require additional research before 
being included in the main text. More recently, Gaming Disorder has been included 
in the 11th revision of the International Classification of Diseases (ICD-11) (World 
Health Organization, 2016). According to the ICD-11, gaming disorder is 
characterized by continuous gaming (i.e., whether online or offline) and include 
three main factors: (i) impaired control, (ii) overlooking other aspect of life (e.g., 
family, interest) in favour of gaming, and (iii) continuation of gaming despite 
negative consequences. As this is the latest official nomenclature, the rest of this 
chapter will systematically use ‘gaming disorder’ (or similar terms such as 
disordered gamer) to designate the addicted, problematic, or pathological gamers. 
The literature on this disorder notes that the gamers will endure negative 
consequences in different domains of their lives. In relation to interpersonal 
relationships, Achab et al. (2011) indicated that individuals suffering from gaming 
disorder had more difficulties with their family and in their relationships compared 
to healthy gamers. Another study replicated this association for the relationship 
between gamers and their parents (Burešová, Steinhausel, & Havigerová, 2012). 
On a personal level, several studies have demonstrated that excessive gamers 
exhibit personal problems, such as increased financial difficulties (Achab et al., 
2011), or academic difficulties (Chiu, Lee, & Huang, 2004; Gentile, 2009). 
Furthermore, disordered gamers not only lose pre-existing relationships due to 
excessive gameplay, they also fail to create new relationships outside of the game 
(Achab et al., 2011; Hellström, Nilsson, Leppert, & Åslund, 2012).  
The most studied game genre in the gaming disorder literature is “Massively 
Multiplayer Online Role-Playing Games” (MMORPGs – e.g., World of Warcraft, 
Final Fantasy XIV, Guild Wars 2). MMORPGs comprise a perpetual virtual world, 
that is, a virtual universe that does not stop evolving when the player disconnects. 
Such games require an important commitment in terms of time, as successful 
gaming requires engaging in activities such as “farming” (i.e., killing monsters 
repeatedly to earn rewards) to keep one’s level and to progress. In MMORPGs, the 
purpose of the player varies greatly depending on the game played, but the main 
activity comprises participating in quests with a main purpose (e.g., defeating a 
monster). Finally, most MMORPGs include a “Player vs. Player” (PVP) 
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component, which is a way to compete with other players. MMORPGs are an 
adaptation of more traditional “Role-Playing Games” (RPGs – e.g., Skyrim, 
Neverwinter Nights, The Witcher 3), that are offline games in which a player 
engages in a quest and improves their character for the sole purpose of finishing the 
game.  
Regarding the studies on gamers’ performance, either cognitive or visual, 
the most studied videogame genres are action videogames, including “First-Person 
Shooter” (FPS – e.g., Overwatch, Battlefield, Call of Duty) games. In these games, 
a first-person perspective is used, providing greater immersion for the player, hence 
the name. Such games can be played either online or offline. In offline games, the 
purpose is often to advance from one specific point to another without dying, whilst 
completing various sub-missions. In FPS game scenarios, while players always 
need to kill their opponents, the main purpose of the session can vary between 
capturing specific areas to catching flags. 
Two widespread videogame genres suffer from a lack of psychological 
research. The first one is “Real-Time Strategy” (RTS) games (e.g., Starcraft 2, 
Warcraft 3, WarHammer 40000). In RTS games, a player must construct buildings, 
and use these buildings to create units that will either battle, or collect resources 
(i.e., used to construct other units/buildings), the purpose of game session being to 
destroy the enemy base entirely. A second game genre little studied is “Multiplayer 
Online Battle Arena” (MOBA) games (e.g., League of Legends, Defense of the 
Ancient, Heroes of the Storm). In fact, League of Legends is currently the most 
played videogame worldwide with 100 million players (“Number of players of 
selected eSports games worldwide as of August 2017 (in million),” 2019). MOBAs 
are closer to RTS games in terms of game length due to the requirement to destroy 
the enemy base in short game sessions (i.e., approximately 30-45 minutes). In this 
kind of game, two teams of five players battle on a limited map, with the main 
purpose being to destroy a central piece of the enemy base (i.e., the nexus), killing 
the opponents to achieve this objective. Contrary to MMORPGs where the player 
impersonates a main character, in MOBA games, all the statistics of the character 
are reset at the beginning of each game. 
The gaming studies literature has focused on the more positive impacts of 
videogames among healthy gamers as well (e.g., Appelbaum, Cain, Darling, & 
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Mitroff, 2013; Sims & Mayer, 2002). These studies have demonstrated improved 
performances of gamers on a variety of different tasks. Research has shown that 
trained competences in videogames can be extended to other fields, including visual 
performance, surgery skills, and navigation. For visual performances, gamers 
exhibit better performance on saccadic eye movement tasks (Mack & Ilg, 2014; 
West, Al-Aidroos, & Pratt, 2013), visual processing levels (i.e., searching for 
changes between two pictures, detecting stimuli), and ignoring distractors 
(Chisholm & Kingstone, 2015a; Durlach, Kring, & Bowens, 2009; Green & 
Bavelier, 2007). Although surgical abilities have only been tested in simulator, 
there were consistent results in that gamers outperformed medical students on 
different surgery simulators, such as laparoscopic surgery (Fanning, Fenton, 
Johnson, Johnson, & Rehman, 2011; Jalink, Goris, Heineman, Pierie, & ten Cate 
Hoedemaker, 2014) or arthroscopy procedures (Jentzsch et al., 2016). The findings 
relating to navigation skills among gamers are far from consistent, with one study 
showing no significant differences between novice and expert gamers (Castell, 
Jenson, & Larios, 2015). However, this was only a pilot study with twelve 
participants and the results are then to be discussed cautiously. Another study found 
no relationship between gaming experience and real-life navigation, but a 
significant one with virtual navigation (Richardson, Powers, & Bousquet, 2011). 
Nonetheless, due to the different tasks used between the two studies, no conclusion 
can be drawn, and more studies are needed in that field to clarify any association 
between navigation and videogame experience. 
The aim of the present review is to explore the cognitive skills among 
gamers in studies that have used experimental designs. The study of the impact of 
videogame use on cognitive skills is a relatively new field and has not been studied 
widely and suffers from large gaps due to inconsistent results, different cognitive 
skills not studied, among other things. It has been shown that training cognitive 
skills on a given task extends to other similar tasks (e.g., task-switching, Karbach 
& Kray, 2009), suggesting that training cognitive skills in-game could improve 
these skills more generally (i.e., in non-gaming settings). Moreover, studies have 
shown that substance addiction can lead to impaired cognitive skills (Kanayama, 
Kean, Hudson, & Pope Jr., 2013; Liang et al., 2013), which stands true in the 
context of non-substance addictions, such as gambling (Ciccarelli, Griffiths, Nigro, 
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& Cosenza, 2017; Leppink, Redden, Chamberlain, & Grant, 2016). As a 
consequence, it is expected that gaming disorder leads to an impairment of 
cognitive skills. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this literature has not been 
reviewed and may be useful in advancing the field. The present chapter is divided 
into two main sections (i.e., the positive and the negative impacts of video gaming 
on cognitive skills), with further subdivisions according to specific cognitive skills.  
2.3. General method 
An extensive literature research was conducted using four different 
databases: Google Scholar, ScienceDirect, PubMed, and PsycINFO. All searches 
included a common set of search words (i.e., videogame, gaming, video game), 
defining the videogame field of study, and other words to specify the cognitive 
domain studied (i.e., decision-making, time perception, delay discounting, 
attention, inhibition, and task-switching). Finally, the studies were included if they: 
(i) dated from the year 2000 (because videogames have greatly evolved since that 
time), (ii) included an experimental design, (iii) included evaluation of cognitive 
processes, (iv) were published in English, and (v) were peer-reviewed. Studies in 
specific areas were further excluded if they had been extensively reviewed before 
such as functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) or Electroencephalography 
(EEG) studies examining gaming (Kuss & Griffiths, 2012; Pontes, Kuss, & 
Griffiths, 2015) and the use of videogames being beneficial to surgical skills (Jalink 
et al., 2014; Lynch, Aughwane, & Hammond, 2010). 
 The research on ScienceDirect, PubMed, and PsycINFO included the same 
type of research terms. Indeed, the only difference was that ScienceDirect allowed 
research of terms in the title, abstract, and paper keywords at the same time, while 
PubMed only allows research in the title and abstract, and PsycINFO only in the 
abstract. Using the words gaming, videogame, and video game associated with the 
specific area sought (e.g., attention, and task-switching) led to the following number 
of papers. On ScienceDirect, there were 39 papers on decision-making, eight on 
time perception, nine on delay discounting, 844 on attention, and 16 on task-
switching. On PubMed, there were 63 papers on decision-making, one on time 
perception, nine on delay discounting, 307 on attention, and 19 on task-switching. 
Finally, on PsycINFO, there were 74 papers on decision-making, three on time 
perception, six on delay discounting, 321 on attention, and 16 on task-switching. 
  
60 
Due to the high number of papers on attention in these searches, the term 
“cognitive” was added, leading to 125 papers on ScienceDirect, 87 on PubMed, and 
104 on PsycINFO.  
 Importantly, due to the inability to research terms only in the abstract or 
keywords on Google Scholar, several of the exclusion criteria were added directly 
in the search, that is reviewed field (i.e., fMRI, MRI, EEG, ERP, and surgery) or 
irrelevant kind of studies (i.e., training and teaching). Yet, as these criteria still yield 
unmanageable results on this database (e.g., 16,100 papers on decision-making), 
the terms characterizing the field of research (i.e., gaming, videogame, video game) 
were searched only in the titles. These last criteria led to 19 papers for decision-
making, five for time perception, one for delay discounting, 85 for attention, and 
one for task-switching, leading to a total of 818 papers. After collating the results 
of the different databases to merge the duplicated papers, sorting the unrelated 
papers, and adding new papers cited in the one selected, the final number of selected 
papers was 38.  
2.4. Results: Positive impact 
2.4.1. Task-switching 
Sophisticated videogames require gamers to switch between several tasks, 
especially in action videogames (e.g., focusing on enemies, picking up items, and 
reloading weapons). Task-switching is a representation of cognitive flexibility, it is 
the ability to alternate between different tasks with distinct demands without 
sacrificing any accuracy or speed (i.e., shifting; Miyake, 2000). In switching tasks, 
the variable measured is called the ‘switching-cost’ (i.e., the increase in reaction 
time [RT] when a participant must switch between tasks). This variable is measured 
by comparing the RT to a stimulus when the response needed has changed (or not) 
from the previous stimulus. A well-validated example of a switching-task is the 
Letter-Number Task developed by Monsell and Rogers (1995). Here, one letter and 
one number are presented together in one of the corners of the screen. If the stimulus 
appears in the upper part of the screen, participants have to decide whether the 
number is odd or even, and if it is in the lower part, whether the letter is a vowel or 
a consonant. This ability can be trained through cognitive tasks, leading to 
diminished switching costs, extending to the other switching-tasks (Karbach & 
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Kray, 2009; Pereg, Shahar, & Meiran, 2013). Accordingly, researchers in this field 
started focusing on task-switching improvement in action gamers. Most of these 
studies have found significant associations between action gameplay and flexibility, 
with gamers showing lower switching-cost than non-gamers (Colzato, 2010; 
Dobrowolski, Hanusz, Sobczyk, Skorko, & Wiatrow, 2015; Green, Sugarman, 
Medford, Klobusicky, & Bavelier, 2012; Karle, Watter, & Shedden, 2010; 
Strobach, Frensch, & Schubert, 2012). To our knowledge, only two studies have 
failed to find differences between action gamers and non-gamers (i.e., Cain, 
Landau, & Shimamura, 2012; Dobrowolski et al., 2015). The study from 
Dobrowolski et al. (2015) will be discussed separately below, as it distinguishes 
between different types of videogames and yields different results.  
Two studies have attempted to understand these results by exploring the 
underlying processes accounting for improved performances. In a study including 
two experiments, Karle et al. (2010) tested both the difficulty level and the 
switching-level impact on task-switching. The first experiment included both non-
gamers and action gamers who played at least six hours per week and judged their 
gaming expertise with a score of at least five out of seven on a Likert scale. These 
participants were tested on a switching-task varying in the difficulty to prepare a 
response or to respond to a trial. To differ the variables, the authors compared the 
visual perception level (i.e., high-contrast vs. low-contrast), the response mapping 
(i.e., changing which key to press for a given stimulus), the cue-to-target interval 
length (i.e., 100ms vs. 1000ms), and the information given by the cue (either giving 
no information or cueing on the next stimulus type). This study showed that the 
gamers had a significantly smaller switching-cost than the non-gamers, resulting in 
both a decreased RT and higher accuracy. Finally, the gap between gamers and non-
gamers grew larger during the long cue-to-target interval, or when the cue was 
informative. These results do not explain the overall superiority of gamers on 
switching-tasks, even if this gives some leads (e.g., cue-to-target interval and cue 
effect could indicate an attentional effect). In the second experiment, Karle et al. 
(2010) tested the switching-level among action gamers (i.e., same protocol as 
previous experiment) and non-gamers on a switching-task including numbers. To 
manipulate the switching-level, the test included three different task types: deciding 
if a presented number was odd or even, if it was lower or higher than five, and if it 
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was a prime number or a multiple number. These three different tasks led to four 
switching combinations, repeat (no switching, two same tasks in a row), switch 
(two different tasks in a row), two-switch (three different tasks performed 
consecutively), and alternate (a first task, followed by a second different task, 
followed by the same first task). The only result of this experiment was a replicated 
improved switching-cost and accuracy among gamers, with none of the switching 
manipulation showing any differences between gamers and non-gamers.  
The second study exploring the underlying processes of these improved 
results was led by Green et al. (2012) and comprised three different experiments. 
The first experiment evaluated the impact of the output type, in other words, testing 
whether the gamers would be better at switching between tasks when they 
responded using a keyboard (i.e., a usual tool in gaming) compared a vocal method 
(i.e., a mostly unused tool for controlling a character). The first experiment included 
action gamers (spending at least five hours per week on action games for the past 
six months) as well as non-gamers. The task was a shape vs. colour switching-task, 
with participants having to assess the shape of the stimulus when it was in the upper-
part of the screen, and its colour when it was in the lower part of the screen. 
Although non-gamers showed shorter RT when they responded orally, there was no 
such significant difference for the gamers. Considering that the gamers were faster 
than non-gamers in both conditions (i.e., despite the improvement of non-gamers in 
the oral condition), it can be inferred that the output type (i.e., responding orally or 
manually) did not account for the difference between the two groups. In the second 
experiment, the authors wanted to compare cognitive- and perceptual-switching. 
For this purpose, action gamers (i.e., same criteria) and non-gamers underwent a 
switching-task with two types of blocks. The first kind of block included the same 
task as the first experiment (i.e., shape vs. colour), while the second one needed the 
participants to decide whether the numbers were odd/even or higher/lower than 
five. Unfortunately, even though this study replicated the reduced switching-cost 
among gamers, the task type (i.e., cognitive vs. perceptual-task) did not yield 
significant results. Finally, the third experiment assessed the stimulus-response 
mapping switching by asking the participants to respond with other keys if the 
background colour changed. As in the two first experiments, there was no effect of 
the task type, but a significant lower switch-cost for the gamers. Thus, this study 
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failed to find any underlying process accounting for the improved results of the 
action videogame players.  
Even though all the previous studies focused on action videogames, these 
are not the only games that lead to an increased flexibility, as other videogames 
need players to switch between several important tasks to win. For example, this is 
the case of RTS games where the players must command several groups of units, 
switching between different categories of units to command them. In these types of 
games, players must also construct buildings, manage resources, and engage in a 
number of other activities. All these tasks are similarly important to win the game 
because they are all interconnected, and thus require the participants to switch 
efficiently between them. In a study by Dobrowolski et al. (2015), RTS players, 
FPS players, and control participants (i.e., having played less than two hours per 
week on both RTS and FPS, and no more than four hours per week on other games 
during the past six months) were tested on both a Switching-task and a Multiple 
Object Tracking Task (MOT). To be included in the study, RTS players had to have 
played at least seven hours per week on RTS games and less than five hours on FPS 
games during the past six months, and inversely for the FPS players. This 
experiment led to significant differences between the three groups with further 
analyses showing that RTS players significantly outperformed both the FPS players 
and the control participants. No significant differences were observed between the 
latter groups, contrary to the previous studies (i.e., as an FPS game is considered an 
action game). In the switching-task, RTS players had a lower switching-cost 
without any differences in global reaction-time or accuracy between the groups. In 
the MOT, RTS players showed a significantly better accuracy than controls, and a 
near-to-significant difference with the FPS players. This study shows some 
interesting results on the impact of videogame playing on task-switching. By 
showing that games other than FPS can lead to further improved flexibility, it 
implies that other studies comparing cognitive processes on different types of 
videogames are required.  
The last study exploring how task-switching is affected by recurrent gaming 
assessed the impact of gaming onset (i.e., age when one started gaming) on this 
executive function (Hartanto, Toh, & Yang, 2016). The participants were classified 
into three groups based on their onset: (i) non-gamers, (ii) early-onset gamers (i.e., 
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started before 12 years old), and (iii) late-onset gamers (i.e., started after 12 years 
old). This age was chosen by Hartanto et al. (2016) due to the relevant literature 
indicating that children reach a fully developed shifting function (i.e., reaching the 
same performance on switching tasks as adults) around the age of 12 years 
(Anderson, Anderson, Northam, Jacobs, & Catroppa, 2001; Cepeda, Kramer, & 
Gonzalez de Sather, 2001). Furthermore, contrary to previous studies, the authors 
explored both the switching cost and the mixed cost (i.e., slower response in 
repeated trials in mixed blocks compared to repeated trials in pure blocks—i.e., 
blocks without any switching), studying a wider range of variables related to the 
shifting function. The results showed that the onset of gaming had no impact on the 
number of hours spent on videogames, nor on self-perceived level of expertise. 
Despite this lack of difference, once all the variables were included in a stepwise 
regression, only the age of gaming onset significantly predicted the shifting levels, 
both for the switching and mixed costs. Finally, when using the same categorization 
as other studies (i.e., comparing gamers who play more than 6 h per week to non-
gamers), gamers had a significantly smaller mixed cost and a marginally smaller 
switching cost (p=0.06). 
In summary, most of the included studies found significantly improved 
performance in switching-task among gamers, implying greater flexibility in 
comparison to non-gamers (Colzato, 2010; Dobrowolski et al., 2015; Green et al., 
2012; Karle et al., 2010; Strobach et al., 2012). One possible explanation for the 
absence of results from some studies could be the lack of control on game playing. 
Since other types of games than action videogames can induce an improvement in 
flexibility (e.g., RTS games – Dobrowolski et al., 2015), it is highly possible that 
some participants in the control groups were playing such games and truthfully 
reported that they did not play any action videogames. The study by Dobrowolski 
et al. (2015) raises an important need to focus on what the different genres of 
videogames can bring in terms of skill to gamers. Indeed, more than different 
gameplay, playing different kinds of videogames requires different categories of 
skill (e.g., strategy, sharpened reflexes, multi-tasking), some games even requiring 
a combination of these skills. Therefore, more studies are needed to assess the 
abilities developed by playing specific videogames, and the impact of this training 
on general cognitive tasks. Despite the lack of control on this variable, the studies 
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still yielded consistent results implying that videogames have an important positive 
impact on flexibility. Even if it appears that the age of gaming onset is playing an 
important part on the flexibility levels of the gamers (Hartanto et al., 2016), little is 
known about the other potential underlying processes in the performance of gamers, 
apart from an increased difference with non-gamers when stimuli are cued, or when 
there is more time to prepare a response (Karle et al., 2010). The even greater 
performance when cues are included in the task could be evidence of a better top-
down control of attention, with gamers exhibiting a somewhat better ability to focus 
their attention on a stimulus when cued beforehand. Further explanation of this is 
provided below. 
2.4.2. Attentional control 
Videogames require constant attention from gamers (arguably more in 
action videogames), as even the slightest lapse in attention can lead to death of the 
character, or to losing the game. Attentional control can be divided into two 
different types, top-down and bottom-up control. In top-down control of attention, 
a person consciously allocates their attention to a chosen stimulus, while in bottom-
up control, the more salient stimulus will catch the person’s attention (Desimone & 
Duncan, 1995). Attention has further been defined by the differentiation of three 
systems according to the Attentional Network Task (ANT; Fan, McCandliss, 
Sommer, Raz, & Posner, 2002). These are the alerting system (i.e., being able to 
make use of a clue to prepare for a stimulus), the orienting system (i.e., being able 
to orientate one’s attention toward a spatial area after a spatial cue), and the 
executive control system (i.e., being able to inhibit the distractors). The first two 
systems (i.e., alerting and orienting systems) are associated with bottom-up 
attention selection due to the cue directing attention despite the will of the person. 
The third system (i.e., executive control system) is linked with the top-down 
selection as this system requires the person to direct their attention themselves by 
ignoring the distractors. It would be expected that gamers exhibit better top-down 
attention since winning a game requires to inhibit the distractors and to focus on the 
right “stimuli” (e.g., to focus one’s attention on important objectives without being 
distracted). Yet, as important stimuli can appear in a game, requiring a fast 
relocation of attention, the bottom-up selection could be at stake among action 
videogame players. Current literature demonstrates that videogames players exhibit 
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better top-down control (Cain & Mitroff, 2011; Cain, Prinzmetal, Shimamura, & 
Landau, 2014; Chisholm, Hickey, Theeuwes, & Kingstone, 2010; Chisholm & 
Kingstone, 2012, 2015a; Irons, Remington, & McLean, 2011), some studies 
showing improved bottom-up processing (Cain & Mitroff, 2011; Castel, Pratt, & 
Drummond, 2005; Chisholm et al., 2010; Mishra, Zinni, Bavelier, & Hillyard, 
2011; Schubert et al., 2015).  
Chisholm and Kingstone published three studies on the attentional abilities 
of gamers (i.e., three hours per week for at least the past six months), mainly testing 
their top-down control of attention (Chisholm et al., 2010; Chisholm & Kingstone, 
2012, 2015a). In these studies, three different tasks were used (i.e., Orientation 
Perception Task, Oculomotor Capture Task, and Compound Search Task), thus 
allowing a wide measure of top-down control. All these studies reached the same 
conclusion that gamers exhibited better top-down control, which was not explained 
by other variables assessed (e.g., speed to engage in an eye-saccade). Studies by 
Cain et al. (Cain & Mitroff, 2011; Cain et al., 2014) confirmed these results despite 
using different tasks (i.e., Change Detection Task, Anti-cue Task, and Attentional 
Blink Task) and a stricter inclusion criterion for being a participating gamer (i.e., 
five or six hours per week for the past six months). In addition, their first study 
demonstrated that gamers exhibited better bottom-up attention selection (Cain & 
Mitroff, 2011), indicating that gamers would both consciously direct their attention 
better than non-gamers and be more sensitive to salient stimuli if these were 
relevant for the ongoing task or activity.  
Dye et al., (2009) explored the associations between videogame use and 
attentional processes via the ANT. As defined earlier, this model divides attention 
into three core systems, the alerting, orienting, and executive control systems (Fan 
et al., 2002). In this study, the authors recruited action videogame players (i.e., 
playing any action videogame during the past 12 months) and non-gamers. Despites 
the different inclusion criteria from other studies (i.e., younger participants and less 
rigorous criteria for gamers), the results obtained match previous findings. Gamers 
were faster in all the conditions (i.e., exhibiting a faster processing speed) and 
showed a greater improvement than non-gamers when the stimuli were cued, 
exhibiting better orienting and executive control systems, thus, a better top-down 
control of attention. The results of this study suggest that playing videogames 
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improves both basic processing speed and conscious control of attention. However, 
the lack of differences between the two groups in the alerting systems indicates that 
there is no difference in bottom-up control, thus refuting results from other studies 
(e.g., Cain & Mitroff, 2011; Mishra et al., 2011). 
Other studies have investigated the Theory of Visual Attention (TVA; 
Bundesen, 1990) recruiting gamers. The TVA measures attention via six 
parameters: the threshold value (T0 - i.e., the minimum time of presentation required 
for participants to process a stimulus), the visual processing speed (C), the short-
term storage memory capacity (K – i.e., amount of stimuli storable concurrently in 
short-term memory), the iconic memory buffer (µ – i.e., the difference in accuracy 
between masked and unmasked stimuli), the top-down control (α), and the spatial 
distribution of attention (wlat – i.e., lateral distribution and wvert – i.e., vertical 
distribution). To assess these parameters, participants must perform both whole and 
partial report tasks. In the whole report, participants are presented with a set of five 
coloured letters (i.e., red or green) which are either masked or unmasked. There are 
three presentation times (i.e., short, medium, and long), and participants are asked 
to indicate which letters were presented. This version of the task leads to measuring 
the parameters C, K, t0, and µ. In the partial condition, one or two letters are 
presented on the screen, and participants are asked to indicate which letter is 
presented in a preselected colour. When two letters are presented, the second letter 
can either be in the preselected colour (participants having to report the two letters), 
or in another colour (participants having to report only one of the letters). The 
partial report task leads to measuring the parameters α, wlat, and wvert (Kyllingsbæk, 
2006). Using this model of visual attention, Schubert et al. (2015) explored the 
underlying mechanisms of the outperformance from gamers on attentional tasks. 
They recruited gamers (i.e., playing 10 hours per week in the past six months) as 
well as non-gamers, and tested them with the whole and partial report tasks. Gamers 
needed a shorter presentation time to process the stimuli (t0), and a greater 
processing speed (C); no other significant difference being observed. These results 
confirm other studies examining processing speed because gamers were faster than 
non-gamers (Cain & Mitroff, 2011; Mishra et al., 2011), but the lack of difference 
in top-down control goes against the main results of other studies (Cain et al., 2014; 
Chisholm et al., 2010).  
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Another study compared two different videogame genres players to test 
whether game type would impact the performance on attentional task or not. In this 
study, Krishnan, Kang, Sperling, and Srinivasan (2013) tested either RPGs or FPS 
gamers. To be included in this experiment, participants had to play one of these two 
types of game at least four days a week, with a minimum of one hour of gaming on 
these days. The participants were all tested on the same task (i.e., pressing a button 
every time a preselected stimulus appeared in a given zone of the screen). 
Depending upon the types of trial, participants were asked to attend to one, two, or 
four regions of the screen, thus increasing the difficulty of the task, and the spatial 
distribution of attention. This experiment led to an overall better performance by 
the FPS players, the difference reaching its pinnacle when the participants were 
asked to attend four locations at the same time. Importantly, due to the lack of 
control group (i.e., participants who did not play any videogames), the only 
conclusion of this study was that FPS players have a better attentional process than 
RPG players. Consequently, nothing can be concluded on the direct contribution of 
RPG to the attentional abilities.  
In conclusion, the current literature on attention agrees on several important 
points. Firstly, gamers appear to exhibit a better global attention level, as their 
processing speed is increased compared to non-gamers (Cain & Mitroff, 2011; 
Castel et al., 2005; Chisholm et al., 2010; Mishra et al., 2011; Schubert et al., 2015), 
even though some studies contest these findings (Cain et al., 2014; Irons et al., 
2011). To nuance these results, Krishnan et al. (2013) demonstrated that the 
improvement in the attentional capacities are greatly influenced by the type of 
games played with FPS players exhibiting better attentional processing than RPG 
players. This study, in accordance with Dobrowolski et al.’s study (2015), indicates 
that more studies exploring the specific impacts of the different types of videogames 
are greatly needed in the cognitive literature. Secondly, gamers exhibited greater 
top-down attentional control, i.e., a greater ability to ignore distractors and to stay 
focused on the main task (Cain & Mitroff, 2011; Cain et al., 2014; Chisholm et al., 
2010; Chisholm & Kingstone, 2012; Dye et al., 2009; Irons et al., 2011), although 
one study’s analyses did not reach significance (i.e., Irons et al., 2011) and one 
study found opposing results (i.e., Schubert et al., 2015).  
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2.4.3. Sub-second time perception 
The research on time perception can be divided into the perception of very 
short durations (i.e., under the second – sub-second time perception) and longer 
durations (i.e., over the second – multi-second time perception). Interestingly, the 
results on both these sections of time perception appear to clash, as one appears to 
improve (i.e., sub-second), while the other one would deteriorate (multi-second). 
Since this section explores the positive impact of gaming, only the sub-second 
studies will be attended to, multi-second time perception being included in the 
negative impact section of this chapter. This time perception mainly comprises the 
ability to differentiate concomitant and serial stimuli, and to perceive which 
stimulus came first in the case of serial stimuli. Indeed, in some videogames, gamers 
can perform several spells and abilities with their character. Hence, knowing that 
one of these skills takes less time to be activated than another one is crucial as it 
allows the gamer to react fast in dangerous situations. Only two studies have 
explored sub-second time perception among gamers.  
In the first study (Donohue, Woldorff, & Mitroff, 2010), multisensory 
temporal processing was tested, which is the ability to know whether two stimuli 
are concomitant or not, and if they are not, which one appeared first. In their 
experiment, gamers (i.e., 2 hours per week on FPS and 4.5 hours per week on any 
other action game for at least 6 months), non-gamers (i.e., less than 1.5 hours per 
week on any action game and 0 hours on FPS for at least 6 months), and “other” 
participants (i.e., fit in none of the two previous groups and were only included in 
the correlational analysis) were compared. All participants were tested on two 
different tasks: A simultaneity judgment task (SJT) and a temporal-order judgment 
task (TOJT). In the two tasks, participants were presented two stimuli (visual and 
auditory) with random Stimulus Onset Asynchronies (i.e., SOA, duration between 
the appearance of the two stimuli) varying between 0ms (i.e., simultaneous stimuli) 
and 300ms. The gamers outperformed the non-gamers on the TOJT, exhibiting 
better accuracy than non-gamers. In the SJT, gamers also outperformed non-gamers 
by being able to perceive that two stimuli were not concurrent with a smaller SOA 
on average. Interestingly, gamers were more biased on both tasks when the visual 
stimulus came first, which is the opposite from non-gamers who were more biased 
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for auditory ones. This can be explained by the higher importance of visual stimuli 
compared to auditory ones in videogames.  
In the second study (Rivero, Covre, Reyes, & Bueno, 2012), there were two 
types of time perception: sub-second perception and multi-second perception. This 
study comprised frequent gamers (i.e., 30 hours per week during the past month) 
and occasional gamers (less than 5 hours per week during the past month). For sub-
second time perception, participants underwent a temporal comparison ask (i.e., 
TCT – 100-1000ms) and a temporal bisection task (TBT, 200-800ms). For the 
multi-second duration, participants performed an Estimation Task (ET – 10, 30, and 
60s) and a time production task (TPT – 5s and 45s). While there was a significant 
outperformance by the gamers for both the TCT and the TBT, there was no 
difference between the two groups for both the multi-second tasks. Even though 
sub-second time perception was affected by gaming, it was unlikely that short 
durations above the second would be affected by this activity. In fact, while sub-
second perception is important in videogames, being able to perceive duration 
above five seconds would be important only in specific game genres. For example, 
in some online games where gamers can fight an opponent, knowing that they will 
not be able to use a specific ability before five seconds is crucial because they know 
that they have a clear advantage during this interval. However, as it has been shown 
that gamers can present severe time loss while playing (Chou & Ting, 2003; 
Meerkerk, Van Den Eijnden, Vermulst, & Garretsen, 2009), assessing time 
perception for longer durations (e.g., above 30 minutes) would be interesting. 
In conclusion, these two studies suggest that gamers exhibit a better time 
perception in the sub-second area, but further studies are needed to explore this 
perception, and its underlying mechanisms. Furthermore, it would be interesting to 
explore the impact of playing different game genres on time perception, as it is 
expected that videogames which do not focus on reflexes would not improve sub-
second time perception. It is of interest as some games need the players to be 
attentive on several delays (i.e., delays before using their own abilities, and delays 
before an opponent can use their own abilities). 
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2.5. Results: Negative impact 
2.5.1. Multi-second time perception 
Gamers often experience time loss, that is, playing longer than intended, and 
not realizing how long it has been since they started playing (Wood & Griffiths, 
2007; Wood, Griffiths, & Parke, 2007). As a matter of fact, some questionnaires 
evaluating excessive use of videogames include questions on time loss due to its 
importance in excessive use (e.g., Demetrovics et al., 2012). Nevertheless, little is 
known on the mechanisms behind this impairment among gamers, although it could 
be a consequence of impaired time perception. As mentioned in the first chapter, 
time perception literature is currently divided between two retrospective and 
prospective time perception (Levin & Zakay, 1989). The first is conscious and ad-
hoc and the second one is unconscious and post-hoc. The following research on the 
topic explored both types of time perception and yielded disparate results.  
The first study on time perception among gamers explored retrospective 
time perception (RTP; Rau, Peng, & Yang, 2006). The authors recruited expert 
gamers and novices who had to play a well-known videogame (i.e., Diablo II, a 
dungeon crawler real-time role-playing game) for one of three different durations 
(i.e., 30, 60, and 90 minutes). After the game session, participants were asked to 
stop playing, and the experimenters assessed how much time the participant needed 
to actually stop playing (delay time), the acceptance of break-off, the satisfaction 
with the session, and a time estimation of play duration. First, there was no 
significant difference for the delay time, acceptance, and satisfaction level between 
the two groups. Second, the experts tended to underestimate the 60-minute-duration 
while the novices overestimated it (i.e., p=.058). Nonetheless, there were several 
limitations in this experiment, as the participants were informed that the experiment 
would last a maximum of 90 minutes, they were able to reach an almost perfect 
time estimation in the 90-minute-duration group. Besides, when tested, there were 
30% of internet-addicted participants in the expert group compared to 35% in the 
novice group. It is possible that many novices just played other games, thus greatly 
biasing the results. This would explain why the novices enjoyed playing this game 
significantly more than the experts.  
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In another study, Tobin and Grondin (2009) explored the impact of activity 
type (i.e., reading or playing a videogame) on both prospective and retrospective 
time perception. For this purpose, they recruited adolescents who were allocated to 
two groups (i.e., prospective and retrospective) and had to perform three 
consecutive activities (i.e., playing a game for 8 and 24 minutes, and reading a text 
for 8 minutes). This distribution highlights the first limitation of this experiment as 
there was no comparison for the 24-minute-session of videogame play, while there 
was one for the 8-minute-session. This is the only study exploring videogame use 
and time perception association without comparing gamers versus non-gamers, as 
the study used a correlational approach by controlling both videogames use and 
abuse. Although the 24-minute gaming session was underestimated, it could be due 
to either the gaming activity or the length itself; the lack of control task for this 
duration prevented any conclusion. On the other hand, the main objective of this 
study was fulfilled, the participants underestimated the 8-minute gaming session 
compared to the reading session. The authors further compared time perception of 
disordered gamers (n = 14) to the remainder of the sample (n = 102). This 
comparison led to a significant difference only for the 24-minute-session, with 
disordered gamers underestimating more greatly the duration of the gaming session 
than the healthy participants. This comparison could not be generalized due to the 
small sample of disordered gamers. As a result, they compared participants playing 
more than seven hours per week (n = 27) and participants playing between one and 
six hours (n = 58); leading to more balanced group sizes. This comparison 
replicated the previous analysis, with frequent gamers underestimating the 24-
minute-session more than the “casual” gamers.  
Another study explored time distortion experienced while gaming (Wood & 
Griffiths, 2007). In this experiment, participants played one out of two videogames 
(i.e., to allow participants to play a game on their favourite platform, computer or 
console) for 45 minutes and were asked to fill in several questionnaires before and 
after the gaming session. While playing, they were interrupted three times (i.e., after 
13, 37, and 45 minutes), being asked how long they had played. The only result 
related to time distortion came from the questionnaire as two-thirds of the 
participants (67.5%) reported frequently/always experiencing time loss. No 
association between videogame play and the duration evaluation was found after 
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each interruption. However, as the authors did not inform the participants before 
the experiment that time estimation would be evaluated in this study, a 
methodological issue arose. The first evaluation of time duration fitted the 
retrospective definition of time perception while the two subsequent evaluations 
arguably fitted the prospective definition. Indeed, as Grondin and Plourde (2007) 
stated, as soon as a participant is asked to make an estimation of play duration, the 
following estimation(s) will systematically become prospective as participants will 
begin to realize what they are being asked to do.  
In brief, despite the frequent time loss reported by gamers (Wood & 
Griffiths, 2007; Wood et al., 2007), studies exploring multi-second perception 
abilities among these gamers show no consistent results. Some studies show biased 
time perception (i.e., without clarifying the paradigm concerned in the results; 
Tobin & Grondin, 2009) or nearly significantly impaired one (i.e., in a retrospective 
paradigm; Rau et al., 2006), while other studies show no such association (i.e., in a 
prospective paradigm; Rivero et al., 2012; Wood & Griffiths, 2007). This lack of 
significant results could be due to the short durations used (i.e., 60 seconds for 
Rivero et al., 2012), or the way that time perception was assessed (e.g., not 
controlling the prospective and retrospective paradigm while measuring time 
perception; Wood & Griffiths, 2007). The near significant results (i.e., p=.059 for 
Rau et al., 2006) may be explained by a lack of rigor, as they did not control whether 
the novice gamers had any expertise in other games than the tested one. Yet, as the 
novice group included 35% of Internet addicts, it is highly probable that these 
participants would have spent a fair amount of time on videogames. In conclusion, 
the current results do not allow any direct conclusion, and little is known on the 
interaction between gaming and time perception. This interaction will be explored 
in depth in the third chapter of this thesis, and the potential variables interacting 
with both gaming and time perception will be analysed thoroughly.  
2.5.2. Inhibition 
Research on potentially impaired inhibition among disordered gamers has 
been motivated by the presence of such an impairment in other behavioural 
addictions (e.g., gambling disorder; Ioannidis, Hook, Wickham, Grant, & 
Chamberlain, 2019). This would imply that disordered gamers would play because 
they cannot prevent themselves from doing it. Inhibition in these studies can be 
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defined in two different ways, as either the restraint of a pre-potent motor response 
(i.e., the ability to inhibit an automatic response) or the cancellation of a pre-potent 
motor response (i.e., the ability to stop an already engaged response).  
The restraint mechanism is often assessed through the Go/NoGo task (i.e., 
pressing a button for a specific stimulus but not for another one) or the Stroop test 
(i.e., reading a colour name while ignoring in which hue it is written – interference 
inhibition). Experiments using the Go/NoGo mostly showed an impaired inhibition 
level among gamers (Littel et al., 2012; Yao, Wang, et al., 2015). The only study 
failing to find any result regarding a Go/NoGo task only recruited 30 participants 
(Chen et al., 2015) compared to other studies with higher numbers of participant (n 
= 52; Little et al., 2012, and n = 66; Yao et al., 2015). The Stroop test was only used 
in two studies explored among gamers yielding contradicting results. While a first 
one failed to find any significant association between gaming disorder and 
inhibition (Yao, Wang, et al., 2015), another study found partial support (Bailey, 
West, & Anderson, 2010). More specifically, Bailey et al. (2010) recruited frequent 
gamers (i.e., playing 43 hours per week on average) and casual gamers (two hours 
per week on average). The study used two Response-to-Stimulus Interval (RSI) 
lengths (i.e., 500ms and 2000ms). Using this manipulation, frequent gamers showed 
poorer results under the longer RSI condition, implying that these participants were 
unable to maintain their control during longer durations.  
In another study, Colzato, van den Wildenberg, Zmigrod, and Hommel 
(2013) explored the other type of inhibition, the cancellation of pre-potent motor 
response, among FPS gamers. This type of inhibition was tested via the Stop-Signal 
Task (SST) which is similar to the Go/NoGo. The main difference is that the 
stimulus will always first appear as a “Go” (i.e., initiating a response from the 
participant) before morphing into a “NoGo” (i.e., forcing the participant to cancel 
its response). In Colzato and colleague’s study (2013), the sample included FPS 
players (i.e., playing at least five hours per week for a year) and control participants 
who were all tested on an SST and an N-Back Task (NBT). Not only did the gamers 
not show any sign of impaired inhibition, they were faster than the non-gamers, 
contradicting the rest of the literature.  
A possible explanation for this unexpected result may be the emotional 
affect involved in gaming. Indeed, the UPPS [Urgency, Premeditation, 
  
75 
Perseverance, Sensation Seeking] Impulsive Behavior Scale (Whiteside & Lynam, 
2001) describes the lack of inhibition (i.e., urgency) as a difficulty to inhibit a 
reaction to an emotional stimulus (e.g., drinking alcohol after a break-up). Two 
studies included emotional affect through gaming stimuli during the task, with the 
purpose of impairing the inhibition of the gamers, and both studies produced 
significant results (Ko et al., 2015; Liu et al., 2014). Liu et al. (2014) added gaming 
pictures in half of the blocks of a classic Go/NoGo task, testing both disordered 
gamers (i.e., according to the Diagnostic Criteria for Internet Addiction for College 
Students [DCIA-C]; Ko et al., 2009) and control participants. The analysis showed 
that gamers only exhibited an impaired inhibition under the gaming-pictures 
condition, with no significant differences found in the control condition. In a second 
study, Ko et al. (2015) used a Directed Forgetting Task (DFT) including gaming 
words with disordered gamers (i.e., same criteria as the previous study) and control 
participants. In the DFT, participants were presented a series of words (i.e., either 
neutral or gaming-related), some of them followed with an instruction to “not 
remember” these (i.e., in order to inhibit the attentional focus on some words). The 
results matched those of Liu et al. (2014) with the gamers remembering more 
gaming-related-words and fewer neutral words than control participants, thus 
implying worse inhibition in comparison to non-gamers.  
In conclusion, the current literature on the inhibition impairment among 
gamers currently provides contrasting findings. Some studies demonstrated an 
impairment among disordered gamers (Ko et al., 2015; Littel et al., 2012), or partial 
support (Bailey et al., 2010; Liu et al., 2014; Yao, Wang, et al., 2015), while other 
studies show no such association (Chen et al., 2015; Colzato et al., 2013). The 
differing results may partially be explained by the tasks used, and thus, the type of 
inhibition tested. For example, Bailey et al. (2010) found that using a Stroop task, 
gamers showed impaired inhibition only under a long response-to-stimulus interval, 
while Yao et al. (2015) only found impaired inhibition in the Go/NoGo task, and 
not in the Stroop Task. This could mean that gamers only show impaired automatic 
response inhibition and not interference inhibition. This supposition explains the 
findings of Littel et al. (2012), however, it does not cover the lack of significance 
in the Go/NoGo task (Chen et al., 2015). It is of interest that when including gaming 
pictures, two studies found that gamers exhibited poorer inhibition despite 
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measuring two types of inhibition (Ko et al., 2015; Liu et al., 2014). These findings 
adhere to the concept of urgency developed by Whiteside and Lynam (2001) where 
under emotional affect, individuals tend to exhibit poorer inhibition. Gaming-
related pictures could have elicited emotional affect, and thus may have impaired 
the gamers’ inhibition. 
2.5.3. Decision-making 
Decision-making can be studied using different paradigms. For instance, it 
can be assessed through tasks measuring the passage between an unknown situation 
to a risky one. In such tasks, the participant does not know the rules at the beginning 
of the task, and learns these through performing the task (e.g., Iowa Gambling Task, 
IGT; Bechara, Damasio, Damasio, & Anderson, 1994). This type of task is thus 
based on a learning process, with participants having worse scores failing to 
understand or perceive these rules. Another way to study such processes is risky 
decision-making, that is, tasks where the participants clearly know about the rules 
as they start the task (e.g., Game of Dice Task [GDT]; Brand et al., 2005; Balloon 
Analogue Risk Task [BART]; Lejuez et al., 2002). Finally, decision-making can be 
assessed through delay-discounting paradigms, an economist perception of 
decision-making stating that the more a reward is delayed, the less value will be 
perceived. In such tasks, participants must make a choice between an immediate 
and small reward (e.g., £10 now) or a delayed bigger reward (e.g., £100 in a year). 
While the two first types of tasks lead to differentiating an impaired learning 
process (i.e., failing to improve in IGT-like tasks), or impaired basic decision-
making (i.e., low scores in risky tasks), the delay-discounting paradigm assesses the 
inability of disordered gamers to postpone a gaming session.  
Two studies have compared the Probability Discounting Task (PDT) 
performance within disorder gaming and control participants in group analysis, thus 
considering risky decision-making (Lin, Zhou, Dong, & Du, 2015; Wang et al., 
2016). In the PDT, participants are presented two choices with a varying reward 
and probability of receiving it (e.g., 100% chance of receiving £10 against 50% of 
receiving £15). The two studies found the same results that impaired decision-
making with riskier choices was more prevalent among disordered gamers. Lin et 
al. (2015) showed a significant correlation between the disorder severity and risk-
taking. Nonetheless, since Lin et al. (2015) assessed internet addiction rather than 
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gaming disorder (i.e., using the Internet Addiction Test; Young, 1998 and recruiting 
participants spending more than half their internet time on games), no definitive 
conclusions can be drawn. These findings on risky decision-making have been 
replicated with the Cups Task (i.e., another task measuring probability discounting), 
showing the same findings, that is riskier choices for the disordered gamers (Yao, 
Chen, et al., 2015; Yao, Wang, et al., 2015). Furthermore, using the GDT among 
disordered gamers (i.e., according to a modified version of the IAT for World of 
Warcraft) and control participants, Pawlikowski and Brand (2011) reported the 
same finding. In the GDT, participants have to bet virtual money on the outcome of 
a dice with pre-programmed choices varying in terms of odds and money wagered 
(i.e., the less likely the outcome, the more money wagered). The results showed that 
at the end of the task, disordered gamers had less money than the control 
participants, indicating riskier choices. There was also a significant and negative 
correlation between disorder severity and the GDT score. Finally, on top of testing 
risky decision-making, Yao, Wang, et al. (2015) demonstrated that disordered 
gamers had a lower improvement in the Iowa Gambling Task than non-gamers. 
However, given the poor results in the risky decision-making tasks (Pawlikowski 
& Brand, 2011; Wang et al., 2016) , it is more likely that the disordered gamers 
have an impaired risk evaluation than an impaired learning process. Consequently, 
more studies exploring the learning processes involved in IGT-like tasks are needed 
to confirm such an explanation.  
Only two studies have explored the delay discounting abilities of disordered 
gamers. In the first study, Weinstein, Abu, Timor, and Mama (2016) tested both 
disordered gamers (i.e., according to the Problematic Online Gaming 
Questionnaire, POGQ; Demetrovics et al., 2012) and control participants on a 
BART and a Delay Discounting Task (DDT). The authors replicated the previous 
results on risk-taking among excessive users with the BART, with disordered 
gamers showing worse results than the control participants. For the DDT, the 
disordered gamers discounted the rewards more steeply than the control 
participants, that is, they preferred immediate and smaller rewards opposed to more 
important delayed ones. Using another task to measure Delay Discounting (i.e., the 
Single Key Impulsivity Paradigm, SKIP), Nuyens et al. (2016) replicated these 
findings. The SKIP is an implicit measure of delay discounting, participants being 
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asked to wait as long as they can before clicking on a picture. The longer they wait, 
the more they earn points or money. In this experiment, the earliest stages from the 
SKIP were negatively correlated with the score on the Problem Online Gaming 
Questionnaire (Demetrovics et al., 2012), while the latest stages were not, implying 
that even though the disordered gamers had a worse delay-discounting level, they 
had the same level of learning process.  
All studies on decision-making among disordered gamers show similar 
findings –impaired decision-making (Lin et al., 2015; Pawlikowski & Brand, 2011; 
Wang et al., 2016; Yao, Chen, et al., 2015; Yao, Wang, et al., 2015). Furthermore, 
it appears that excessive gamers tend to make riskier choices (Lin et al., 2015; 
Pawlikowski & Brand, 2011), which could explain their tendency to play 
videogames more than intended (e.g., playing more despite being more tired the 
next day). On the other hand, the results on the learning processes at stake in the 
decision-making are unclear, firstly due to the lack of studies on this specific 
process (i.e., only two studies; Nuyens et al., 2016; Yao, Wang, et al., 2015), and 
secondly due to opposite results (i.e., significant results; Nuyens et al., 2016; no 
significant results; Yao, Wang, et al., 2015). Finally, the two studies using delay-
discounting tasks found that disordered gamers had difficulty in delaying rewards 
(Nuyens et al., 2016; Weinstein et al., 2016), which might explain their tendency to 
play immediately instead of waiting. In conclusion, more studies are needed in this 
field, as little is known on either the learning processes and the delay-discounting.  
2.6. Discussion 
It appears that gaming can impact cognitive processes both positively and 
negatively. Firstly, gamers appear to have better conscious control of their attention 
(i.e., top-down attention; Cain & Mitroff, 2011; Chisholm & Kingstone, 2012) and 
a better processing speed (Castel et al., 2005; Mishra et al., 2011). These 
performances appear to be differently affected depending on the videogame genre 
played, FPS gamers showing better results than RPG gamers (Krishnan et al., 
2013). Secondly, gamers exhibited better cognitive flexibility (i.e., better task-
switching performance; Colzato, 2010; Karle et al., 2010). This improved flexibility 
may be dependent upon the game genre played because FPS players were 
significantly outperformed by RTS players (Dobrowolski et al., 2015). Moreover, 
two studies explored the underlying mechanisms of superior performance by 
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gamers. Nonetheless, these studies failed to find any significant results other than 
even better results when the gamers were cued or had more time to prepare their 
response to a stimulus (Karle et al., 2010). These studies match the results from the 
attentional studies, as better top-down attention led to such results too. Thirdly, 
gamers showed better multisensory temporal processing (i.e., ability to differentiate 
simultaneous or consecutive stimuli; Donohue et al., 2010; Rivero et al., 2012). 
Nonetheless, despite their better overall cognitive performance, gamers exhibited a 
bias towards visual stimuli compared to auditory ones (i.e., a trend reporting that 
the visual stimulus came first instead of the auditory one), with the control 
participants showing the opposite trend (Donohue et al., 2010). In short, gamers 
outperformed non-gamers on three different cognitive processes: task-switching, 
sub-second time perception, and attentional processes. Additionally, two studies 
raised an important issue by comparing different game genres in their experiment, 
leading to significant differences between these genres (Dobrowolski et al., 2015; 
Krishnan et al., 2013). Such differences may indicate that all game genres may 
impact on cognitive processes differently, depending upon their structural 
characteristics. Additionally, it should be noted that almost all the studies reviewed 
assessing the positive impacts explored action videogames as a global construct, 
despite that this is an umbrella designation grouping very different game genres 
(e.g., FPS, RTS, MOBA, etc.).  
Importantly, no causal link can be confirmed regarding the improved 
cognitive processes among videogame players due to the quasi-experimental design 
used. Nonetheless, several studies explored the training effect of videogames on 
several cognitive processes. Even if these were not included in the review, as the 
researchers did not recruit gamers per se but non-gamers that were asked to play in 
order to improve specific skills, they are noteworthy. Indeed, these studies tend to 
support a causal effect of videogames on the improvement observed instead of the 
possibility that individuals with improved cognitive skills play games due to their 
higher level on these skills. Concerning the switching costs, several studies found 
that training non-gamers, or inexperienced gamers, on videogames led to significant 
improvements, with reduced switching costs (e.g., Glass, Maddox, & Love, 2013; 
Oei & Patterson, 2014; Strobach et al., 2012). Regarding attention, the same pattern 
of results was observed in several studies using videogames in order to improve 
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processing speed or visual attention (Belchior et al., 2013; Schubert et al., 2015). 
To the best of the author’s knowledge, there is no study that has explored how 
videogame training could improve or worsen sub-second time perception. 
However, it is important to put these results in light of a meta-analysis led by Sala, 
Tatlidil and Gobet (2018) who explored the effect of videogames on cognition 
considering the type of study (i.e., comparison of gamers and non-gamers, training 
studies, and correlational studies). What the authors showed is that while there was 
a small significant effect for the comparison and correlational studies, there was no 
significant overall effect in the training studies. These results contrast with Bediou 
et al.’s (2018) meta-analysis showing how action videogames affect the gamers’ 
cognitive skills. This discrepancy between the two papers may result from the 
specific focus of Bediou et al. (2018) on the action videogame genre, while Sala et 
al., (2018) used a broader approach to gaming (i.e., all game genres included). This 
is of interest when Bediou et al., (2018) mentioned that the type of videogame 
played may influence the impact on cognition. This implication is based on the fact 
that intervention studies comparing action videogames to other game genres (e.g., 
Tetris, Real-Time Strategy games) still yielded significant results. In brief, little can 
be concluded on a possible causal effect of playing videogames on cognition and 
more research in this domain is required. 
Although gamers exhibited better sub-second time perception, it was 
expected that they would show impaired multi-second time perception, as time loss 
is a common consequence among those experiencing gaming disorder (Wood & 
Griffiths, 2007; Wood et al., 2007). Yet, the studies exploring time perception failed 
to provide any clear conclusion, some studies not finding any significant differences 
(Rivero et al., 2012; Wood & Griffiths, 2007), while other studies found either 
significant results (Tobin & Grondin, 2009) or near significant ones (Rau et al., 
2006). Nonetheless, taken as a whole, results pointed towards impaired time 
perception despite some methodological errors (e.g., no separation of RTP and PTP, 
no verification of the control group’s gaming habits) biasing the results. Another 
cognitive process impaired through gaming disorder is decision-making. Studies 
have shown that both risky decision-making (e.g., Pawlikowski & Brand, 2011; 
Yao, Wang, et al., 2015) and delay-discounting (Nuyens et al., 2016; Weinstein et 
al., 2016) were significantly impaired among disordered gamers. The results 
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regarding the learning process in decision-making are contrasting, as only two 
studies explored these associations, each leading to opposite results (i.e., an 
improvement throughout the task, Nuyens et al., 2016; lower score on the IGT, Yao, 
Wang, et al., 2015). Therefore, more studies on the learning level of disordered 
gamers in decision-making tasks are needed, even if it is probable that gamers only 
have impaired risky decision-making with a correct learning process (i.e., ability to 
learn and apply the rules in a decision-making task) according to the other studies’ 
results. Finally, it has been hypothesized that disordered gamers would engage in 
this behaviour due to an impaired inhibition. The current literature is not clear on 
this aspect, with some studies showing an impairment (Ko et al., 2015; Littel et al., 
2012), and other studies finding no impairment, or an even better performance 
among disordered gamers (Colzato et al., 2013). Nevertheless, meeting the urgency 
definition of Whiteside and Lynam (2001), two studies found that disordered 
gamers exhibited impaired inhibition only when gaming pictures were included in 
the task (Ko et al., 2015; Liu et al., 2014). This means that disordered gamers may 
engage in problematic behaviour despite knowing the possible consequences (e.g., 
playing videogames late at night despite the risk of being tired in the morning) as 
the videogame stimuli emotionally aroused them. 
Despite some differences found in the results, the studies exploring the 
improvement among gamers yielded relatively consistent findings including 
improved (i) sub-second time perception, (ii) switching abilities, and (iii) 
attentional abilities (mostly the top-down control, and processing abilities). These 
studies only recruited healthy gamers, and mostly studied the action game genre 
that comprises numerous game genres (e.g., RTS, FPS, RPGs). The studies yielding 
a negative impact on the cognitive processes among gamers do not show such 
consistency, as they revealed contrasting results for both the multi-second time 
perception and the inhibition studies. The studies exploring decision-making 
provided consistent results (i.e., impaired decision-making abilities in risky 
situations). Again, the populations studied may have impacted on the results 
reported. While the studies exploring the positive consequences of gaming recruited 
participants from the healthy population, the studies on the negative consequences 
of gaming solely recruited disordered gamers. To the best of the author’s 
knowledge, only one study explored the difference of attentional control between 
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disordered and healthy gamers, finding no significant difference (Collins & 
Freeman, 2014). This results in no possible definitive conclusion due to the lack of 
comparison between disordered and healthy gamers in the studies outlined. 
Consequently, the current literature examining the effect of gaming on cognitive 
ability requires further study comparing the two populations. 
Future studies investigating the impact of gaming on cognitive processes 
should also examine executive functions using validated models of cognitive 
processes. For example, the Miyake model of Executive Functions (Miyake, 2000) 
includes three different functions: (i) shifting (or task-switching), (ii) inhibition, and 
(iii) updating. According to this model, several tasks are needed to fully explore 
each of these functions, and despite the number of studies exploring both inhibition 
and shifting, only part of the tasks have been used. For example, in the switching 
task there were no studies examining local-global shifting, which is the ability to 
identify either a bigger figure (e.g., a triangle or a square) or smaller figures 
composing the bigger one. Finally, the updating function, (i.e., the ability to encode 
information in working memory, and gradually delete old any unnecessary 
information when it becomes useless and replace it with new more important 
information) have yet to be explored. Gaming may improve this function, as most 
current videogames require gamers to monitor different stimuli during their session 
(e.g., objectives, ammunition, and whether the team member is still alive). 
 In conclusion, the studies reviewed suggest that gaming can have a positive 
impact on cognitive processes for healthy gamers, contrasting with the negative 
consequences brought by disordered gaming. However, this field of study needs 
more rigour because little is known about the (i) different impacts concerning 
disordered or casual gaming, or (ii) impact regarding different game genres. Such 
studies may be of use for the videogame industry as the results indicate that 
videogames can have a positive impact on gamers, as long as gameplay is non-
disordered. Indeed, those in the gaming studies field should work in co-operation 
with game developers to prevent gamers developing addictive behaviours.  
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Chapter 3: The potential interaction between time perception and gaming 
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3.1. Chapter overview 
In the first chapter of this thesis, time perception was defined and the main 
cognitive and emotional processes affecting it have been explored. The purpose of 
that chapter was to understand which types of variable were to be controlled in this 
thesis. The second chapter, on the other hand, explored which types of cognitive 
processes were affected by gaming, whether it was healthy or disordered use. The 
purpose of this chapter was twofold. First it allowed to explore the different types 
of design used in this field of research, which helped designing the experiments of 
this thesis. The second aim, directly linked to this chapter, was to explore which 
cognitive functions were common between the research on gaming and time 
perception.  
This current chapter builds from these two chapters, and examines which 
processes are different (i.e., either improved or altered) among gamers (i.e., whether 
healthy or disordered) and could explain time loss observed in this population. The 
chapter is divided into six parts: (i) an introductive section briefly summing up time 
perception, gaming, and previous research on their interaction; (ii) the common 
cognitive processes between gaming and time perception; (iii) the emotional 
processes in common between time perception and gaming; (iv) the implication of 
emotion regulation in this interaction; (v) the impact of flow; and (vi) a conclusion.  
3.2. Introduction 
3.2.1. Gaming 
In recent years, videogames have become one of the major leisure activities 
with more than two billion people playing at differing levels of involvement 
(Statista, 2018a). In most cases, gaming is non-problematic and associated with 
positive outcomes (e.g., Colder Carras et al., 2017; Granic, Lobel, & Engels, 2014; 
Nuyens, Kuss, Lopez-Fernandez, & Griffiths, 2019). It is however recognized that 
for a minority, excessive videogame playing can result in a number of problems. 
Indeed, gaming disorder has been associated with deficits affecting specific 
cognitive processes (e.g., decision-making and inhibitory control; see Nuyens, 
Kuss, Lopez-Fernandez, & Griffiths [2017] for a systematic review) and with 
various psychological and health-related negative outcomes (e.g., Achab et al., 
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2011; Gentile, 2009; Hellström et al., 2012; Männikkö, Ruotsalainen, Miettunen, 
Pontes, & Kääriäinen, 2020).  
Negative consequences of videogame overuse have become a health 
concern because a small percentage of gamers are impacted by problems emerging 
as a consequence of gaming disorder (e.g., Gentile, 2009; Rumpf et al., 2018; 
Taechoyotin, Tongro, & Piyaraj, 2018; Yen et al., 2008). This concern led to the 
inclusion of Internet Gaming Disorder (IGD) in Section 3 (i.e., disorders requiring 
further research) of the latest (fifth) edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
of Mental Disorders (DSM-5; American Psychiatric Association, 2013), and 
Gaming Disorder in the eleventh edition of the International Classification of 
Diseases (ICD-11; World Health Organization, 2016). Based on these recent 
developments, the present chapter uses the terms ‘gaming disorder’ and ‘disordered 
gamer’ for the sake of consistency. 
One factor of interest existing in both disordered and healthy gaming is 
compromised time control (i.e., time loss) which can be defined as the 
underestimation of time spent in a gaming session (e.g., Chou & Ting, 2003; 
Meerkerk et al., 2009). This phenomenon is clinically relevant as time spent playing 
videogames can directly affect an individual’s life if not controlled properly (e.g., 
compromising sleep quality, occupation and/or education, and/or relationships; 
Griffiths, Kuss, & King, 2012). Additionally, compromised time control is 
frequently encountered by clinicians dealing with patients suffering from gaming 
disorder (Torres-Rodríguez, Griffiths, Carbonell, Farriols-Hernando, & Torres-
Jimenez, 2019), but little is known regarding the psychological mechanisms 
underlying compromised time control. Time loss may potentially be explained by 
impaired time perception, resulting in difficulty in keeping track of within-session 
gaming duration. Although the present paper focuses on problem gaming, it is 
worth noting that impaired time control has been related to a wide range of 
psychopathological disorders, including Attention Deficit and Hyperactivity 
Disorder (e.g., Bielefeld et al., 2017), bipolar disorder (e.g., Bolbecker et al., 2014), 
schizophrenia (e.g., Ciullo et al., 2018), and substance use disorder (e.g., Wittmann, 
Leland, Churan, & Paulus, 2007). Consequently, compromised time control 
constitutes a trans-diagnostic etiopathological process (e.g., Dudley, Kuyken, & 
Padesky, 2011). Importantly, as literature examining the relationship between 
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disordered gaming and time perception is scarce, research on healthy gaming will 
be explored to delineate the possible associations between time perception and 
disordered gaming.  
3.2.2. Time perception 
According to influential models, time perception depends on two separate 
processes: a conscious and ad-hoc process where attention is directed towards time 
(i.e., prospective time perception [PTP]), and an unconscious and post-hoc process 
where attention is diverted away from time (i.e., retrospective time perception 
[RTP]) (Levin & Zakay, 1989). The prospective process is conceptualized in the 
Attentional Gate Model (AGM; Zakay & Block, 1995) and the retrospective 
process is mainly conceptualized within the Contextual Change Model (CCM; 
Block & Reed, 1978). 
3.2.3. Previous exploration of time perception among gamers 
From a clinical perspective impaired time perception amongst gamers 
appears obvious (i.e., compromised time control is often observed in gaming 
disorder). Still, to date, only four studies have explored impaired time perception 
among problem gamers, leading to mixed results (i.e., Rau et al., 2006; Rivero et 
al., 2012; Tobin & Grondin, 2009; Wood & Griffiths, 2007). Since these studies 
were explored in the previous chapter, they will only be summarized here as a 
reminder. Rau et al. (2006) asked experts gamers (i.e., on the tested game) and 
novice gamers to play Diablo II (a dungeon crawler real-time role-playing game) 
for three different time intervals (i.e., 30, 60, and 90 minutes) and asked them to 
estimate the duration of the session retrospectively. Even though the difference 
between the two groups was non-significant (p=.059), the expert gamers 
underestimated the 60-minute-duration while the novice gamers overestimated it. 
In order to compare the impact of different activities on both PTP and RTP, Tobin 
and Grondin (2009) made adolescents perform three consecutive activities (i.e., 
playing a game for 8 and 24 minutes, and reading a text for 8 minutes). The 24-
minute-session of video-gaming was underestimated and the 8-min gaming session 
was more frequently underestimated than the reading session. Furthermore, when 
comparing disordered gamers (i.e., according to the scale developed by Griffiths & 
Hunt, 1998) to healthy gamers as well as when comparing frequent (i.e., more than 
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seven hours per week) and casual (i.e., between one and six hours per week) players, 
the authors showed an underestimating trend among the more ‘excessive’ gamers.  
In another experiment, Wood and Griffiths (2007) asked participants to play 
one of two videogames (i.e., participants could choose whether they wanted to play 
a console or computer game) for 45 minutes and were interrupted at three pre-
determined moments (i.e., after 13, 37, and 45 minutes), where they were asked to 
report how long they had played. Results showed that there was no significant 
association between videogame play and temporal estimation after each pause. The 
final study exploring time perception among gamers was conducted by Rivero et 
al. (2012) who examined both sub-second and multi-second time perception. The 
first one was relative to reflexes and action planning rather than duration estimation 
and is thus not discussed here. Participants were asked to perform an estimation 
task (i.e., estimating three different durations of 10, 30, and 60s) and a temporal 
production task (i.e., pressing a button for 5 or 45s). No significant differences 
between the occasional and frequent gamers were found which may have been due 
to the small sample used.  
The research on time perception and gaming (i.e., whether disordered or 
healthy) currently suffers from a lack cohesion, as the aforementioned studies 
produced very different findings. From a clinical perspective, understanding the 
underlying mechanisms of compromised time control is important in order to 
improve and tailor treatment interventions. Accordingly, the purpose of this chapter 
is to elaborate on the psychological processes and mechanisms susceptible to cause 
compromised time control while gaming. Two different pathways will be 
considered, underlain by either cognitive or emotional processes. Indeed, past 
research has emphasized that problem gaming is associated with specific cognitive 
(e.g., executive functions) and emotional factors (e.g., emotion regulation 
strategies) that are postulated to play a pivotal role in time perception (e.g., 
Baudouin, Vanneste, Isingrini, & Pouthas, 2006; Cain et al., 2014; Colzato et al., 
2013; Fayolle et al., 2014). 
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3.3. Cognitive processes in time perception and gaming 
3.3.1. Attentional processes 
 Attention processes play a crucial role in time perception, even if it is 
postulated that they affect RTP and PTP in an opposite way (Block & Zakay, 1997). 
In RTP, performing a task which elicits more selective attention lengthens the 
perceived duration via the larger number of events happening during the interval 
(Block & Reed, 1978). In PTP, performing a more cognitively demanding task 
shortens its perceived duration because participants pay less attention to time 
(Zakay & Block, 1995). In experimental situations, the first way to assess how 
attention affects PTP is to divert the participant’s attention away from time by using 
a dual-task paradigm. In doing so, researchers have observed a systematic 
underestimation of time when participants have had to perform a non-temporal 
concurrent task while estimating time duration (e.g., Burle & Casini, 2001; 
Chinchanachokchai et al., 2015). In another attempt to manipulate attention 
demand, it has been shown that it is possible to consciously divert an individual’s 
attention from time to a different increment (Casini & Macar, 1997; Kladopoulos 
et al., 2004; Macar et al., 1994). For example, Macar et al. (1994) asked participants 
to perform both a word categorization task (i.e., counting animals’ names) and a 
temporal task (i.e., estimating a word series’ duration). The participants were 
further told to focus their attention either entirely on one of the two tasks (i.e., 
100%/0%), mainly on one of the two tasks (i.e., 75%/25%), or equally between the 
two tasks (i.e., 50%/50%). Results showed that the more attention was directed to 
the categorization task, the more errors were made in the temporal task and the 
fewer errors were made in the categorization task. A final way of testing the 
attentional effect is by using cues to explore attention orientation. Here, participants 
received a cue regarding the following stimulus (e.g., its duration, location, 
modality) which helped them to focus on it due to their preparation. As they were 
more focused on the stimulus, and as a result less on time perception, an 
underestimation of time was observed (Mattes & Ulrich, 1998; Osugi et al., 2016).  
Many videogames (especially action videogames such as first-person 
shooter [FPS]) require continuous and flexible attention from players, and even the 
slightest lapse in attention can lead to losing the game. Attention can be divided 
into two separate processes, namely top-down attention (i.e., when individuals 
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consciously direct their attention towards a specific stimulus) and bottom-up 
attention (i.e., when individuals’ attention is attracted toward a prominent stimulus). 
In addition, top-down attention can be ‘activated’ by either normal cues (i.e., 
warning the participant that a stimulus is about to appear) or a spatial cue (i.e., 
directing participants’ attention towards a specific spatial area). The current 
literature demonstrates that videogame players appear to exhibit better top-down 
control (e.g., Cain et al., 2014; Chisholm & Kingstone, 2015b; Irons et al., 2011) 
which could be explained by the requirement to focus on the relevant stimuli in-
game (e.g., to focus an individual’s attention on important objective-related stimuli 
without being distracted). Furthermore, some studies exhibited improved bottom-
up processing (e.g., Castel et al., 2005; Mishra et al., 2011; Schubert et al., 2015), 
which could be a consequence of important stimuli appearing randomly within a 
game requiring a fast relocation of attention from the gamers. However, these 
studies used different tasks and paradigms to measure attention (e.g., Theory of 
Visual Attention tests, anti-cueing task, and compound search task) and recruited 
gamers playing different games genres, which complicates their comparison. 
Another way to explore attentional processes among gamers is to utilize attentional 
biases. The basic principle is to include game-related stimuli (i.e., either words or 
pictures) in a previously validated task. The studies using this paradigm among 
disordered gamers have systematically demonstrated that gamers unintentionally 
direct their attention towards the gaming stimuli and have difficulty in disengaging 
from these stimuli (Jeromin, Rief, & Barke, 2016; Lorenz et al., 2013; Metcalf & 
Pammer, 2011; van Holst et al., 2012). 
Interestingly, a study by Krishnan, Kang, Sperling, and Srinivasan (2013) 
compared players of two different genres of videogames (i.e., role-playing game 
[RPG] and FPS game players) to assess whether game genre impacts the 
performance on attentional tasks. Findings demonstrated overall better performance 
by the FPS players. Due to the lack of control group (i.e., participants who did not 
play any videogames), the only conclusion that can be drawn from this study was 
that FPS players have better attentional processes than RPG players. Consequently, 
nothing can be concluded on the direct contribution of playing RPGs on time 
perception compared to non-gamers. 
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3.3.2. Working memory 
 Another important process in prospective time perception is working 
memory, especially when an individual compares two different time durations. 
According to Baddeley (1992), working memory comprises three components (i.e., 
visuospatial sketchpad, phonological loop, and central executive). The visuospatial 
sketchpad plays a central role in retaining and manipulating the visuospatial 
imagery while the phonological loop has the same role concerning auditory 
information. The central executive facilitates controlled and proactive cognitive 
processes and coordinates the visuospatial sketchpad and the phonological loop. 
According to the AGM (Zakay & Block, 1995), working memory plays a central 
role in the decision-making process of PTP. First, pulses are gathered in an 
accumulator in working memory, allowing an individual to make a time duration 
estimation. After the estimation is made, the response is stored in a reference 
memory which is more durable. This storage allows the comparison of a newly 
observed time duration estimation with a previous experienced time duration via 
working memory. Research on the relationship between time perception and 
working memory has mainly – if not entirely – been conducted in prospective 
settings, confirming the AGM theory. Indeed, studies have shown that PTP is 
predicted by both the visuospatial sketch components of working memory 
(Baudouin, Vanneste, Isingrini, et al., 2006; Bi et al., 2013; Perbal, Droit-Volet, 
Isingrini, & Pouthas, 2002). In addition, numerous studies have shown that when 
performing dual-tasks, participants tend to underestimate time (e.g., Brown & 
Merchant, 2007; Brown & Smith-Petersen, 2014), which is of interest given that 
divided attention is part of the four executive functions comprising the central 
executive component of working memory (Baddeley, 1992).  
A study conducted among elderly participants showed that poorer temporal 
performance (i.e., lack of precision when estimating a time duration) was associated 
with working memory deficits (Baudouin, Vanneste, Pouthas, et al., 2006). On the 
contrary, when exploring the development of time perception skills among children, 
Zélanti and Droit-Volet (2011) observed that while short-term memory and 
attention predicted temporal sensitivity development in the different age groups, 
working memory did not show such an effect. Additionally, while attentional 
processes predicted the difference of temporal performance between single and dual 
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tasks among children, working memory did not play such a role (Hallez & Droit-
Volet, 2017). To date, the only study showing an effect of working memory on time 
perception among children did not show any developmental effect, but an overall 
positive correlation between the two variables (Droit-Volet, Wearden, et al., 2015). 
 Most of the available research regarding videogame players emphasizes that 
regular gamers have an improved working memory (e.g., Colzato et al., 2013; 
McDermott, Bavelier, & Green, 2014; Mishra et al., 2011), some studies showing 
that these improvements only occur with regards to the visuospatial sketchpad (e.g., 
Posner Letter Identity Task, Visual Working Memory Task) (Lau-Zhu, Holmes, 
Butterfield, & Holmes, 2017; Mishra et al., 2011; Seya & Shinoda, 2016). Although 
this latter finding is theoretically coherent because videogames mainly influence 
visuospatial skills (Bavelier, Green, Pouget, & Schrater, 2012), studies still 
demonstrate that healthy gamers do not exhibit any impaired working memory 
component (e.g., Colzato et al., 2013; Lau-Zhu et al., 2017). Furthermore, Huang, 
Young, and Fiocco (2017) compared the effects of console and mobile gaming on 
cognition, including a measure of working memory. First, their results supported 
previous research (i.e., regular console gaming improves working memory). 
Second, they found that playing casual games on a mobile device led to similar 
effects. This study is noteworthy given that increasing numbers of people now own 
a smartphone (Statista, 2018b), granting them free and easy access to multiple 
videogames.  
3.4. Emotional processes in time perception and gaming 
Time is subjective. It appears to drag out when engaged in a boring activity 
(e.g., waiting for an appointment or queuing in a shop) and to pass by very quickly 
when engaged in an appealing or joyful activity (e.g., partying or watching a good 
film). When researchers have tried to explore the effect of emotions on time 
perception in a laboratory setting, results have not systematically supported the 
idiom that ‘time flies when you’re having fun’. Indeed, the results mainly show an 
overestimation of time irrespective of whether the task was prospective or 
retrospective (e.g., Bisson et al., 2009; Cassidy & Macdonald, 2010; Kellaris & 
Kent, 1992). It is noteworthy that studies using pictures for a longer duration 
managed to observe an underestimating effect among participants (Smith et al., 
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2011). It is then possible that only longer emotional stimuli would manage to lead 
to an underestimation, while shorter ones would not.  
Nevertheless, whether music affects time perception and whether listening 
to music while performing a laboratory task can be considered as ‘fun’ are two 
separate issues. For example, a few studies have explored fun in other ways, 
showing different results. For instance, one study explored time perception among 
novice tandem skydivers (Campbell & Bryant, 2007). Even though skydiving is 
inherently different than playing videogames, the way the researchers investigated 
this may be helpful in understanding how gaming enjoyment could affect time 
perception. The study assessed participants’ levels of excitement and fearfulness 
before the jump and after landing, and (retrospectively) asked participants how long 
the skydive had lasted. The results showed that while their level of fear positively 
predicted their time estimation (i.e., time slowing down), their level of excitement 
showed the opposite (i.e., time passing faster).  
Another study explored the motivational intensity of the positive state effect 
on time perception by comparing a low-approach motivation positive state (i.e., 
feeling calm or peaceful) and a high-approach motivation positive state (i.e., feeling 
desire) to a neutral state (Gable & Poole, 2012). In this study, participants could 
either look at pictures of flowers (low-approach), dessert pictures (high-approach), 
or geometric shapes (neutral). The results showed that there was no difference 
between the low-approach motivation positive state and the neutral state. On the 
other hand, the high-approach motivation positive state was significantly 
underestimated compared to the other two groups. Also, by telling half the 
participants that they would receive a dessert at the end of the experiment, the 
authors showed that expectancy was able to strengthen the previous results as the 
participants expecting to actually eat a dessert ended up underestimating time more 
than other participants not expecting to eat a dessert. 
Concerning gaming, its impact on emotion has been investigated via 
neuropsychological studies. These studies demonstrate stronger brain reactivity for 
disordered gamers compared to control participants when confronted with gaming 
cues, meaning that disordered gamers are more aroused by gaming stimuli (Ahn, 
Chung, & Kim, 2015; Ko et al., 2013; Liu et al., 2017; Zhang et al., 2016). For 
instance, two studies using the same paradigm showed that disordered gamers 
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exhibited stronger brain reactions than healthy gamers when confronted with 
gaming-related cues (Ko et al., 2013; Thalemann, Wölfling, & Grüsser, 2007; 
Wang et al., 2017), and that these activations were associated with their urge to play 
videogames (Ko et al., 2013; Wang et al., 2017) . These two studies imply that on 
top of disordered gamers being more sensitive to gaming cues than non-gamers 
(which would be normal since non-gamers are not familiar with these), they are 
more sensitive than healthy gamers too. 
Three other studies have explored in-game reactions with either neural 
activation through an electroencephalogram (EEG, Shin, Heard, Suo, & Chow, 
2012) or physiological activation through an electrocardiogram (ECG), facial 
electromyography (EMG), and skin conductance (Ravaja, Saari, Salminen, Laarni, 
& Kallinen, 2006; Salminen & Ravaja, 2007). The EEG study showed that even if 
healthy gamers can experience negative emotions during a gaming session (e.g., 
their character getting shot or dying), they reported only positive subjective 
emotions after the gaming session. The physiological activation studies showed that 
some game events elicited arousal (Salminen & Ravaja, 2007), and that both 
positive and negative events elicited positively valenced arousal among healthy 
gamers (Ravaja et al., 2006). Taken together, the findings of these studies tend to 
support the emotional explanation for compromised time control. Indeed, 
behavioural and EEG studies have demonstrated that disordered gamers tend to 
show stronger brain reactivity when confronted with gaming-related stimuli than 
non-gamers and exhibit stronger neural activity than non-disordered gamers while 
playing. These findings demonstrate that disordered gamers experience stronger 
arousal, which can lead to increased time distortion and in turn to experiencing 
greater compromised time control. Besides, the in-game studies demonstrate that 
healthy gamers experience positive arousal during their gameplay, whether they are 
achieving something good or bad in-game. 
3.5. Emotion regulation 
Even though emotion regulation plays a crucial role in the interaction 
between cognitive skills and emotion (e.g., working memory; Malagoli & Usai, 
2018; executive functions; Marceau, Kelly, & Solowij, 2018), this has rarely been 
studied in the field of time perception. According to Eisenberg and Spinrad’s (2004, 
p. 338) comments on a paper by Cole, Martin, and Dennis (2004), emotion 
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regulation can be defined as “the process of initiating, avoiding, inhibiting, 
maintaining, or modulating the occurrence, form, intensity, or duration of internal 
feeling states, emotion-related physiological, attentional processes, motivational 
states, and/or the behavioral concomitants of emotion in the service of 
accomplishing affect-related biological or social adaptation or achieving 
individual goals”. The studies on this topic show that good emotion regulation leads 
to a lower (almost non-existent) interference of emotion on temporal estimation 
(Tian, Liu, & Huang, 2018; Wittmann, Rudolph, Linares Gutierrez, & Winkler, 
2015).  
Since emotion regulation can be defined as the reduction of an individual’s 
reaction to an arousing stimulus (e.g., Evren, Evren, Dalbudak, Topcu, & Kutlu, 
2018), three studies can be included in this section because they explored the 
different ways to reduce a stimulus-arousing effect on an individual. The first way 
to reduce reaction to an arousing stimulus is to divert attention from it. Using this 
method with aversive sounds, Mella, Conty, and Pouthas (2011) showed that when 
their participants had to focus on the sounds, there was an effect of the stimulus on 
their time estimation (i.e., overestimation). However, when participants were asked 
to focus equally on the task and the sound, or exclusively on the task, this effect 
was disrupted, supporting previous findings. Using the perceived level of control 
as a mediating variable, Buetti and Lleras (2012) recruited arachnophobe and non-
arachnophobe participants and confronted them with spider pictures. In order to 
fluctuate their level of perceived control of the situation, and therefore the arousing 
effect of the pictures, the participants were either told that pressing a button would 
make less spider pictures appear or did not receive such instruction. The results 
showed that under a higher perceived control of the situation, the effect of the very 
arousing pictures was completely nullified, and this was independent of the 
percentage of spider pictures presented. These results were further replicated in 
another study using a similar design (Mereu & Lleras, 2013). Accordingly, it can 
arguably be concluded that emotion regulation would diminish (if not entirely 
inhibit) the interference of emotional stimuli on time perception. If this was verified, 
it would mean that better emotion regulation would lead to a lesser impact of 
emotion on time perception, and as a result a lesser underestimation of duration.  
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This fact is of interest given that that several studies have shown 
associations between gaming and emotion regulation. Villani and Colleague’s 
recent review (2018) showed that regular gaming can be a useful tool in regulating 
emotion (e.g., to relax during a stressful time) and is even used in therapy. 
Nonetheless, it would appear that this is different among disordered gamers. For 
instance, Seo, Kang, and Chae (2012) compared regular and disordered gamers on 
various emotional variables (i.e., emotional competence, positive emotion, 
emotional expression, and emotional intelligence) and showed that disordered 
gamers exhibited lower scores on the emotional variables compared to healthy 
gamers. These results are further supported by studies showing that disordered 
gamers have impaired emotion regulation (Evren et al., 2018; Wichstrøm, Stenseng, 
Belsky, von Soest, & Hygen, 2018) as well as abnormal activation in brain areas 
responsible for emotion regulation (i.e., orbitofrontal cortex, Du et al., 2016, Zhou 
et al., 2019; dorsal anterior cingulate cortex, Lee et al., 2015; subcortical and 
cortical regions, Yip et al., 2018). Based on this literature, it would appear that an 
efficient emotion regulation ability would alter (if not prevent) any emotional 
interference on time perception. Yet, the fact that the disordered gamers exhibit an 
impaired regulation of their emotion may explain why they cannot control the 
emotional affect coming from their gaming sessions. While a healthy gamer could 
‘inhibit’ or at least reduce the arousal arising from their gaming session (and thus 
diminish the impact on their time perception), disordered gamers would not be able 
to (or would have more difficulties to) do so, resulting in observed compromised 
time control. 
3.6. Flow 
Flow has been defined as a total involvement in a task where the level of the 
individual’s skill is matched by the level of challenge the task poses leading to 
experiencing a loss of self-consciousness (Csíkszentmihályi, 1975). According to 
Csíkszentmihályi (1993), it includes four main components (i.e., control, attention, 
curiosity, and intrinsic interest) and eight elements (i.e., clear goals and immediate 
feedback, balance between skills and challenge, concentration, sense of control, 
loss of self-consciousness, awareness and action merging, reward, and time 
distortion). When an individual experiences a flow state, all attention is focused on 
the task itself (e.g., playing videogames) to the point of possibly experiencing a 
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momentary self-awareness loss. Csíkszentmihályi (1993) pointed out that one of 
the flow elements is time distortion, where individuals experience either a 
lengthening or shortening of time duration while in a flow state (i.e., overestimation 
or underestimation of lapsed time during the activity). In an opinion paper on the 
possible effect of boredom on time perception, Zakay (2014) based part of his 
argument on Csíkszentmihályi’s (1990) definition of flow, asserting that boredom 
was the other end of a pole on the enjoyment continuum.  
Therefore, according to Zakay (2014), while boredom leads to an 
overestimation of duration, flow experience leads to the opposite effect (i.e., a 
significant underestimation of time due to the almost entire attentional pool 
resources being allocated to the activity, inducing the flow state). The case of 
boredom tends to be supported when comparing participants with a high level of 
boredom-proneness to participants with low levels. Indeed, Watt (1991) and 
Danckert and Allman (2005) showed that individuals with more boredom-prone 
tendencies judge time to be longer during a boring task than participants with lower 
levels of boredom-proneness. Although this is not a direct measure of flow, the 
findings indicate a possible fluctuation of time depending on flow experience-
proneness. Another way to approach the effect of flow on time perception is through 
attention. Numerous studies on attention (i.e., see section “1.1.1. Attention”) tend 
to support the relationship between flow and time perception due the increased 
attention on non-temporal activity leading to an underestimation of time. 
In a more direct manner, few studies have explored the direct effect of flow 
on time perception. By solely exploring the effect of immersion in a videogame, 
Sanders and Cairns (2010) showed that in a prospective setting, the more a 
videogame player was immersed in a game (through the inclusion or not of music 
within a short videogame session), the more they underestimated the time spent 
playing it. This matched the reports of the participants stating that they felt more 
immersed when they heard in-game music. This result, among other things, may 
explain the different results obtained in the previously described experiment on 
compromised time control among disordered gamers. Indeed, different games 
include different background music which may constitute a confounding variable. 
The results of studies exploring the effect of flow experience on playing 
videogames have been inconsistent and could be due to the varying measures used 
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in the different studies (e.g., Game Engagement Questionnaire, Brockmyer et al., 
2009; the Flow State Scale-2, Jackson & Eklund, 2002). For example, some studies 
have found an association between flow experience and disordered gaming (Chou 
& Ting, 2003; Hull, Williams, & Griffiths, 2013; Khang, Kim, & Kim, 2013), while 
others have not (Wan & Chiou, 2006). Contrarily, when exploring time spent 
gaming among healthy gamers, studies showed that the gamers experiencing flow 
states tended to spend more time playing (Johnson, Gardner, & Sweetser, 2016; 
Khang et al., 2013). Finally, it has been pointed out that the structural characteristics 
of videogames (e.g., negative rewards features, narrative), as well as the players’ 
motives (e.g., playing alone or with other gamers, online or offline), can affect how 
likely gamers are to experience a flow state (Kaye, 2016; Laffan, Greaney, Barton, 
& Kaye, 2016; Liu & Chang, 2016). A common denominator between the three 
papers is the importance of social interaction. While Laffan et al. (2016) and Liu 
and Chang (2016) only reported that the result on a subscale exploring social 
interaction correlated significantly with the experienced level of flow, Kaye (2016) 
put this variable to the forefront in her study. It was demonstrated that knowing 
teammates’ skill levels and having efficient communication and teamwork with 
teammates significantly predicted the level of experienced flow.  
The study by Kaye (2016) showed that in online cooperative games (e.g., 
Massively Multiplayer Online Role-Playing Games [MMORPG], Multiplayer 
Online Battle Arena games [MOBA]), not only are the gameplay and the players 
themselves important to achieve a flow experience, but the way the players interact 
with their teammates plays an important role. These studies further imply that some 
game genres (e.g., FPS games and real-time strategy games) can facilitate the 
experience of a flow state. This needs to be explored in future studies as the finding 
implies that different types of games have different indirect impacts on time 
perception via the level of flow they induce. 
Another way to explore the potential association between time perception, 
gaming, and flow is through the concept of enjoyment. In a study by Christandl, 
Mierke and Peifer (2018), participants engaged in a task for ten minutes, and half 
of them were told that the task lasted five minutes (time-dragging condition), while 
the other half was told it lasted 15 minutes (time-flying by condition). The 
participants who were told that the task lasted longer than what they had thought 
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evaluated their recalled level of flow as higher than the participants who were told 
the task was shorter. This study shares similar results to another study on time 
perception and task enjoyment (i.e., Sackett, Meyvis, Nelson, Converse, & Sackett, 
2010). They showed that by making participants feel like time passed faster (i.e., 
by deceiving them about the total duration of the task), participants judged the task 
as more enjoyable. The study also replicated the results with irritating sounds (i.e., 
using an underestimation’ condition, leading to a lower irritating rating) and music 
(i.e., using an ‘underestimation’ condition, leading to a higher rating of the song 
played). These two studies suggest that time perception and flow are highly 
associated based on their mutual bidirectional association with enjoyment.  
Interestingly, by associating the results on the interaction of emotion and 
time perception and the research exploring flow, it may provide a possible 
explanation of how retrospective time perception of gamers can be affected. The 
studies on the emotional interference on time perception showed that emotions, and 
especially ‘having fun’, can induce an underestimation of time duration. Based on 
this, it could be argued that gamers will experience arousal when confronted with 
gaming stimuli, which would lead to an emotional response which would not be 
present among non-gamers, even if they were to play once (as there would not be 
such an association due to the lack of repetitive game play). Furthermore, as 
disordered gamers exhibit a hypersensitivity to gaming stimuli, this would lead to 
a stronger emotional effect compared to healthy gamers. This stronger effect may 
then result in a stronger underestimation of time during the gaming session, leading 
to the observed compromised time control effect. This hypothesis is once again 
supported by flow theory as enjoying a game helps in experiencing a flow state 
while playing, strengthening the aforementioned effect. Additionally, the difficulty 
to inhibit one’s arousal while playing (i.e., emotion dysregulation observed among 
disordered gamers) could prevent disordered gamers attenuating this effect 
compared to healthy gamers.  
3.7. Discussion 
 This chapter aimed to collate previously published data on the compromised 
time control effect and relate it to disordered gaming. The compromised time 
control effect is a possible direct consequence of impaired time perception, which 
leads to an underestimation of the time spent on an activity (in this case, gaming). 
  
99 
It is important as underestimating gaming session length significantly can lead to 
detrimental consequences due to little time remaining for other important activities 
(e.g., education and/or occupation, spending time with loved ones, and sleep). Even 
though it would appear that compromised time control is a direct consequence of 
impaired time perception, the studies on this topic did not show consistent results, 
implying that this may not be the case (Rau et al., 2006; Tobin & Grondin, 2009; 
Wood & Griffiths, 2007). Therefore, the present chapter sought to understand how 
time perception and videogame use can be associated in order to explain the 
compromised time control effect.  
The first explanation provided for this relates to cognitive processes as 
cognition can be both impaired by disordered gaming (Nuyens et al., 2017) and 
improved by regular (non-disordered) gaming (Nuyens et al., 2018). When 
examining cognitive factors relevant in time perception, two common processes are 
attention and working memory (Gibbon, Church, & Meck, 1984; Zakay & Block, 
1995). When evaluating these two processes among non-disordered gamers, it has 
been shown that they were both improved, especially for visual working memory 
(e.g., Colzato et al., 2013; McDermott et al., 2014) and top-down attention (e.g., 
Cain & Mitroff, 2011; Chisholm et al., 2010). Then, from a cognitive perspective, 
it would appear that non-disordered gamers are more likely to have a more accurate 
time perception than non-gamers, whereas this is not the common observation. 
Nevertheless, the studies on the associations between working memory and 
attention with time perception solely used prospective experimental settings. It is 
thus possible that the compromised time perception among gamers is not 
prospective but retrospective, which fits gaming reality, the gamers rarely 
consciously monitoring time while engaging in the activity they enjoy. This is 
supported by the concept of flow according to Zakay (2014), who posited that flow 
and boredom represent opposite ends of the same continuum. While being bored 
lengthens time duration (i.e., overestimation of time), experiencing flow leads to 
the opposite effect (i.e., underestimation of time), thus explaining the compromised 
time control effect. Although this has not been thoroughly researched, the studies 
on the association between attention and time perception tend to support this since 
the less attention is focused on time, the shorter the time duration is perceived to 
be.  
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Another possible explanation relates to emotional factors rather than 
cognitive ones, the enjoyment of an activity leading to underestimating its duration. 
To date, the laboratory studies mainly showed an overestimation of time when 
adding emotional stimuli to the experimental task (e.g., Bisson et al., 2009; Cassidy 
& Macdonald, 2010), thus contradicting the idea developed by Zakay (2014). 
However, there is a difference between observing emotional stimuli in a laboratory 
setting and actually having fun to the point of forgetting about time. This fact is 
underlined by the study among novice skydivers, showing that their level of 
excitement during their very first jump was negatively associated to their duration 
estimation (i.e., the more they were excited, the shorter they estimated the jump) 
(Campbell & Bryant, 2007). Interestingly, the opposite trend was observed, with 
participants estimating a task as more enjoyable when they were tricked into 
believing that a task lasted longer than they thought (Sackett et al., 2010).  
The studies reviewed showed that disordered gamers tend to show more 
intense reactivity to gaming cues, and to exhibit greater physiological reactions 
during a gaming session than healthy gamers and control participants (e.g., Ko et 
al., 2013; Ravaja et al., 2006; Salminen & Ravaja, 2007; Thalemann et al., 2007). 
On top of the higher reactivity, these studies showed that even ‘bad’ in-game events 
could lead to positive arousal reactions (e.g., character getting shot or dying in the 
game; Ravaja et al., 2006). Again, flow can play a determining role in the 
relationship between gaming, emotion, and time perception. Using Zakay’s (2014) 
definition of boredom as the opposite to flow on the enjoyment continuum, research 
has demonstrated that boredom-prone participants tend to overestimate the duration 
of a boring task more than less boredom-prone participants (Danckert & Allman, 
2005; Watt, 1991). Furthermore, when participants were more immersed in a game, 
they estimated the duration of their gaming session as shorter than when they were 
less immersed. This result was only significant in a prospective setting (Sanders & 
Cairns, 2010). Even though there is a lack of studies examining the causal link 
between enjoyment and time perception, it appears plausible that having fun leads 
to underestimating time duration. Since disordered gamers exhibit difficulties 
regulating their emotions, it is possible that it would affect the emotional 
interference of gaming on time perception. Since it has been shown that an efficient 
emotion regulation can reduce (if not nullify) the emotional interference on time 
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perception, it is expected that a deficient emotion regulation will lead to a stronger 
effect of emotion.  
Based on the reviewed literature, several hypotheses on the association 
between time perception and gaming can be formulated. First, based on the 
improved working memory and attentional focus observed amongst the healthy 
gamers (e.g., Cain & Mitroff, 2011; Chisholm et al., 2010), it appears that the 
impaired time perception leading to the time loss effect would not be prospective. 
Indeed, attention and working memory, according to the Attentional Gate Model 
(Zakay & Block, 1995) are crucial within prospective time perception and these 
improved skills would therefore lead to a more accurate time perception 
prospectively. However, according to Block and Zakay (1997), attention or working 
memory would not directly affect retrospective time perception as this type of 
temporal cognition is rather based on short term memory (Block & Reed, 1978). It 
is then possible that the gamers’ time perception would be only affected 
retrospectively.  
Second, it has been shown that having fun can lead to an underestimation of 
time (Campbell & Bryant, 2007; Gable & Poole, 2012), although the laboratory 
studies exhibited that emotional stimuli often lead to an overestimation of duration 
(Gil & Droit-Volet, 2011; Grommet et al., 2011). This is of interest since it has been 
shown that gamers react more strongly to gaming stimuli, and can associate 
negative outcomes with pleasure (Ahn et al., 2015; Ravaja et al., 2006; Thalemann 
et al., 2007). Therefore, it is possible that the reason behind the gamers’ 
underestimation of time while playing result from an exacerbated arousal derived 
from their gaming session. Furthermore, since the disordered gamers exhibited even 
stronger reactivity to the same gaming cues than healthy gamers (Ko et al., 2013) it 
could be hypothesized that the effect of gaming on their time perception would be 
stronger as well. Finally, emotion regulation could play a crucial role due to the 
difference observed between healthy and disordered gamers regarding this skill. 
Indeed, while healthy gamers exhibit normal abilities to regulate their emotions 
(Villani et al., 2018), it appears that the disordered gamers manifest an impaired 
emotion regulation (Seo et al., 2012; Wichstrøm et al., 2018). As a result, it can be 
presumed that while the healthy gamers could manage to limit the effect of their 
emotional reactivity when confronted to gaming cues, the disordered gamers would 
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end up overwhelmed by their stronger reactivity due to their impaired emotion 
regulation.  
Interestingly, several of the potential associations between time perception 
and disordered gaming explored in this chapter are included in the Interaction of 
Person-Affect-Cognition-Execution (I-PACE) model (Brand et al., 2019). 
According to this model, the development and maintenance of addictive behaviours 
(including disordered gaming) would rely upon common underlying mechanisms. 
Each category of process affecting the development is represented by a letter of the 
model: (p) represents the core characteristics of the person (e.g., the 
biopsychosocial constitution, the personality, the motives), (a) and (c) are the 
affective and cognitive responses to stimuli (e.g., cognitive biases, cue-reactivity, 
emotion regulation), and (e) represents the executive functions (e.g., inhibition, 
decision-making). Concerning this thesis, the (a), (c), and (e) sections of this model 
are of particular interest since they integrate the emotional and cognitive processes 
explored in the present studies (e.g., attention, working memory). 
 In conclusion, for the rest of this thesis, it will be hypothesized that the time 
loss effect among gamers results from impaired retrospective time perception. 
Nonetheless, it will also be assumed that this impairment results from their hyper-
reactivity to gaming cues and will therefore not be observed in normal conditions.   
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Chapter 4: Methodology 
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4.1. Chapter overview 
The main aim of the present research is to validate the Dual-Process 
Contingency model (DPCM) with longer durations (i.e., multi-minute time 
perception) among gamers and non-gamers. This thesis comprises three 
experiments utilising a quantitative approach because it was decided to explore a 
continuous variable (i.e., temporal estimation). The first experiment aims at testing 
the DPCM with a longer duration, thus determining the associations existing 
between retrospective and prospective time perception. The second experiment’s 
objective is to test the difference in time perception between gamers and non-
gamers in view of the DPCM. Finally, the third experiment’s aim is to test the 
interactions between cognitive and emotional factors in the DPCM among gamers 
and non-gamers. Consequently, the thesis will have important implications at both 
theoretical and experimental levels by unifying prospective and retrospective time 
perception under the DPCM and studying its associations with cognitive and 
emotional factors. In addition, it will have implications at clinical level by 
determining the role played by impaired time perception in the emergence of time 
loss. Before exploring the methodology adopted in the three experiments 
constituting this thesis, this chapter will expound the philosophical assumptions 
underlying the thinking process behind the thesis as well as a short explanation of 
the methodological approach chosen to test the hypotheses (i.e., quantitative 
experimental approach). 
4.2. Philosophical assumptions 
Underlying philosophical assumptions are important before starting any 
experimentation. Indeed, a researcher’s philosophical assumption shapes their 
vision of the world and will affect their research design greatly. Although numerous 
paradigms have been created through time, Candy (1989) has summarised these 
into three main taxonomies, a fourth one having been added by Tashakkori and 
Teddlie (2003). These four main paradigms are the pragmatist, positivist, 
interpretivist, and the critical paradigm. These paradigms are all defined through 
four axes: (i) epistemology (i.e., the nature of one’s knowledge), (ii) ontology (i.e., 
a belief system on which the interpretation of the data is based), (iii) methodology 
(i.e., the research design: how the experiment is conducted), and (iv) axiology (i.e., 
ethical considerations).  
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Given that this thesis solely comprises quantitative experiments, the most 
fitting philosophical assumption is positivist pragmatism, which follows the 
scientific method (see Figure 1, p. 238). Since its first introduction by Auguste 
Comte (1856), the positivist approach of research postulates that knowledge is only 
achievable through experimentation and observation. Its epistemology is objectivist 
(i.e., knowledge is deduced from experimental work), its ontology fits the naïve 
realism (i.e., material objects and their characteristics are observable), its 
methodology follows the scientific method, and its axiology is beneficence (i.e., 
trying to maximize positive results while minimizing any possible risk for the 
participants).  
4.3. The quantitative approach 
Given that the variables explored in this thesis are exclusively continuous 
(e.g., time estimation, scale scores, and reaction time), the most appropriate 
research approach is quantitative. Indeed, this experimental design particularly fits 
the natural science method of testing (Bryman, 1984; Howe, 1992) and is core to 
the positivist approach of social sciences research. The quantitative designs follow 
the scientific method adapted from the natural sciences and are based on statistical 
analysis of numeric data (i.e., extracted from the testing such as scale scores or 
reaction times) (McQueen & Knussen, 2006). Therefore, based on this type of 
design, a researcher should explore the possible independent variables influencing 
the level of a dependent variable (e.g., in this thesis, gaming is an independent 
variable and time estimation is the dependent one), while controlling possible 
cofounding variables (e.g., in this thesis, gender and age). The main assets of this 
method compared to a qualitative one are its objectivity (i.e., the discussion is based 
on objective measures of the behaviour) and its replicability (i.e., using the same 
measure, another tester could do the same experiment and reach the same results). 
Furthermore, one of the assets of this method is that the results are generalizable if 
a representative sample is explored.  
This method has been criticized for its lack of flexibility regarding the 
complexity of human processes, which can sometimes result in disregarding 
potentially interesting variables. And despite this research attempting to show the 
associations between different variables, sometimes it will not be able to explain 
how, or why, these relationships exist with regards to the human mind. In this 
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particular research, the quantitative approach assesses the relationship between 
gaming and time perception and test two variables underlying this relationship (i.e., 
cognitive process and emotional interference).  
Quantitative research is mainly used in three types of experiments: (i) survey 
research, (ii) correlational studies, and (iii) experimental research. These 
experiment types are not exclusive and can be mixed in the design, especially for 
long-term work such as a thesis. In this thesis, demographic data, as well as 
personality trait data, and gaming use data will be collected via questionnaires, 
similar to survey research. Furthermore, the scores on these questionnaires will be 
compared to the results on the various experimental tasks through the use of 
correlations. The core of this experiment (i.e., exploring the interaction between 
gaming and time perception) will be studied via an experimental approach because 
the scores of the different groups will be compared. Accordingly, this thesis will be 
based on the three main types of research included in the quantitative approach of 
social sciences (e.g., psychology, law, and sociology). 
4.4. Limitations and advantages of a laboratory-based approach of time 
perception in gaming disorder 
The first limitation of the laboratory-based approach in this experimental 
thesis is its context and its impact on arousal. Indeed, one of the aims of this 
experiment is to explore the arousing effect of videogames on time perception, in 
other words, observing if the distorted time perception of gamers is due to an 
emotional reaction following the presentation of gaming cues. For this purpose, 
gaming pictures will be used in the third experiment, with the aim of eliciting an 
emotional reaction among the gamers even if this experiment’s method cannot 
compare to the many types of stimulation offered by real modern videogames (e.g., 
visual stimuli, music, and sound effects). Interestingly, within this limitation lies 
one of the advantages of this method, which is the control of exogenous variables. 
Indeed, while a real videogame will procure an abundant amount of diverse 
stimulations (i.e., both visual and auditory), this experiment will be able to maintain 
its focus on a single type of stimulation (i.e., visual). This will allow a better grasp 
of this specific stimulation, further studies being able to explore the other types of 
stimulation. Only when understanding each component on their own will the 
research be able to integrate them all in a complex model.  
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The central variable assessed in this thesis is time perception, which is 
thought to be impaired among gamers due to their observed time loss. In real life, 
gamers will play for varying durations depending on multiple factors (e.g., the day, 
time of the day, and the game itself). Testing the participants in a laboratory setting 
is then not representative of this variation, yet it allows a replication of the duration 
between and within the different groups tested. Another limitation directly related 
to the previous one is the duration tested (i.e., between one and six minutes for a 
total of ten minutes) compared to the duration of a typical gaming session (i.e., more 
than one hour). Even though the duration used in this thesis is not fully 
representative of a typical gaming session duration, it represents a viable 
approximation and a stepping stone for further research using durations and 
contexts which are more ecologically valid. In addition, using shorter durations 
gives the ability to make several trials in a retrospective setting where the 
participants would provide all the estimations at the end of the task. This is possible 
since less than 10 minutes would pass between the end of the first block and the 
moment where the participants would provide their estimation (i.e., the end of the 
task). For longer durations (e.g., three blocks varying between 10 and 30 minutes 
for a total duration of one hour), almost one hour would lapse between the first 
block and the end of the task where the participants would provide their estimation. 
In the second case, it may be hard for the participants to remember how long the 
first block lasted when they had finished the whole task, while it is much easier in 
the first case. As a consequence, fewer trials should be included for longer 
durations, if not a single estimation. Although this would be closer to the reality of 
gaming sessions, using a multiple shorter duration allows more adjustments (e.g., 
deletion of multiple outliers for each duration). These possible adjustments 
represent a security measure which is essential in a first exploration such as this 
one.  
 Another limitation lies within the population tested, as most of the 
participants available at a university campus are students. This limitation does not 
reside within the young age of the sample which should not be a major problem due 
to the similar age of the general gamer population (Statista, 2018c), making this 
sample representative of the real gaming population. Instead, the limitation results 
from the recruitment of participants through an internal credit system provided by 
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Nottingham Trent University. Indeed, the students using this system are mostly 
psychology students aiming to gather enough credits for their third-year thesis. 
Therefore, the participants may try to work out the aim of the experiment, affecting 
the result both by a lack of focus on the task itself and by adapting their behaviour 
based on their own hypothesis. However, the main aim of this thesis is the 
exploration of time perception (i.e., both prospective and retrospective), which may 
prevent such a bias. Indeed, in the case of retrospective time perception, the 
participant does not know the real aim of the experiments since they are performing 
a recall task. The participants may indeed try to understand how they are expected 
to perform the distraction task, rather than considering time perception as a variable. 
In the opposite case, when performing a prospective time estimation, it is expected 
that the participant will perform as well as they can regarding the time estimation, 
despite having to perform a cognitively challenging task. In brief, this bias can be 
viewed to be in favour of this experiment. 
4.5. Variables explored in the thesis 
4.5.1. Time perception 
In this section, the most adequate measure of time perception for this thesis 
will be discussed. Numerous tasks exist in the literature to measure time perception 
which can be reduced to six main tasks, which have been adapted into multiple 
variations. First, in the Estimation Task (ET), participants are presented a stimulus 
(e.g., a picture or a video), or asked to perform a task for a random duration and 
then are being asked to tell the experimenter how long that stimulus/task was 
presented for/lasted. Second, in the Temporal Reproduction Task (TRT), 
participants are asked to observe a duration (i.e., similar to the ET), and to reproduce 
this duration with an action (e.g., pressing a button for the same duration, or telling 
the experimenter when that duration has elapsed again). The third task, the 
Temporal Production Task (TPT) is highly similar to the TRT task, with the 
exception that instead of having to observe a stimulus and reproducing its duration, 
the experimenter will simply tell a duration to the participants, who are being asked 
to reproduce it in the same manner as for the TRT. Fourth, in the Temporal 
Comparison Task (TCT), participants are presented two durations (i.e., either 
identical or different) and are asked to decide which one is the longer one. The fifth 
task, the Temporal Bisection Task (TBT), requires the experimenter to present two 
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durations (i.e., called anchors) repeatedly to the participants until they manage to 
differentiate them. Afterwards, participants are presented durations between these 
two anchors and are asked to decide to which of the anchors it is the closest. Finally, 
the sixth task, the Temporal Generalization Task (TGT), is similar to the TBT. 
Participants are asked to familiarize themselves with a single duration at the 
beginning (i.e., instead of two durations), and in the following blocks of the task, 
they are asked to indicate whether the following durations are shorter or longer in 
comparison to the first one.  
All these tasks have their strength and weakness, and not all are suitable for 
specific research purposes. For example, while the temporal production, 
generalization, and bisection tasks do not allow the researcher to perform testing in 
a retrospective setting, the estimation, reproduction, and comparison tasks allow 
testing retrospectively. It is noteworthy that the TCT only allows a single 
retrospective testing since, after the first comparison, the participant will be aware 
of the temporal aspect of the experiment, leading them to make any further 
judgment prospectively. Nonetheless, when it comes to quantitative experiments, 
some of the previous tasks represent an important interest as they allow testing a 
myriad of durations (i.e., the TGT and TBT). Since the participant simply needs to 
remember up to two durations, and to compare it to other random durations, it 
allows the experiment to present dozens of these durations and achieve precise 
estimations of their temporal perception. The other tasks also allow the testing of 
multiple durations, but the way they were created greatly limits the number of 
testing. 
In this thesis, both retrospective and prospective time perception are 
measured, the first aim of the thesis being to validate the Dual-Process Contingency 
Model of time perception (i.e., see the first chapter on time perception for an 
exploration of the model). Therefore, the temporal reproduction, bisection, and 
generalization tasks were not viable tasks to explore time perception in the present 
thesis since they are not fit to test retrospective time perception. Additionally, both 
the temporal comparison and production tasks only allow for testing once because 
participants make a first trial retrospectively, and then have to perform the other 
trials prospectively. The ET on the other hand allows the experimenter to avoid this 
issue by simply asking the participants to estimate the duration after all the trials 
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have been presented. Unfortunately, this prevents the experiment from including 
numerous trials (i.e., it may be arduous to estimate more than 2-3 durations 
accurately retrospectively), yet, this is still the best possibility. Furthermore, this 
task is particularly suitable to evaluate the time loss effect among gamers. Indeed, 
when gamers observe such a temporal distortion (i.e., underestimating the time 
spent on a game), it is more likely that they estimate the duration, instead of any 
other means offered by the other tasks (e.g., reproducing the duration). In 
conclusion, this task is not only more suitable in regard to the experimental setting, 
it is also more ecologically valid than any other task.  
4.5.2. Gaming disorder 
Given that gaming disorder was defined in the second chapter of this thesis, 
its definition will not be further discussed in this section. It is still worth mentioning 
that in this thesis, two approaches to gaming disorder will be used to cover a wider 
aspect of this construct. First, the definition and criteria provided by the DSM-5 
(i.e., IGD, American Psychiatric Association, 2013) and second, the problematic 
use of videogames provided by Demetrovics et al. (2012). Indeed, King, Haagsma, 
Delfabbro, Gradisar, and Griffiths (2013) reviewed all the different gaming disorder 
scales existing at the time (i.e., 19 scales) which assessed different 
conceptualisations of this construct. In evaluating these scales, the authors extracted 
16 different facets of this disorder (e.g., preoccupation, control loss, and deception), 
and the Problematic Online Gaming Questionnaire (i.e., POGQ, Demetrovics et al., 
2012) used in the present research assesses nine of these criteria. When adding the 
nine criteria of the IGD to the POGQ, a total of 13 criteria from King et al.’ 16 
criteria (2013) are assessed. The only non-explored criteria according to King et al.’ 
study (2013) not studied using these two psychometric scales are “dependency on 
others”, “illegal acts”, and “financial conflicts”.  
4.5.3. Attentional focus 
The interaction between attention and both time perception and gaming has 
been widely explored in the three first chapters of this thesis and will not be further 
explored in this section. In summary, it appears that attention is a crucial variable 
in time perception (Lejeune, 2000; Zakay & Block, 1995) and appears to be more 
efficient among regular gamers (Cain & Mitroff, 2011; Chisholm et al., 2010). For 
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this reason, it appeared judicious to include a measure of attentional focus in this 
thesis in order to control a potential effect of the improved attention of gamers on 
their perception of time. For this purpose, the model of the Attention Network Task 
(ANT) was adopted (Fan et al., 2002). According to the ANT, attention is divided 
into three different systems: (i) the alerting system (i.e., being able to make use of 
a clue to prepare for a stimulus), (ii) the orienting system (i.e., being able to orient 
attention towards a spatial area after a spatial cue), and (iii) the executive control 
system (i.e., being able to inhibit the distractors). The first two systems (i.e., alerting 
and orienting systems) are associated with bottom-up attention selection (i.e., 
external stimuli catching one’s attention) due to attention being directed despite the 
will of the individual. The third system (i.e., executive control system) is associated 
with top-down selection (i.e., conscious direction of one’s attention) as this system 
requires the individual to direct their attention themselves by ignoring distractors. 
4.5.4. Working memory 
As for the attentional focus, working memory has been explored in regards 
with time perception and gaming in the third chapter of this thesis and will not be 
further explored in this section. Similar to the section on ‘attention’, it has been 
explained that working memory is a very important process in temporal cognition 
(Gibbon et al., 1984) and appears to be improved among regular gamers (Colzato 
et al., 2013; Mishra et al., 2011). In this experiment, the Digit Span Test (DST), one 
of the sections of the fourth edition of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (i.e., 
WAIS-IV, Weschler, 2008), was chosen to assess working memory. Even though 
this task may not be entirely accurate because it is only a specific part from the 
entire battery, this task had the advantage of being short, given that the whole testing 
session lasted over 40 minutes.  
4.5.5. Impulsiveness 
Impulsiveness has first been defined as a tendency to act spontaneously in 
an unplanned and excessive fashion, and this unidimensional construct was the 
second mostly cited diagnostic criterion in the DSM-IV-TR (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2000). Although the root of impulsiveness lies in antiquity with 
Hippocrates’ work, this section will explore the evolution of this construct, starting 
with the inclusion of impulsiveness within Eysenck’s three-factor model of 
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personality (i.e., neuroticism, extraversion/introversion, and psychoticism) 
(Eysenck, 1967). According to Eysenck, impulsivity is mainly related to 
psychoticism and is defined as a tendency to not think before acting. It was still 
observed that impulsivity-related items were present in all the sections of the 
questionnaire Eysenck created to assess this model of personality (i.e., Eysenck’s 
Personality Questionnaire; Eysenck & Eysenck, 1975). Impulsiveness is included 
in the Five-Factor Model of personality (i.e., FFM, Costa & MacCrae, 1992) which 
includes four facets, or subcategories, directly related to impulsiveness: (i) 
impulsiveness–neuroticism, (ii) self-discipline and deliberation–
Conscientiousness, and (iii) excitement-seeking–extraversion).  
The first multidimensional model of impulsivity was proposed by Barratt 
(1985). According to him, there are three main types of impulsiveness, subdivided 
into six factors: attentional impulsiveness (including attention and cognitive 
instability; difficulty to remain focused on a task), non-planning impulsiveness 
(including self-control and cognitive complexity; not thinking ahead about the 
possible consequences of an action), and motor impulsiveness (including motor and 
perseverance; acting on the spur of the moment). Based on these three concepts, 
Patton, Stanford, and Barratt (1995) created the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale 11 
(BIS-11).  
Basing their thoughts on the aforementioned measures of impulsivity, 
Whiteside and Lynam (2005) created a test battery which they administered to 437 
university students. The battery included the NEO-PI-R (Costa & MacCrae, 1992), 
the BIS-11 (Patton et al., 1995), the sensation-seeking scale (Zuckerman, 1993), the 
Temperament and Character Inventory (Cloninger, Svrakic, & Przybeck, 1993), the 
EASI-III Impulsivity Scales (Buss & Plomin, 1975), the Personality Research Form 
Impulsivity Scale (Jackson, 1984), the Multidimensional Personality Questionnaire 
Control Scale (Tellegen, 1982), Dickman’s Functional and Dysfunctional 
Impulsivity Scales (Dickman, 1990), and the I-7 Impulsiveness questionnaire (S. 
Eysenck, Pearson, Easting, & Allsopp, 1985), and 14 items created to assess 
impulsivity occurring in negative emotional states (e.g., “When I feel bad I will 
often do things I later regret in order to make myself feel better now”, “I only act 
rashly when I am upset”). Collating the data from all the questions and performing 
factor analyses, Whiteside and Lynam (2005) developed a four-factor model of 
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impulsivity. These four factors were named urgency, lack of premeditation, lack of 
perseverance, and sensation seeking, giving its name to this model: the UPPS model 
of impulsivity.  
Urgency is the tendency to react rashly when experiencing a negative 
emotion (e.g., drinking lots of alcohol after receiving bad news). According to 
Cyders and Smith (2008), there exists the positive equivalent of negative urgency 
(i.e., positive urgency), which posits that the same type of rash reaction to emotion 
can occur when the situation is positive (e.g., spending a lot of money after 
receiving good news). This positive urgency later led to the creation of an 
integrative model of impulsivity, namely the UPPS-P (Lynam et al., 2006). 
Furthermore, it has been shown that both types of urgency are subcomponents of a 
key mechanism conveniently named “urgency” (Lynam et al., 2006). This factor is 
closely related to the neuroticism facet of the FFM, and individuals with high 
urgency tend to be more anxious or dysphoric (d’Acremont & Van der Linden, 
2007). Compared to ‘motor impulsiveness’ elaborated by Barratt (1985) which held 
a similar definition, this concept has the important advantage of including emotion 
in impulsiveness. This is interesting given that it has been shown numerous times 
that emotion can alter inhibition (e.g., Rebetez, Rochat, Billieux, Gay, & Van der 
Linden, 2015; Verbruggen & De Houwer, 2007) while urgency has been associated 
with the inhibition of pre-potent response (Bechara & Van Der Linden, 2005).  
Premeditation is the ability to think about the potential (negative) 
consequences of an act before acting; the lack of premeditation being the difficulty 
to foresee these consequences. This is close to the deliberation facet of the FFM, 
the lack of planning ability from the BIS, or the definition of impulsivity from 
Eysenck. Individuals with a lack of premeditation simply act without care for (or 
thought of) the consequences of their actions (e.g., drinking heavily the day before 
an important job interview). According to Bechara and Van der Linden (2005), 
premeditation is linked to decision-making.  
Perseverance is the ability to remain focused on a hard or boring task and 
the lack of perseverance refers to the difficulty to remain focused on such a task. 
This construct is close to the self-discipline facet of the FFM, as well as the 
cognitive impulsivity and cognitive complexity of the BIS. Individuals with a lack 
of perseverance tend to present attentional deficits, have more mind drift (Bechara 
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& Van Der Linden, 2005), and find it harder to lead their project to completion 
(Gay, Schmidt, & Linden, 2011). 
Sensation seeking is openness to new experiences and the tendency to seek 
exciting activities and new adventures. This facet is related to the motivational 
systems defined by Gray (1981; i.e., Behavioural Inhibition System and 
Behavioural Activation System) and the excitement facet of the FFM. Individuals 
with higher levels of sensation seeking tend to take more risks, and to engage in 
more dangerous activities.  
As mentioned earlier, both types of urgency are part of a higher global 
Urgency factor. And, according to a structural modelling of the UPPS-P, 
premeditation and perseverance depend on a global component named the 
conscience deficit factor (Billieux, Rochat, & Van der Linden, 2014). This 
conscience deficit factor and urgency are both part of a higher-order factor, self-
control, which relates to executive functions (e.g., inhibition, and decision-making). 
On the other hand, sensation seeking is more related to the motivational systems 
and is thus a separate motivational factor. Even though these two higher-order 
factors (i.e., motivational and self-control) are separate, they still show important 
interaction, which impacts an individual’s behaviour (Billieux et al., 2012).  
When thinking about the interaction of impulsivity and time perception, the 
first thing that comes to mind is the delay discounting (DD) paradigm. The DD 
paradigm is based on an economist perspective of decision-making, where the 
longer an individual has to wait before receiving a reward, the less subjective value 
they will attribute to this reward (Ainslie, 1993). Therefore, in a DD task, a 
participant is presented with varying reward values and delays before getting it, 
allowing the researcher to determine a function of their temporal decision-making 
(Rachlin, Brown, & Cross, 2000). Interestingly, the research examining the DD 
function of gamers exhibits a steeper function (i.e., a faster devaluation of reward 
over time) for pathological gamers compared to healthy or non-gamers (i.e., a 
difficulty to delay rewards, Buono et al., 2017). Furthermore, this relationship has 
been further supported by a study using a more implicit method to explore this 
association (i.e., the Single Key Impulsivity Paradigm, Nuyens et al., 2016). 
Unfortunately, despite the importance of time perception in DD (i.e., 
overestimating duration makes it harder to postpone a reward), no study clearly 
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explored the associations between these two variables. However, several studies 
have shown that groups exhibiting an impaired DD also showed impaired time 
perception (e.g., Baumann & Odum, 2012; Brocas, Carrillo, & Tarrasó, 2018). Still, 
this is not a pure measure of the association between impulsivity and time 
perception since other factors come into play (e.g., reward sensitivity).  
When it comes to directly comparing impulsivity and time perception, the 
results and methods differ between the few experiments available (i.e., multiple 
definitions of impulsivity, and different temporal tasks). According to tapping 
studies (i.e., asking participants to tap in a repetitive rhythm of one tap per second), 
impulsive individuals tend to tap faster, indicating a faster cognitive tempo (Barratt, 
Patton, Greger Olsson, & Zuker, 1981; Wittmann et al., 2007). When comparing 
these results to the current main prospective time perception model (i.e., the 
attentional gate model, see first chapter for more details), this refers to a faster pulse 
rate from the pacemaker, leading impulsive individuals to overestimate duration.  
This assumption is supported by case studies showing that populations 
marked by stronger impulsivity (e.g., individuals with Attention 
Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder, borderline disorder, and addiction disorder) tend to 
overestimate duration (Stanford & Barratt, 1996). This relationship is of interest 
when juxtaposed with studies exploring impulsivity among gamers where, despite 
a few inconsistencies, gamers appear to exhibit increased impulsivity (e.g., Billieux 
et al., 2015b; Ryu et al., 2018). In addition, studies demonstrate that the level of 
impulsivity experienced by gamers predict their level of addiction (e.g., Billieux et 
al., 2011; Ko et al., 2017), and could even trigger the development of disordered 
use (Gentile et al., 2011). Moreover, this last study showed in their longitudinal 
exploration of disordered gaming that developing disordered use leads to increased 
impulsivity.  
4.5.6. Depression 
According to the DSM-5 (American Psychiatric Association, 2013), 
depressive disorder is an umbrella concept including different mental disorders (i.e., 
disruptive mood dysregulation disorder, major depressive disorder, persistent 
depressive disorder, premenstrual dysphoric disorder, substance/medication-
induced depressive disorder, and depressive disorder due to another medical 
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condition). These disorders have been regrouped into a single section due to their 
shared presence of mood modification (i.e., presence of sadness/emptiness feeling, 
sleep disturbance, and thoughts of death). Among these specific disorders, the most 
common one is major depressive disorders, which is outlined by a succession of 
depressive episodes of at least two weeks (i.e., changes in cognition, affect, and 
neurovegetative functions) and remission episodes. The ICD-11 (World Health 
Organization, 2016) shares a similar definition of the umbrella construct of 
depressive disorders, the specific disorders inside this umbrella term slightly 
differing from the DSM-5 (i.e., single episode depressive disorder, recurrent 
depressive disorder, dysthymic disorder, and mixed depressive and anxiety 
disorder). The equivalent of major depressive disorders in the ICD-11 is recurrent 
depressive disorder, which is characterized by the presence of at least two 
depressive episodes (i.e., similar to the ones presented in the DSM-5), separated by 
a remission period. 
Regarding time perception, depressed individuals often report that the 
perception of time was lengthened, or that time was slowed down (Gallagher, 2012; 
Msetfi, Murphy, & Kornbrot, 2012). For example, Vincent Van Gogh in one of his 
letters to his brother mentioned that “days seem like weeks” to him (Van Gogh, 
1890). However, it can be argued that it refers to the time experience construct (i.e., 
the subjective feeling of time passing by). Even if these two constructs are 
theoretically very similar, several authors pointed out that the processes at stake can 
be drastically different (Kent, van Doorn, Hohwy, & Klein, 2019; Msetfi et al., 
2012).  
Concerning the time perception measures in research, the association with 
depression is inconclusive. Some current research has found that depressed 
participants (i.e., whether clinical or non-clinical) tend to overestimate durations 
(Biermann et al., 2011; Bschor et al., 2004), while other research has either failed 
to find any significant difference (Oberfeld, Thönes, Palayoor, & Hecht, 2014; 
Thönes & Oberfeld, 2015) or, occasionally, the opposite result (i.e., an 
underestimation of duration; Gil & Droit-Volet, 2009; Mioni, Stablum, Prunetti, & 
Grondin, 2016). This could be due to two main factors related to the methodology 
used. First, it has been shown in several experiments that depressed patients exhibit 
dulled motor responses. Therefore, the experiments using either a production or 
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reproduction task exhibit a clear limitation because of the importance of the motor 
input in these tasks. Second, most of the studies exploring time perception use short 
durations to allow multiple measurements of time estimation. Although this is 
ecologically relevant, the way the depressed participants express their time 
experience tends to imply that they refer to long, meaningful durations, which is 
not represented by the studies exploring durations smaller than a minute.  
This is of particular importance when it is known that depressed individuals 
appear to exhibit impaired sustained and selective attention (Gualtieri, Johnson, & 
Benedict, 2006) which is crucial for longer durations, but of lower importance in 
the shorter durations (Zakay & Block, 1995). When taking these two points into 
consideration, there is unfortunately not enough evidence to reach a definitive 
conclusion regarding the importance of depression in time perception, even though 
the association between depression and time experience has systematically been 
shown in research (Oberfeld et al., 2014; Thönes & Oberfeld, 2015). 
Concerning gaming, the results are more straightforward and most of the 
research including a measure of depression alongside a measure of gaming 
addiction has found an association between the two variables (e.g., Bargeron & 
Hormes, 2017; Männikkö et al., 2020; van Rooij et al., 2014). The only question 
still under debate is whether disordered gaming leads to depression, or if depressed 
individuals escape through gaming and develop disordered use afterwards. A few 
studies have attempted to resolve this debate by performing longitudinal research, 
showing disparate results. For example, Brunborg et al. (2014) showed that the 
amount of gaming at the first time point in the longitudinal study significantly 
predicted depression levels (among other variables) at the second time point (i.e., 
two years later). This study therefore implied that gaming is the predictor, or the 
antecedent, of depression. Gentile et al. (2011) supported these results with a 
stronger exploration of this interaction, and showed that someone with more 
gaming disorder symptoms at the first time point of the longitudinal study exhibited 
higher levels of depression at the second time point of the study (i.e., one year later). 
And, if the symptoms of gaming disorder increased for the second measurement 
time point of the study, levels of depression became even stronger at the third time 
point of the study (i.e., one year after the second measurement, and two years after 
the first one).  
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Interestingly, another longitudinal study highlighted the possibility of a 
vicious circle, or a bidirectional interaction between the two variables (Krossbakken 
et al., 2018). This research first supported the two previous longitudinal studies by 
showing that disordered gaming predicted levels of depression after one and two 
years. Second, it showed the opposite trend where depression predicted the 
development of disordered gaming after one year (i.e., not after two years). Despite 
the lack of support regarding the associations between time perception and 
depression, it was decided to include a measure of this variable in the present 
research in order to control for its potential impact. This is of particular importance 
because it has been shown that disordered gaming is closely related to depression. 
4.5.7. Anxiety and stress 
According to the DSM-5 (American Psychiatric Association, 2013), anxiety 
disorders are characterized by an excessive fear (i.e., a response to a real or perceive 
threat) and anxiety (i.e., anticipation of a threat). Anxiety disorders include several 
subtypes (i.e., separation anxiety disorder, selective mutism, specific phobia, social 
anxiety disorder, panic disorder, agoraphobia, and generalized anxiety disorder), 
the most common disorders being Specific Phobias and Social Anxiety Disorder 
(i.e., social phobia) according to the DSM-5. The first one is defined by fear/anxiety 
immediately triggered by a specific object/situation, which is avoided by the 
individual (or endured with intense discomfort) for at least six months. The second 
one, a specific phobia, shares commonalities with the previous disorder. This 
phobia is directed towards social situations, especially in situations when 
individuals can be observed and “judged” negatively by other individuals (e.g., due 
to their anxiety symptoms). It differs from Specific Phobias by the fact that the 
fear/anxiety is disproportionate compared to the actual threat of the situation. The 
ICD-11 offers a similar definition of Anxiety Disorders but since the ICD-11 does 
not include prevalence rates, there is no predominant type of Anxiety Disorder in 
this reference book (World Health Organization, 2016). 
The literature on anxiety and time perception is scarce compared to 
depression, yet, the global results appear more straightforward. The literature on 
this interaction shows that anxious individuals tend to overestimate duration (e.g., 
Bagana & Raciu, 2012; Campbell & Bryant, 2007; Droit-Volet, Mermillod, et al., 
2010). The most common effect observed concerns Social Anxiety Disorder, where 
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individuals suffering from social phobia overestimate the duration of angry and 
fearful faces compared to non-anxious faces (Ishikawa & Okubo, 2016; Yoo & Lee, 
2015). According to Bar-haim, Kerem, Lamy, and Zakay (2010), this difference 
between anxious and non-anxious individuals only occurs within very short 
durations (i.e., in this experiment, the results were significant only for 2s, and not 
for 4s and 8s). Interestingly, studies on one of the most widespread phobias, 
arachnophobia, showed that when confronted with their fear (i.e., spiders), 
arachnophobes overestimated time in the same manner that social phobic 
participants did when observing angry faces (Buetti & Lleras, 2012; Watts & 
Sharrock, 1984). Furthermore, the target of this phobia (i.e., spiders) was easily 
manipulated in experimental settings (i.e., compared to social situations), and 
allowed for more flexibility in the testing of the phobia. For example, Watts and 
Sharrock (1984) approached a spider as close as the participant could withstand it 
and made them estimate a 45s duration, showing that there was no difference in the 
estimation between the phobic and non-phobic individuals. Afterwards, they placed 
the spider closer to the participants, asking them to signal when it was starting to 
be unbearable and then again asked them to estimate a 45s duration. They showed 
that phobic participants overestimated the duration compared to the non-phobic 
ones. In another study, Buetti and Lleras (2012) explored the effect of perceived 
control on the interaction between anxiety (or stress) on time perception. For this 
purpose, they manipulated the perceived control of arachnophobes (and non-
arachnophobes) on the appearance of a spider (or other high-arousing negative 
pictures) in a task. They showed that when participants believed that they had no 
control over the appearance of the spider pictures, they tended to overestimate the 
duration of these, while the effect completely disappeared when participants 
thought that they were controlling their appearance.  
To the best of the author’s knowledge, only one study found a result that 
potentially contradicts the previous research in this section. In a study comparing 
anxious and depressed patients with control participants, Mioni et al., (2016) 
showed that while depressed participants under-reproduced durations (500, 1000, 
and 1500ms), anxious participants over-reproduced them. This could be interpreted 
as an overestimation of time for the depressed participants versus an 
underestimation for the anxious (as they estimated their production as shorter than 
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its real duration). Even though this first interpretation may be true, it could be due 
to anxious participants overestimating the duration of the stimuli which they had to 
reproduce. Indeed, if the participants overestimated the first duration, they would 
in turn produce a longer one, contradicting the underestimation hypothesis.  
Regarding gaming, the results follow the same trend as for depression, with 
disordered use (i.e., irrespective of the terminology and/or measure used) having 
been associated with higher anxiety scores (e.g., Bargeron & Hormes, 2017; Hyun 
et al., 2015; Wartberg, Kriston, & Thomasius, 2017). All of the studies showing 
this association used surveys, and most of them used the general population, 
showing the same type of results, and will not be further discussed. On the other 
hand, some of the research on this interaction explored it among clinical 
populations, or observed potential variables altering this association, and will be 
discussed in the following paragraphs.  
Using a clinical sample, Vadlin, Åslund, Hellström, and Nilsson (2016) 
compared the levels of different psychopathologies between non-disordered gamers 
and disordered gamers within a clinical population, and observed whether the same 
observations could be made between disordered gamers and control participants 
from the non-clinical population. Interestingly, while presenting symptoms of 
depression, ADHD or anxiety raised the likelihood of developing disordered use in 
the non-clinical population, there was no difference in terms of psychiatric 
symptoms among the clinical population.  
Two factors appear to influence the relationship between disordered gaming 
and anxiety levels. First, Bonnaire and Baptista (2019) showed that while 
disordered Massively Multiplayer Online Role-Playing Game (MMORPG) players 
exhibited higher levels of anxiety (and depression) compared to healthy gamers, 
disordered Multiplayer Online Battle Arena (MOBA) gamers only showed higher 
scores of depression and alexithymia. Therefore, it appears that the game genre 
preferred by the disordered gamers may influence the impact of their disordered use 
on their mental health. In another study, Király et al. (2015) explored the gamers’ 
motives as well as their disordered use, showing that the motives of escape (i.e., 
playing games to avoid real-life struggles) and competition (i.e., playing to compete 
with other players) directly influenced the interaction between gaming disorder and 
psychological distress. The escape motive interaction is of particular interest 
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because it has been hypothesized that disordered gaming may develop as result of 
the gamer playing games to escape negative affect (Kardefelt-Winther, 2014).  
The following studies investigated stress rather than anxiety which are 
included in this section due to the similarities in these constructs’ definitions. The 
results are similar to the ones from anxiety studies due to the disordered gamers 
overall higher level of stress (Achab et al., 2011; Che et al., 2017; Kaess et al., 
2017). This relationship has mainly been studied among disordered gamers, one 
study (Canale et al., 2019) exploring both gaming disorder and time spent gaming 
in relation with the perceived stress (i.e., perceiving stress as uncontrollable). 
Although this study showed the same association found in previous literature 
between stress and disordered gaming, the researchers observed that there was an 
interaction effect between psychological resilience and stress on gaming. When 
analysing this effect, they showed that when the level of psychological resilience 
was low, the level of perceived stress was positively correlated to time spent 
gaming, while this correlation was non-significant when the level of psychological 
resilience was high.  
As with anxiety, gaming disorder variables appear to influence its 
interaction with stress (i.e., motives and mindfulness). Similar to anxiety, the 
escapism motive appears to play a key role in the relationship between stress and 
gaming disorder (Snodgrass et al., 2014). To summarize this research, it appears 
that perceived stress is related to the escapism motive and that this same motive is 
associated with disordered gaming. This makes sense as the escapism motive 
concerns gamers playing to escape real-life problems or negative emotional states 
(i.e., here perceived stress). Accordingly, a stressed gamer could play more to 
escape their negative state and would be more at risk in developing disordered use. 
It is worth noting that all types of stress are not necessarily related to gaming 
disorder. For example, Hong, You, Kim, and No (2014) showed that academic 
stress was negatively associated with disordered gaming, indicating that the more 
stressed their participants were about their academic achievement, the less likely 
they were to developing gaming disorder. This is interesting, once coupled with the 
observed negative correlation between academic motivation and gaming disorder, 
as it could mean that when students want to perform at school and are stressed about 
it, they would simply spend more time working instead of escaping this stress while 
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gaming. Finally, while motives appear to promote the association between gaming 
disorder and stress, it would appear that mindfulness, on the other hand, shows the 
opposite effect (Yu, Mao, & Wu, 2018). Indeed, while the researchers observed an 
overall significant association between stress and gaming disorder, this association 
was only existent among participants with lower levels of mindfulness, while it 
entirely disappeared when they had higher levels of mindfulness. It could mean that 
when gamers are able to cope with stress in another way than gaming, they would 
not need to escape from their negative state which would reduce the risk of 
developing disordered gaming. 
This section has shown that gaming disorder shares important associations 
with both anxiety and stress, different variables being able to reinforce or diminish 
that interaction. In addition, it appears that anxiety and stress can directly affect 
time perception, leading to a quasi-systematic overestimation of time. Furthermore, 
it was shown that the lack of control of stress (i.e., one of the two components of 
perceived stress) is closely related to gaming disorder (Che et al., 2017). Finally, it 
was shown that not having control over a stressor systematically leads to an 
overestimation of time (Buetti & Lleras, 2012; Watts & Sharrock, 1984). Therefore, 
it appears that some of the reinforcement of stress both increases its impact on 
gaming and time perception. This information made it crucial for this thesis to have 
a measure of both stress and anxiety in order to control its potential influence on 
the participants’ time perception.  
4.5.8. Emotion reactivity 
This measure is unrelated to both gaming and time perception and was used 
as a control variable in the third experiment; its relevance will be briefly explained. 
In the third experiment of this thesis, emotional stimuli (i.e., gaming pictures) will 
be introduced in order to observe if they affect the gamers’ time perception. Since 
emotional reactivity differs between individuals, it may directly influence the 
relationship between the arousal created by the gaming pictures and the gamers’ 
time perception. As a result, it was decided to include such a measure. 
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4.6. Conclusion 
Based on these previous considerations, three experiments studied the 
underlying mechanisms of time loss through a careful inspection of the gamers’ 
time perception. The first experiment aimed to validate the explored Dual-Process 
Contingency Model of time perception combining both retrospective and 
prospective time perception with longer duration (i.e., longer than one minute). This 
first experiment already included the control variables aforementioned (i.e., 
depression, anxiety, stress, attention, working memory, impulsiveness, and emotion 
reactivity) in order to prevent any confounding variable biasing the results. The 
second study explored the baseline retrospective time perception of the gamers, 
which meant testing their time perception without any additional variable. This 
study was also adapted on the basis of the first experiment’s results. Finally, the 
third and final study of this thesis explored how attention, through an increased 
difficulty of the task, and emotion (i.e., gaming pictures) affects the interaction 
between gaming use and time perception. In the second and third experiments, 
controlling the extraneous variables was important due to the interaction of these 
with both gaming use and time perception. 
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Chapter 5: Experiment 1 – Validation of the Dual-Process Contingency 
Model 
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5.1. Experiment 1 background 
In the first chapter of this thesis, it was outlined that time perception was 
theoretically split between the prospective time perception (PTP, i.e. – conscious 
perception of time) and retrospective time perception (RTP, i.e. – unconscious 
perception of time; Block & Zakay, 1997). While PTP is supposed to rely on a 
model based on attentional process at its core (i.e., the attentional gate model, AGM 
- see Chapter 1; Zakay & Block, 1995), RTP appears to rely on a memory-based 
model (i.e., the contextual change model, CCM - see Chapter 1; Block & Reed, 
1978).  
However, according to Thomas and Weaver (1975), both timing process 
aforementioned would be tightly related through two core cognitive variables, 
namely time processing (i.e., focusing more or less on time, comparable to the 
AGM) and information processing (i.e., estimating time through the changes in the 
environment, comparable to the CCM). While the first variable would be 
predominant and the second one would be secondary in the PTP, the opposite trend 
should be observed in the RTP. (For more details on the functioning of this model, 
see Chapter 1). In their research piece, Thomas and Weaver (1975) named this 
model the Dual-Process Contingency Model (DPCM) and showed that the model 
exhibited significant results for duration shorter than 100ms. Later on, Zakay (1993) 
validated this model for duration between 12 and 15 seconds.  
5.2. Aim and hypotheses  
In the previous section, a model unifying PTP and RTP was outlined which 
currently suffers from a lack of validation as only two studies explored and 
validated the model, and this for short durations (i.e., less than 15s). Nevertheless, 
one of this thesis’ objectives is to explore time perception among gamers to help 
understanding why they tend to underestimate greatly the time they spend gaming 
(i.e., time loss effect). Consequently, the previous validation of maximum 15s is 
not suited for this thesis, as a gaming session will always exceed this duration 
considerably.  
Therefore, the first and main aim of this experiment is to validate the DPCM 
with a longer duration. And, as the following experiments will explore time 
perception among gamers as well as the variables affecting this association, this 
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study will already include measurement of gaming use and abuse within a survey. 
This first exploration of gaming in this study will allow a first look at the potential 
impact of gaming on time perception. Additionally, the impact of potentially 
confounding variables (i.e., attention, working memory, depression, stress, anxiety, 
and impulsiveness) has been included either through questionnaires or tasks (i.e., 
see “Section 5.3.3. Materials”). 
According to previous research on the DPCM, there should be a significant 
triple interaction between the time perception paradigm (i.e., PTP and RTP), time 
processing, and information processing. After analysis, time processing should 
exhibit an important effect in the PTP contrasting with a less pronounced effect in 
the RTP and the opposite trend should be observed in the RTP.  
Concerning gaming, it was hypothesized in Chapter 3 that gamers’ impaired 
time estimation would lie within the RTP and not PTP. It was also mentioned that 
their RTP would be impaired only when confronted to emotional affect, and that 
their time perception should remain unaffected under normal circumstances. As a 
result, no association between the gaming variables and time perception, whether 
retrospectively or prospectively, should be observed in this study. 
5.3. Method 
5.3.1. Design 
A between-group comparison design has been used in this experiment. The 
independent variables were the segmentation (i.e., separation of the stimuli in 
multiple groups, two or four subgroups), the difficulty of the task (i.e., easy or hard), 
and the time perception paradigm (i.e., prospective or retrospective). These three 
dichotomous variables led to a 2x2x2 design creating eight different groups. The 
dependent variable was the temporal estimation of the participants. In addition, this 
between-group design was coupled with a correlational exploration of several 
variables which may affect time perception (i.e., attentional process, working 
memory, gaming use/abuse, impulsiveness, depression, stress, anxiety, and 
demographic data).  
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5.3.2. Participants 
A sample of 98 participants (13 males) were included in this experiment 
(Mage = 20.98 years, SD = 4.71). They were recruited mainly through an internal 
credit system provided by Nottingham Trent University in which the psychology 
students could participate to diverse experiment in exchange for credits. In order to 
recruit more participants, the students from the research methods classes at NTU 
were asked to participate in exchange for research credits. Of these 98 participants, 
23 mentioned that they played videogames between 1 and 30 hours per week (M = 
10.67, SD = 8.62). 
5.3.3. Materials 
5.3.3.1. Self-reported measures 
Demographic data: Demographic data were collected to have a better 
overview of the population recruited for the experiments. Furthermore, it allowed 
control of any possible cofounding variables. The data collected were the 
participants’ age, gender, highest achieved educational level, and whether they were 
currently suffering from a mental health problem. 
Gaming use: The first experiment’s goal was not to compare gamers and 
non-gamers (i.e., whether disordered or healthy), yet these questions were included 
to allow a first approach between time perception and videogame use. Therefore, 
participants were first asked if they played videogames. If they did, gaming 
questionnaires were administered, if they did not, these questionnaires were not 
completed. First, they were asked about favourite game genre(s) among the 
following options (i.e., allowing them to pick as many as they wanted to): 
Multiplayer Online Battle Arena (MOBA) games, Massively Multiplayer Online 
Roleplaying Games (MMORPGs), First-Person Shooter (FPS) games, Role-
Playing Games (RPGs), Real-Time Strategy (RTS) games, race games, sport 
games, and other genres (i.e., allowing them to write down their favourite genres). 
Afterwards, they were asked about the title(s) of their favourite game(s), the average 
hours per week they spent playing videogames, whether they preferred playing on 
weekdays or the weekend (or both), and whether they played in the morning, 
afternoon, evening, or at night (on weekdays and the weekend). 
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UPPS-P, short behavioural scale (s-UPPS-P; Khazaal & Nuyens, 2020): 
The s-UPPS-P is a multidimensional measure of impulsiveness which comprises 20 
four-point Likert items equally distributed on the five UPPS-P subscales (i.e., 
positive/negative urgency, lack of premeditation, lack of perseverance, and 
sensation seeking). Although this specific scale has not been validated yet, other 
short versions of the UPPS-P have been rigorously validated previously in several 
languages such as in Arabic (Bteich, Berbiche, & Khazaal, 2017; alphas between 
.58 and .72) and Swedish (Claréus, Daukantaitė, Wångby-Lundh, & Lundh, 2017; 
alphas between .61 and .79). It is worth noting that this English short version of the 
UPPS-P is adapted from the French short version created by Billieux et al. (2012). 
The UPPS-P is not the only multidimensional construct of impulsiveness (e.g., the 
Barratt Impulsiveness Scale, Patton et al., 1995), but, contrary to the other well-
validated scales, the UPPS-P includes an emotional construct (i.e., positive and 
negative urgency). This emotional aspect is essential in this thesis because the last 
experiment aims at exploring the emotional interference on time perception among 
gamers, which means that analysing an emotional aspect of impulsivity is relevant.  
Problematic Online Game Questionnaire (POGQ, Demetrovics et al., 
2012): The POGQ is a multidimensional tool assessing the problematic use of 
online videogames including 18 five-point Likert items divided into five different 
subscales. The first subscale, preoccupation, comprises two questions and is defined 
as the constant thinking about the game when one is not playing. The second 
subscale, immersion, includes four questions and is defined through different 
concepts associated with time loss (i.e., losing track of time while playing and 
forgetting to eat due to the game). The third subscale, social isolation, refers to the 
neglect of other activities or of one’s friends in favour of gaming and comprises 
three questions. Interpersonal conflicts, the fourth subscale, comprises two 
questions exploring how gaming impacts the participants’ life negatively. The fifth 
subscale, overuse, defines abuse of the game (i.e., spending too much time on the 
game) via three items. Finally, the last subscale, withdrawal, includes four items 
exploring negative emotions emerging when one cannot play videogames for a 
prolonged period of time. This scale has high Cronbach’s alphas (e.g., between .90 
and .95 in its first validation, Demetrovics et al., 2012). Furthermore, the scale’s 
scores showed interesting interactions with various variables, such as risky 
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decision-making (Weinstein et al., 2016), delay discounting (Nuyens et al., 2016; 
Weinstein et al., 2016), and other types of problematic use (Bőthe, Tóth-Király, & 
Orosz, 2015). Finally, it has been shown that this scale’s validity did not vary 
between the online and offline gamers, which is of interest as this thesis will include 
both types of gamers (Smohai et al., 2017). 
Internet Gaming Disorder (IGD) criteria (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2013): The IGD criteria comprise nine dichotomous questions 
exploring the different symptoms according to the DSM-5 (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2013), namely: (i) preoccupation (i.e., thinking constantly about 
Internet games), (ii) withdrawal (i.e., negative feelings when the Internet game has 
been taken away), (iii) tolerance (i.e., the need to increase the gaming time or to 
play more exciting games to achieve the same level of satisfaction), (iv) 
unsuccessful attempts to stop playing, (v) loss of interest in other activities, (vi) 
gaming despite harm, (vii) deception (i.e., lying about one’s gaming habits), (viii) 
escape (i.e., playing to avoid negative feelings), and (ix) interpersonal conflicts. 
According to the DSM-5, in order to be considered as disordered gamer, an 
individual has to present five of these nine criteria during the past 12 months.  
Depression Anxiety and Stress Scale – Short-form DASS-21 (Lovibond & 
Lovibond, 1995): The short version of the DASS comprises 21 four-point Likert 
items equally distributed between three subscales exploring depression, anxiety, 
and stress symptoms for non-clinical population. The first validation showed high 
Cronbach’s alphas (i.e., between .87 and .94, Antony et al., 1998) and the scale has 
been validated in Vietnamese (i.e., alpha between .70 and .77, Tran, Tran, & Fisher, 
2013), Spanish (i.e., alphas between .71 and .88, Antúnez & Vinet, 2012) and in 
Portuguese (i.e., alphas between .86 and .92, Vignola & Tucci, 2014). This scale 
was of interest due to the measures of three separate important concepts using a 
single brief instrument, avoiding the inclusion of multiple scales, which could have 
affected the results due to survey fatigue.  
Emotion Reactivity Scale (i.e., ERS, Nock, Wedig, Holmberg, & Hooley, 
2008): This scale assesses a multidimensional definition of emotion reactivity: (i) 
emotion intensity (i.e., how strongly an individual reacts), (ii) sensitivity (i.e., 
individual’s reaction to a stimulus or an array of stimuli), and (iii) persistence (i.e., 
the time taken to return to the baseline level of arousal) across 21 five-point Likert 
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items. This scale showed high reliability in its validation study for every single 
subscale (i.e., Cronbach’s alphas ranged between .81 and .88). As for the other 
scales, this construct has been validated in other languages, such as French (Lannoy, 
Heeren, et al., 2014) or Dutch (Claes, Smits, & Bijttebier, 2014), exhibiting the 
same type of reliability scores (Cronbach’s alphas respectively between .75 and .88 
and between .77 and .89). 
5.3.3.2.  Behavioural measures 
Temporal task: In order to test the DPCM with longer durations (i.e., around 
one, three, and six minutes), a distraction task was needed because making time 
perception core to the task would have rendered impossible a switch between 
prospective and retrospective time perception, this latter one being an unconscious 
process. This task needed to include stimuli allowing an easy fluctuation of the 
DPCM’s two main variables, namely segmentation and attention. These stimuli also 
needed to be able to fluctuate in terms of emotional valence (i.e., neutral stimuli 
versus emotional ones) as the plan was to test emotional processes in further studies. 
These facts led to the selection of words allowing the fluctuation of both the DPCM 
variables and of a word recalling task (WRT), which was a non-temporal distraction 
task. In order to modify the attention brought upon the task, and indirectly to time 
itself, half the participants were presented with simple, familiar, words (e.g., “cat”, 
and “night”), while the other half had to remember more complex and non-familiar 
words (e.g., “belligerent”, and “plenipotentiary”). Normally, having more 
complicated/unfamiliar words to retain requires more cognitive resources than 
remembering simple/familiar words. Concerning segmentation, celebrity names 
were included at regular intervals between the common words (with a single name 
in the low segmentation groups and three in the high segmentation groups). 
The purpose of the celebrity names was to divide the sequence of stimuli 
into several subgroups, allowing the participants to have one or three markers in 
order to provide a time estimation. The names changed depending on the level of 
difficulty as well (e.g., “Zlatan Ibrahimovic” vs. “Rihanna”). Finally, half the 
participants were told beforehand that they would have to estimate the length of 
each block at the end of the task (i.e., prospective time perception), while the other 
half only learned about this aspect of the task at the end of the trial, making this 
estimation unconscious (i.e., retrospective time perception). These three 
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dichotomous variables led to a 2x2x2 design and the creation of eight different 
experimental conditions.  
The words were selected on the MRC Psycholinguistic Database from the 
University of Western Australia (Coltheart, 1981). Among the diverse variables 
offered by the website, the familiarity rating (i.e., ranging from 100 to 700, with an 
average of 488 and a standard deviation of 99) and the number of syllables were 
chosen to create the word list. For the complex words, they could not score higher 
than 325 on the familiarity score (i.e., about 1.65 standard deviation under the 
average familiarity score) and needed to include at least three syllables (i.e., in order 
to produce “complex” words). For the simple words, they required a minimum of 
587 in the familiarity score (i.e., one standard deviation over the average familiarity 
score, as 1.65 did not yield enough words), and to include a maximum of three 
syllables (i.e., to produce simple, “easy to remember” words). Furthermore, each 
word needed to include at least three letters to allow the removal of numerous 
conjunctions or pronouns, the remaining words (e.g., she, they, and for) being 
manually removed afterwards. The task structure comprised a succession of a 
fixation cross (1000ms), a word (3000ms), and a blank screen (1000ms) for a total 
of 5s per trial. The short block included 11 trials (i.e., 55s), the medium-length block 
included 31 trials (i.e., 155s), and the long block included 71 trials (i.e., 355s). In 
order to avoid the participants guessing the exact duration of each block by 
rounding up their estimation to the minute, each block lasted slightly shorter than 
the aimed duration (i.e., 55s vs. 60s, 155s vs. 180s, 355s vs. 360s). The blocks were 
randomized, and the participants had two minutes to recall as many words as they 
could. At the end of the task, the participants were asked to estimate the duration of 
each block as accurately as they could, excluding the two-minute recall parts.  
  Digit Span Test (Weschler, 2008): The Digit Span Test is a well-
validated measure of working memory (Jung, 2018; Torgesen & Griffith, 1980). In 
this test, the experimenter reads a series of digits in which the participant has to 
either repeat in the exact same order (i.e., forward test) or in the opposite order (i.e., 
backward test). Starting with three numbers in the forward test and two in the 
backward test, the number of digits is increased by one with every correct answer. 
When participants answered wrongly, they had another chance with the same 
number of digits, a second mistake led to the end of the test.  
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Attentional Network Task – Revised (ANT-R, Fan et al., 2002): The ANT-
R explores three different components of attention, namely the alerting system, the 
orienting system, and the executive control system. In this task, the participant first 
sees a fixation cross (between 1000 and 2200ms) during which a cue appears for 
150ms. This is followed by a set of either one or five arrows (until the participant 
answers or for a maximum of 1500ms), and the cross reappears 1000ms after the 
arrows disappeared. The participant has to decide which direction the central arrow 
is heading. The cue can appear above or below the cross, indicating where the 
arrows will appear. Also, the cues can be multiple and appear at both these locations 
at the same time, or simply be juxtaposed on the fixation cross. In these two last 
cases, the cue does not indicate where the arrow(s) will appear but lets participants 
know that its/their apparition was imminent. Whether the cue indicates where the 
arrows are going to appear or not helps to assess the alerting and orienting system. 
In order to assess the executive control system, the trial can either include a single 
arrow or multiple arrows; in the second case, the arrows surrounding the central one 
(i.e., the target) can either be congruent (i.e., heading in the same direction) or 
incongruent (i.e., heading in the opposite direction). 
5.3.4. Procedure 
Participants could either subscribe through the University recruitment 
system to a specific date and time when they would participate in the experiment, 
or on a piece of paper with the same options if recruited in a research methods class. 
When coming to the laboratory, they were given a code name to ensure their 
anonymity based on the first letter of their first name, the first letter of their mother 
maiden name, and the two last digits of their birth year (e.g., FD92, AA94). The 
mother’s maiden name was preferred to the participants’ second name because the 
use of their initials would allow the experimenter, or any other researcher involved 
in the study, to find the participants’ real identity when they were recruited in 
classes (i.e., through the University database).  
After reading the information sheet and giving their fully informed consent, 
the participants were introduced to the first task, the WRT. The participants were 
first randomly allocated to one of the eight possible groups varying in terms of the 
three independent variables (i.e., segmentation, work load, and temporal paradigm). 
Afterward, the participants were introduced to the functioning of the task. First, the 
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participants would be presented a series of words which would appear automatically 
one after another and would need to read the words passively until the following 
message appeared: “All the words have been presented, please press the space bar 
and try recalling as many words as you can for two minutes”. After seeing that 
message, they were asked to press the space bar and start writing down as many 
words as they could until the screen message changed to “The recalling time is 
over, please press the space bar as soon as you are ready for the next block”. The 
only difference in terms of instructions between the different groups depended on 
the time perception paradigm; the participants in the PTP were warned that they 
would have to estimate the duration of the three blocks, while the other participants 
did not know about time perception until the end of the task (RTP). After 
completing the three different blocks (i.e., in a fully random order), the participants 
were asked to provide their time estimation for each of the three blocks. They were 
allowed to use any time measure they preferred (i.e., minutes or seconds) and were 
told that they could be as accurate as they wanted (e.g., one minute and thirty 
seconds, three minutes and ten seconds). 
After completing the WRT, the participants were introduced to the DST. 
This order was chosen to allow the participants to stop fixating the computer screen 
and rest their eyes for a few minutes. It was explained that they would first have to 
repeat the digits dictated by the experimenter in the exact same order (i.e., forward 
test) with increasing difficulty until they could not do it anymore. Secondly, they 
were asked to repeat the digits recited by the experimenter in the opposite order 
(i.e., backward test) with increasing difficulty until they could not do it anymore. 
Finally, the participants were reassured that the task was virtually limitless, and that 
getting stuck did not mean that they failed the test in order to prevent as many 
negative feelings as possible.  
Once the participants were done with the DST, they were introduced to the 
ANT-R. Since the task was quite complex, participants were offered examples on 
top of the text instructions. In these examples, each type of cues and arrow were 
shown to the participants and the researcher took some time to explain what these 
types of cues and arrows implicated in the task. Once the participants confirmed 
that they understood the functioning of the ANT-R, they completed a first short 
training blocks including 16 trials with at least one representation of each clue and 
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arrow. While completing this training block, the participants were monitored by the 
experimenter to ensure a proper completion of the task afterward. The experimenter 
let the participants know that they would be monitored for the training block and 
that they would not be observed for the testing blocks. Afterwards, the participants 
completed three different testing blocks with 48 trials each. In order to assure that 
the participants would not try to estimate the duration of the task, and get distracted, 
the duration of the task was revealed at the beginning of the testing blocks.  
Finally, after completion of the ANT-R, the participants completed the 
survey in the following order: demographic data, DASS-21, gaming use1, UPPS-P, 
POGQ1, ERS, and the IGD criteria1. The participants were told that they could ask 
any question to the experimenter in case they did not understand any part of it. At 
the end of the survey, they were given the option to share an email address to 
participate in further studies organised by the experimenter. Afterward, they were 
fully debriefed, especially when they were deceived about the time perception 
aspect of this study and thanked. 
5.3.5. Ethics 
This research was approved by the College Research Ethics Committee 
(CREC) prior to data collection. Furthermore, this study’s design and procedure is 
consistent with the Declaration of Helsinki. Only two parts of this experiment could 
have caused minor harms to the psychological wellbeing of the participants. The 
first one is the disappointment of the participants in their own performance in the 
DST which was compensated with the experimenter reassuring each participant 
with their own score. The second one lies within the method of this experiment, as 
half the participants were in the RTP condition, thus not knowing about the time 
perception aspect of this study. Therefore, as the participants were deceived on the 
true purpose of this experiments (i.e., they were told that the variable of interest was 
the number of words they could properly remember), they were properly debriefed 
at the end of the experiments, explaining the reason behind the deception. The other 
participants were also fully debriefed, although they were not deceived in any way. 
 
 
1 These questionnaires were not included if the participants reported not playing videogames.  
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5.4. Results 
5.4.1. Preliminary statistics  
Time perception: The time estimation in seconds of the participants had a 
relatively important fluctuation which increased depending on the duration 
estimated (i.e., SD = 54.92, SD = 85.97 SD = 120.36 for the short, medium, and 
long estimation respectively). Therefore, it was decided that every estimation twice 
as long as the real duration (i.e., 55s, 155s, or 355s) would be removed from the 
sample. This reduced the variance of both the short and medium blocks (i.e., SD = 
21.72 and SD = 68.34 respectively) but did not affect the long block variation as 
none of the estimation was removed. These standard deviations fit the Scalar 
Expectancy Theory (SET), as according to this theory, the longer the duration, the 
longer the estimation variation. The mean and standard deviation of these 
estimations, including the total estimation, are provided in Table 5.1. 
Table 5.1. Descriptive statistics of the time estimations 
 
Real 
duration (s) 
Mean estimation 
provided (s) 
Standard 
deviation (s) 
Short estimation 55 49.62 21.72 
Medium estimation 155 137.07 68.34 
Long estimation 355 244.95 120.36 
Total estimation 565 459.51 217.06 
 
ANT-R: When calculating the average RT of each participant, two factors 
were taken into account. First, none of the trials where the participants answered 
wrongly were included in the calculation. From this modification, a first average 
and SD were calculated and used to further sort the RT of the participants. Any RT 
differing from more than two SD from the mean (i.e., either above or below) were 
excluded. Afterward, the real RT means of the participants were calculated (i.e., 
global RT, RT based on the different cues, and RT based on the number and 
congruence of the arrows). The descriptive statistics of both the RT and the 
accuracy of the ANT-R can be seen in Table 5.2.  
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Table 5.2. Descriptive statistics of the ANT-R 
 Mean1 SD 
Global RT 434.80 52.91 
Single arrow RT 410.53 47.35 
Multiple arrows RT 460.82 60.95 
Multiple congruent arrows RT 436.61 56.67 
Multiple incongruent arrows RT 487.96 66.10 
Informative cue2 RT 417.32 54.66 
Dual cue3 RT 455.22 54.34 
Central cue4 RT 450.47 54.57 
Global accuracy 94.02 1.58 
Single arrow accuracy 94.86 1.65 
Multiple arrows accuracy 93.48 2.16 
Multiple congruent arrows accuracy 96.75 1.28 
Multiple incongruent arrows accuracy 95.09 4.05 
Informative cue1 accuracy 94.55 1.51 
Dual cue2 accuracy 97.47 2.82 
Central cue3 accuracy 89.81 2.75 
Note. 1The RT value are in ms and the accuracy values in percentages; 2 Single cue 
appearing either below or above the fixation cross; 3Two cues appearing both below and 
above the fixation cross; 4Cue appearing at the same location as the fixation cross.  
 
DST: The DST does not need any real prior modification before its analysis, 
as the result analysed is simply the maximum number remembered by the 
participants either forward (i.e., short-term memory) or backward (i.e., working 
memory). However, two extra variables were created to attain a deeper exploration 
of working memory. First, the number of digits recalled backward by the 
participants was subtracted to the number of digits recalled forward by the 
participants. The purpose of this modification was to take into account the basic 
short-term memory of the participant in the calculus of the working memory score 
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(i.e., the bigger the difference, the worse the working memory). The limitation of 
this calculation is that a participant with two low scores could end up with the same 
global score as a participant with two higher scores (e.g., five digits forward and 
three backward – Score of 2; ten digits forward and eight backward – Score of 2). 
To overcome to this limitation, a second calculation was performed, and the 
previous results were multiplied by the total number of digits recalled by the 
participants (i.e., the sum of the backward and forward results). Interestingly, this 
calculation can be summarised as the square score on the forward task subtracted 
by the squared score on the backward task. With this method, a participant repeating 
more digits overall would have a better global score (e.g., to take back the previous 
example; 16 vs. 36). The descriptive statistics of the DST, including the newly 
calculated variables, are available in the Table 5.3.  
Table 5.3. Descriptive statistics of the DST 
 Mean SD 
Forward score (F) 7.61 1.23 
Backward score (B) 5.87 0.97 
Subtraction score  
(F-B) 
1.74 1.36 
Multiplication score  
(F-B) * (F+B) 
24.09 20.25 
 
Questionnaires: For clarity’s sake, the results from the gaming 
questionnaires are separated from the questionnaires not related to gaming. Apart 
from this fact, no modification has been brought upon the survey results and the 
guidelines offered by the authors of the scales have been followed. The descriptive 
statistics of the global questionnaires can be found in Table 5.4 (n = 97) and the 
gaming questionnaires in Table 5.5 (n = 23).  
  
  
138 
Table 5.4. Descriptive statistics of the questionnaires not related to gaming 
 Minimum Maximum Mean SD 
Stress (DASS) 7 27 13.46 4.09 
Anxiety (DASS) 7 27 11.45 3.79 
Depression (DASS) 7 25 11.39 4.06 
Negative urgency (UPPS-P) 4 16 9.95 3.21 
Positive urgency (UPPS-P) 6 14 10.63 2.18 
Premeditation (UPPS-P)1 4 12 7.48 2.19 
Perseverance (UPPS-P)1 4 13 7.56 1.90 
Sensation seeking (UPPS-P) 5 16 10.87 2.64 
Emotional reactivity (ERS) 15 101 56.32 19.28 
Note. 1Lack of perseverance/premeditation 
 
Table 5.5. Descriptive statistics of the questionnaires related to gaming 
 Minimum Maximum Mean SD 
IGD criteria 0 7 1.78 1.88 
Preoccupation (POGQ) 2 8 4.13 1.69 
Overuse (POGQ) 3 12 5.96 3.36 
Immersion (POGQ) 4 18 11.52 3.62 
Social isolation (POGQ) 2 8 4.13 1.87 
Interpersonal conflicts (POGQ) 2 6 2.91 1.41 
Withdrawal (POGQ) 4 14 6.65 3.21 
Total POGQ score 20 62 35.30 12.27 
 
5.4.2. Time perception 
A first analysis performed on the temporal estimation was to compare the 
error of estimation between all the participants. For this purpose, the estimation of 
each participant was first divided by the real duration of the block, giving a number 
theoretically varying between 0 and 2 (i.e., the estimation over twice the real 
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duration being removed previously). This calculation was still not sufficient 
because the overestimation (i.e., scores above 1) and underestimation (i.e., score 
below 1) errors were separated. To get rid of this issue, the scores were first 
subtracted by 1 (i.e., varying between -1 and 1) and then squared (i.e., varying 
between 0 and 1). Afterward, to achieve the real error rate, rather than its squared 
value, the squared root of the previous score was used (i.e., still varying between 0 
and 1). The short block had an error rate of .34 (SD = .23), the medium-length block 
of .39 (SD = .23), and the long block of .40 (SD = .23). Interestingly, when 
comparing these variables through a repeated measures ANOVA, there was a 
significant difference, F(2) = 8.579, p=.005. Once applying the Bonferroni 
correction, it appeared that this significant difference was due to a significantly 
higher error rate in the longest block, compared to the medium and short blocks. It 
is important to mention that only the data from the participants who did not provide 
a single outlying estimation remained in the repeated measures ANOVA, leading 
to a sample of 71 participants. Therefore, for the specific analysis, the mean of the 
sample changed to .34 for the short block (SD = .23), .37 for the medium block (SD 
= .22), and .44 for the long block (SD = .23).  
Concerning the control variables included in this experiment which could 
affect time perception of participants (e.g., depression and attention), their effect on 
the temporal estimation in this experiment were explored through a correlational 
analysis. As Tables 5.6, 5.7, and 5.8 show, none of the correlations explored 
affected the estimation of the participants.  
Table 5.6. Correlation between the DST variable and time estimation 
  
DST forward 
score 
DST backward 
score 
DST 
subtraction 
DST global 
score 
Short estimation  
(n = 73) 
.045 -.094 .104 .105 
Medium estimation  
(n = 98 
.015 -.085 .074 .071 
Long estimation  
(n = 98) 
-.135 -.041 -.093 -.089 
Total estimation (n 
= 98) 
-.060 -.097 -.060 -.097 
Note. * Correlation is significant at the p<.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Table 5.7. Correlation r between the ANT-R variables and time estimation 
  
Short 
estimation 
(n = 14) 
Medium 
estimation  
(n = 38) 
Long 
estimation  
(n = 44) 
Total 
estimation 
 (n = 43) 
Global RT -.039 -.005 -.070 -.133 
Single arrow RT -.021 -.001 -.065 -.128 
Multiple arrows RT -.054 -.008 -.072 -.131 
Multiple congruent arrows 
RT 
-.034 -.027 -.077 -.151 
Multiple incongruent arrows 
RT 
-.082 .011 -.065 -.108 
Informative cue1 RT -.015 -.002 -.059 -.121 
Dual cue2 RT -.084 -.002 -.050 -.130 
Central cue3 RT -.045 -.015 -.099 -.139 
Global accuracy .020 -.130 -.034 -.053 
Single arrow accuracy .009 -.193 -.091 -.130 
Multiple arrows accuracy .099 -.089 -.026 -.030 
Multiple congruent arrows 
accuracy  
.363 .091 .099 .126 
Multiple incongruent arrows 
accuracy  
.020 -.119 -.057 -.067 
Informative cue1 accuracy -.040 -.112 .083 .047 
Dual cue2 accuracy .283 -.151 -.095 -.102 
Central cue3 accuracy -.040 -.090 -.138 -.142 
Note. *Correlation is significant at the p<.05 level (2-tailed). RT = Reaction time; 1Single cue 
appearing either below or above the fixation cross; 2Two cues appearing both below and above the 
fixation cross; 3Cue appearing at the same location than the fixation cross. 
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Table 5.8. Correlations between stress, anxiety, depression, and impulsiveness 
with time estimations 
  
Short 
estimation 
(n = 73) 
Medium 
estimation 
(n = 97) 
Long 
estimation 
(n = 97) 
Total 
estimation 
(n = 97) 
Stress (DASS) -.017 .002 .045 .052 
Anxiety (DASS) .200 .545 .666 .420 
Depression (DASS) -.060 .006 -.027 -.022 
Positive urgency (UPPS-P) .005 -.054 -.149 -.141 
Negative urgency (UPPS-P) -.122 -.107 .019 -.118 
Premeditation (UPPS-P)1 -.032 -.088 -.049 -.212 
Perseverance (UPPS-P)1 .100 -.074 -.025 -.052 
Sensation seeking (UPPS-P) .037 .072 .116 .057 
Note. * Correlation is significant at the p<.05 level (2-tailed). 1Lack of perseverance or 
premeditation. 
 
5.4.3. Validation of the DPCM 
 In order to verify the validity of the DPCM for the longer duration explored 
in this thesis, a General Linear Model Multivariate was used with the three 
dichotomic variables (i.e., segmentation, difficulty, and temporal paradigm) as 
predictors and the three durations as well as the total duration for the dependent 
variables. The order of the block and the participants’ ages were further included as 
a covariate in the analysis to control its impact on the participant’s estimation. The 
results were not significant for all the tested variables, F(8) = .733, p=.66 for the 
short duration, F(8) = .769, p=.63 for the medium duration, F(8) = .936, p=.50 for 
the long duration, and F(8) = .967, p=.47 for the total duration. Furthermore, when 
exploring the error rate (i.e., see ‘Section 5.4.2. Time perception’ for the calculation 
process), these results were replicated for all durations, the p-value varying between 
.48 and .52.  
 A variable of interest within the WRT used to test the DPCM is the number 
of words recalled by the participants. First, the number of words was compared 
between the easy and complicated versions of the task, the participants recalling 
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more words in the easy setting for all the blocks, p<.001. None of the correlations 
between time perception and the number of words recalled exhibited a significant 
effect post-correction (i.e., Benjamin-Hochberg correction).  
5.4.4. Gamers’ time perception 
 The small sample of gamers who participated allowed a first exploration of 
their time perception. However, it is important to bear in mind that any results 
described within this section are to be taken cautiously due to the difference of 
sample size between the gamers (n = 23) and the non-gamers (n = 74). 
Unfortunately, the number of participants scoring above 5 on the IGD (i.e., 2 
participants) being too low, no group analysis was led based on this variable. The 
results showed that the long duration and the total duration were significantly 
different (i.e., the total duration difference probably resulting from the long duration 
difference). In the long duration, the gamers estimated the duration to be about 
71.72s longer than the non-gamers’, t(95) = 2.55, p=.012. For the total duration, 
this difference was of 112.92s, t(95) = 2.186, p=.031. However, this difference was 
observed without separating prospective and retrospective time perception. When 
splitting the estimation between these two paradigms, the estimations of the gamers 
did not differ significantly from the non-gamers’ estimations retrospectively. 
Nonetheless, when comparing the prospective estimation provided by the gamers 
(358.18s) and the non-gamers (240.00s), a significant difference was observed 
(p=.01). Although it appears unexpected for the gamers to overestimate time 
compared to the non-gamers, a careful observation changed this interpretation. 
Indeed, when knowing that the real duration of the longer block was of 355s, it 
appears that the estimation provided by the gamers was simply more accurate than 
the non-gamers’. This tends to support that gamers have an improved PTP.  
 Regarding the gaming variables explored in the survey, their effect on time 
perception was tested through Pearson correlations which can be seen in Table 5.9. 
Although six of these correlations were significant at first, after the Benjamin-
Hochberg correction, they systematically became non-significant. It is still worth 
mentioning that most of these correlations that were significant at first were 
systematically negative, indicating that gaming disorder could lead to an 
underestimation of time.   
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Table 5.9. Correlation between the disordered use of gaming and time 
perception 
 
Short 
estimation 
(n = 16) 
Medium 
estimation 
(n = 23) 
Long 
estimation 
(n = 23) 
Total 
estimation 
(n = 23) 
IGD criteria -.175 -.152 .115 .076 
Total score (POGQ) -.478 -.492* -.071 -.224 
Preoccupation (POGQ) -.195 -.197 -.211 -.353 
Overuse (POGQ) -.225 -.427* -.064 -.181 
Immersion (POGQ) -.513* -.424* .123 .037 
Social isolation (PGQ) -.448 -.328 -.009 .046 
Interpersonal conflicts 
(POGQ) 
-.337 -.399 -.020 -.411 
Withdrawal -.509* -.484* -.217 -.369 
Note. *Correlation significant at p<.05 before Benjamin-Hochberg correction. 
 
5.5. Discussion 
The main aim of this study was to explore the validity of the DPCM for 
longer durations since it was only tested for durations up to 15s. When testing the 
impact of the three dichotomous variables of the model on the estimations provided 
by the participants, the model was non-significant, and this for all the variables. 
Consequently, it is possible that while this specific model of time perception is 
accurate in describing short durations, it would be inefficient in predicting longer 
estimations. It is noteworthy that there was no difference in the estimation provided 
by the participants in the prospective and retrospective settings. This could be due 
to the lack of difference observed based on the difficulty of the task. This could 
indicate that the easy task was already too complicated for the participants to be 
able to focus properly on time. According to the AGM, if participants could not 
focus at all on the task, the attentional gate would be fully closed, leading the 
participants to estimate the time retrospectively rather than prospectively. 
Therefore, for the rest of this thesis, a simpler task than the recalling task should be 
preferred to allow an effect of the cognitive load. Furthermore, it is worth 
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mentioning that none of the control variables explored within this study correlated 
significantly with the time estimations of the participants.  
Concerning the gamers, they significantly overestimated time compared to 
non-gamers, a result which is to be considered cautiously due to the small number 
of gamers (n = 23) compared to non-gamers (n = 74). Interestingly, since the 
estimation of the gamers was actually closer to the real duration compared to the 
non-gamers, this could be interpreted as an improved estimation instead of an 
overestimation. This could be a direct consequence of the previously discussed 
improved attentional focus and working memory (i.e., see the third chapter on the 
interaction of gaming and time perception). Consequently, it further implies that 
RTP would be the key concept when exploring time perception of gamers while 
PTP would not be implicated. The variables measuring disordered use of 
videogames among these gamers were correlated with the temporal estimations 
provided by these same gamers. Nonetheless, the only few significant correlations 
appeared to not be significant anymore after the Benjamin-Hochberg correction. It 
appeared that all these correlations were negative, which could indicate that the 
more disorder use symptoms present in an individual, the more they underestimated 
time even though these were not significant post-correction.  
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Chapter 6:  Experiment 2 – Gamers’ baseline retrospective time perception 
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6.1. Experiment 2 background 
In Chapter 3 of this thesis, the potential associations between time 
perception and gaming were explored. It has been noted that due to their improved 
attentional focus (e.g., Cain et al., 2014; Castel et al., 2005) and working memory 
(e.g., Colzato et al., 2013; Mishra et al., 2011), gamers should exhibit a more precise 
prospective time perception (PTP) than non-gamers. The results observed in the 
first experiments tended to support this hypothesis, as gamers produced a more 
accurate estimation of the longer block compared to the non-gamers (results to be 
taken cautiously due to the sample difference). This possibility does not match the 
observed time loss among gamers (Wood et al., 2007) which would exclude that 
the gamers’ impaired time perception would be prospective but rather indicate that 
they would potentially exhibit an impaired retrospective time perception (RTP). 
Consequently, this impacted the second study because prospective time perception 
(PTP) would no longer be explored.  
Furthermore, the first experiment’s results were non-significant regarding 
the Dual-Process Contingency Model (DPCM) of time perception, indicating that 
this model was not fit for longer durations and for this thesis. Accordingly, the 
following experiments will be based on the Attentional Gate Model (AGM) of time 
perception and a continuum of attention linking both RTP and PTP (i.e., see 
discussion of previous experiment). The first study also exhibited that there was no 
difference between the duration estimation under the easy and the hard settings of 
the task, meaning that the easy task was potentially already too hard for the 
participants to focus on time. Thus, the following experiments will include an easier 
task.  
6.2. Aim and hypotheses  
As mentioned in the previous section, the aim of this study is to compare 
the baseline time perception of gamers and non-gamers in a retrospective setting. 
What baseline means in this study is that no external variable will be explored in 
the temporal task, all the participants will be confronted with an easy task, including 
neutral stimuli, without any prior mention of its temporal aspect. The point of this 
manipulation is to observe whether the gamers exhibit a globally impaired time 
perception, or if a specific process impairs their time perception while gaming. In 
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addition, the performances of the gamers and non-gamers will be compared on their 
non-temporal scores for the Lexical Decision Task (i.e., reaction time and 
accuracy). 
Based on the literature outlined in the third chapter, and the lack of 
coherence in the previous studies exploring time perception among gamers (Rau et 
al., 2006; Wood et al., 2007), it is expected that no difference will be observed 
between the two groups. Concerning the performance of the gamers on the non-
temporal tasks, it is expected that they will outperform the non-gamers on reaction-
time (RT) of the LDT. However, as the LDT is a simple task in term of input (i.e., 
deciding whether the string of letters represents a word or a string of consonants), 
accuracy should suffer from a ceiling effect and it is possible that no difference will 
be observed.  
6.3. Method 
6.3.1. Design 
A between-group comparison design has been used in this experiment. The 
independent variable was the gaming habits of the participants where gamers were 
compared to non-gamers. The dependent variable was the temporal estimation of 
the participants as well as their RT and accuracy. This between-group design was 
coupled with a correlational exploration of several variables which may affect time 
perception (i.e., attentional process, working memory, gaming use/abuse, 
impulsiveness, depression, stress, anxiety, and demographic data).  
6.3.2. Participants 
A sample of 44 participants (6 males) were included in this experiment, their 
average age was 19.55 years (SD = 1.25) ranging between 18 and 23 years. They 
were recruited mainly through an internal credit system provided by Nottingham 
Trent University in which the psychology students could participate to diverse 
experiment in exchange for credits. Furthermore, in order to recruit more 
participants, students from research methods classes at NTU were asked to 
participate in exchange for research credits. Of these 44 participants, 22 mentioned 
that they were playing videogames for 8.48 hours per week on average (SD =9.14, 
range = 1-35).  
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6.3.3. Materials 
6.3.3.1. Self-reported measures 
The self-reported measures in Experiment 2 were identical to those in 
Experiment 1. 
6.3.3.2. Behavioural measures 
Both the ANT-R and the DST remained unchanged as they brought the 
desired results in the previous experiment. The DPCM model of time perception, 
on the other hand, is no longer fit for this thesis and the Word Recalling Task was 
deemed too hard to generate the expected results. Therefore, it was decided to 
change the whole temporal task for an easier task which would not include the 
DPCM segmentation variable (i.e., this variable not being part of the AGM).  
When creating the new task for the second experiment, several factors were 
considered. First, the task required to use the same type of stimuli, in order to 
control its neutrality, so that the second task still had to include words. Furthermore, 
the simple task had to be easier, without getting boring, a state that would also affect 
time perception (Danckert & Allman, 2005; Zakay, 2014). This led to the selection 
of a lexical decision task (LDT) where the participants are presented either words 
or non-words and are asked to decide whether the stimulus is a word or not. 
Although the second experiment did not aim to explore the impact of emotion and 
cognition on time perception, the task was created to allow these variables’ 
inclusion in another stage of the thesis. As a consequence, it was decided that in the 
easy task, the non-words would be strings of consonants (e.g., “XGHR”) while in 
the complicated task, they would be non-words resembling real words (e.g., 
“CORI”, Rastle, Harrington, & Coltheart, 2002). In order to fluctuate the level of 
emotional activation, a priming effect was used, a picture being shortly presented 
before each stimulus, the picture being either neutral (e.g., a lamp, a book) or 
gaming-related (i.e., pictures extracted from popular videogames). For more details 
on the selection of the non-words resembling real words and the emotional pictures, 
see ‘Chapter 7: Experiment 3 – Effect of cognition and emotion on the gamers’ time 
perception’.  
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The LDT was a succession of a fixation cross (250ms), a blank screen 
(250ms), a priming picture (750ms), the target stimulus (until the participant 
responded or a maximum 1500ms), and another blank screen (1750ms minus the 
target reaction time). The last blank screen had an adaptive duration in order to 
make sure that every single trial lasted exactly the same duration (i.e., 3s) because 
the participants were required to estimate the blocks’ durations. This task included 
three blocks with varying durations which were entirely randomised. The short 
block included 24 trials (i.e., 72s), the medium block included 64 trials (i.e., 192s), 
and the long block included 112 trials (i.e., 336s) for a total of exactly ten minutes. 
As aforementioned, half the trials were non-words while the other half were real 
words (i.e., selected from the simple list used in the first experiment). These trials 
were further pseudo-randomised to avoid having more than three words or non-
words in a row. As this second experiment did not aim to explore emotion, only 
neutral pictures from the International Affective Picture System (IAPS, Lang et al., 
1999) were selected (i.e., between 4.74 and 5.26 in valence, under 4 in arousal, and 
over 6 in dominance – each variable scaling between 1 and 9). Twenty-four pictures 
were selected (i.e., eight per block) as every single block number of trials was 
dividable by eight, avoiding another confounding variable.  
6.3.4. Procedure 
Participants could either subscribe through the University recruitment 
system to a specific date and time, or on a piece of paper with the same options if 
recruited in a research methods class. When coming to the laboratory, they were 
given a code name to ensure their anonymity based on the first letter of their first 
name, the first letter of their mother’s maiden name, and the two last digits of their 
birth year (e.g., FD92, AA94). The mother’s maiden name was preferred to the 
participants’ family name because the use of their initials would allow the 
experimenter, or any other researcher involved in the study, to find the participants’ 
real identity when they were recruited in classes (i.e., through the University 
database).  
After reading the information sheet and giving their fully informed consent, 
the participants were introduced to the first task, the LDT. The participants were 
first introduced to the functioning of the task. They were told that words or string 
of consonants would appear in the centre of the screen and that they would have to 
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press the right key (i.e., “n”) if it was a word, and the left key (i.e., “z”) if it was not 
a word. After confirming that they understood the functioning of the task, the 
participants were asked to perform a first training block which was monitored by 
the experimenter to ensure a proper completion of the task afterward. The 
experimenter let the participants know that they would be monitored for the training 
block, but that they would not be observed for the testing blocks. Once the training 
block was completed, the participants could start the real task composed of three 
separate blocks. After completing the testing blocks (i.e., in a fully random order), 
the participants were asked to provide their time estimation for each of the three 
blocks. They were allowed to use any time measure they preferred (i.e., minutes or 
seconds) and were told that they could be as accurate as they wanted (e.g., one 
minute and thirty seconds, three minutes and ten seconds). 
After completing the LDT, the participants were introduced to the Digit 
Span Test (DST). This order was chosen to allow the participants to stop fixating 
the computer screen and rest their eyes for a few minutes. It was explained that they 
would first be asked to repeat the digits dictated by the experimenter in the exact 
same order (i.e., forward test) with increasing difficulty until they could not do it 
anymore. Secondly, they were asked to repeat the digits recited by the experimenter 
in the opposite order (i.e., backward test) with increasing difficulty until they could 
not do it anymore. Finally, the participants were reassured that the task was virtually 
limitless, and that getting stuck did not mean that they failed the test in order to 
prevent as many negative feelings as possible.  
Once the participants completed the DST, they were introduced to the ANT-
R. Since the task was quite complex, participants were offered examples on top of 
the text instructions. In these examples, each type of cue and arrow were shown to 
the participants and the researcher took some time to explain what these types of 
cues and arrows implicated in the task. Once the participants confirmed that they 
understood the functioning of the ANT-R, they completed a first short training 
blocks including 16 trials with at least one representation of each clue and arrow. 
As for the LDT, the participants were warned about the monitoring of this specific 
block and that the experimenter would not monitor the whole task. Afterwards, the 
participants completed three different testing blocks with 48 trials each. In order to 
assure that the participants would not try to estimate the duration of the task, and 
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get distracted, the duration of the task was revealed at the beginning of the testing 
blocks.  
Finally, after completion of the ANT-R, the participants completed the 
survey in the following order: demographic data, DASS-21, gaming use2, UPPS-P, 
POGQ1, ERS, and the IGD criteria1. The participants were told that they could ask 
any question to the experimenter in case they did not understand any part of the 
survey. At the end of the survey, they were also given the option to share an email 
address to participate in further studies organised by the experimenter. Afterward, 
they were fully debriefed, especially concerning the deception about the time 
perception aspect of this study and thanked. 
6.3.5. Ethics 
This research was approved by the College Research Ethics Committee 
(CREC) prior to the data collection. Furthermore, this study design and procedure 
is consistent with the Declaration of Helsinki. Only two parts of this experiment 
could have caused minor harms to the psychological wellbeing of the participants. 
The first one is the disappointment of the participants in their own performance in 
the DST which was compensated by the experimenter reassuring each participant 
with their own score. The second one lies within the method of this experiment, as 
the participants did not know about the time perception aspect of this study (i.e., 
RTP). Therefore, as the participants were deceived about the true purpose of this 
experiments (i.e., they were told that the variable of interest was their lexical 
decision-making abilities), they were properly debriefed at the end of the 
experiments, explaining the reason behind the deception. 
6.4. Results 
6.4.1. Preliminary statistics 
 Time perception: The time estimation of the participants in seconds greatly 
fluctuated (i.e., SD = 134.94s, SD = 162.76s, SD = 147.49s for the short, medium, 
and long estimation respectively). It was then decided that every estimation twice 
as long as the real duration (i.e., 72s, 192s, or 338s) would be removed from the 
sample. This greatly reduced the variance of both the short and medium blocks (i.e., 
 
2 These questionnaires were not included if the participants reported not playing videogames.  
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SD = 42.92 and SD = 82.27 respectively) but barely affected the long block 
variation (i.e., SD = 149.90). The mean and standard deviation of these estimations 
are provided in Table 6.1. Since only 14 participants’ estimations remained for the 
shortest block, the total duration will be the sum of the medium and long block 
rather than the sum of the three estimations.  
Table 6.1. Descriptive statistics of the duration estimation 
 
Remaining 
sample 
Mean SD 
Short block 14 74.29 42.92 
Medium block 38 179.61 82.27 
Long block 44 226.71 149.90 
 
ANT-R: When calculating the average RT of each participant, two factors 
were taken into account. First, none of the trials where the participants answered 
wrongly were included in the calculation. From this modification, a first average 
and SD were calculated and used to further sort the RT of the participants. Any RT 
differing from more than two SD from the mean (i.e., either above or below) were 
excluded. Afterward, the real RT means of the participants were calculated (i.e., 
global RT, RT based on the different cues, and RT based on the number and 
congruence of the arrows). The descriptive statistics of both the RT and the 
accuracy of the ANT-R can be seen in Table 6.2.  
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Table 6.2. Descriptive statistics of the ANT-R 
 Mean1 SD 
Global RT 449.90 55.89 
Single arrow RT 425.70 51.80 
Multiple arrows RT 475.54 61.41 
Multiple congruent arrows RT 450.66 58.11 
Multiple incongruent arrows RT 503.66 69.12 
Informative cue2 RT 432.19 53.37 
Dual cue3 RT 465.36 58.17 
Central cue4 RT 470.25 63.01 
Global accuracy 94.22 1.18 
Single arrow accuracy 94.69 2.26 
Multiple arrows accuracy 93.61 2.37 
Multiple congruent arrows accuracy 96.36 2.19 
Multiple incongruent arrows accuracy 95.46 3.46 
Informative cue1 accuracy 94.48 2.10 
Dual cue2 accuracy 90.06 2.77 
Central cue3 accuracy 97.29 2.89 
Note. 1The RT value are in ms and the accuracy values in percentages; 2Single cue 
appearing either below or above the fixation cross’; 3Two cues appearing both below 
and above the fixation cross; 4Cue appearing at the same location than the fixation cross.  
 
 LDT: The participants RT in the LDT went through the same type of process 
as for the ANT-R. First, all the RT occurring after a wrong answer was deleted from 
the calculation. From this first series of RT was calculated and average and SD, and 
all the value differing more than two SD from the average were suppressed. 
Afterward, an average RT was calculated for each participant and separated as well 
between the word and the non-word trials. The descriptive statistics can be observed 
in the Table 6.3.  
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Table 6.3. Descriptive statistics of the LDT 
 Mean1 SD 
Global RT 556.99 60.85 
Real word RT 551.90 60.63 
Non-word RT 562.38 63.13 
Global accuracy 97.38 2.91 
Real word accuracy 97.91 2.00 
Non-word accuracy 96.84 4.94 
Note. 1The RT value are in ms and the accuracy values in 
percentage. 
 
 DST: The DST does not need any prior modification before its analysis, as 
the result analysed is simply the maximum number of remembered by the 
participants either forward (i.e., short-term memory) or backward (i.e., working 
memory). Nonetheless, two extra variables were created to attain a deeper 
exploration of working memory. First, the number of digits recalled backward by 
the participants was subtracted from the number of digits recalled forward by the 
participants. The purpose of this modification was to take into account the basic 
short-term memory of the participant in the calculation of the working memory 
score (i.e., the bigger the difference, the worse the working memory). The limitation 
of this calculation is that a participant with two low scores could end up with the 
same global score as a participant with two higher scores (e.g., five digits forward 
and three backward – Score of 2; ten digits forward and eight backward – Score of 
2). To overcome to this limitation, a second calculation was added, the previous 
results were multiplied by the total number of digits recalled by the participants 
(i.e., the sum of the backward and forward results). Interestingly, this calculation 
can be summarised as the square score on the forward task subtracted by the squared 
score on the backward task. With this method, a participant repeating more digits 
overall would have a better global score (e.g., to take back the previous example; 
16 vs. 36). The descriptive statistics of the DST, including the newly calculated 
variables, are available in Table 6.4.  
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Table 6.4. Descriptive statistics of the DST 
 Mean SD 
Forward score (F) 7.73 0.96 
Backward score (B) 5.73 0.92 
Subtraction score  
(F-B) 
2.00 1.05 
Multiplication score 
(F-B) * (F+B) 
27.02 15.08 
  
Questionnaires: For clarity’s sake, the results from the gaming 
questionnaires will be separated from the questionnaires not related to gaming. 
Apart from this fact, no modification has been brought upon the survey results and 
the guidelines offered by the authors of the scales have been followed. The 
descriptive statistics of the global questionnaires can be found in Table 6.5 (n = 44) 
and the gaming questionnaires in the Table 6.6 (n = 20).  
Table 6.5. Descriptive statistics of the questionnaires not related to gaming 
 Minimum Maximum Mean SD 
Stress (DASS) 7 22 13.96 3.96 
Anxiety (DASS) 7 22 12.00 3.72 
Depression (DASS) 7 21 11.89 3.94 
Negative urgency (UPPS-P) 4 16 9.64 3.39 
Positive urgency (UPPS-P) 7 15 10.18 2.09 
Premeditation (UPPS-P)1 4 12 7.50 2.06 
Perseverance (UPPS-P)1 4 13 8.11 2.33 
Sensation seeking (UPPS-P) 4 16 10.84 2.65 
Emotional reactivity (ERS) 12 95 38.80 19.34 
Note. 1Lack of perseverance/premeditation) 
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Table 6.6. Descriptive statistics of the questionnaires related to gaming 
 Minimum Maximum Mean SD 
IGD criteria 0 5 1.80 1.64 
Preoccupation (POGQ) 2 8 4.55 1.67 
Overuse (POGQ) 3 8 5.10 1.62 
Immersion (POGQ) 4 18 10.90 3.66 
Social isolation (POGQ) 2 8 4.25 1.68 
Interpersonal conflicts (POGQ) 2 5 2.65 1.04 
Withdrawal (POGQ) 4 14 6.75 2.83 
Total POGQ score 19 56 34.20 10.30 
 
6.4.2. Time perception 
A first analysis performed on the temporal estimation was to compare the 
error of estimation between all the participants. For this purpose, the estimation of 
each participant was first divided by the real duration of the block, giving a number 
theoretically varying between 0 and 2 (i.e., the estimation over twice the real 
duration being removed previously). However, since this calculation was not 
sufficient because the overestimation (i.e., scores above 1) and underestimation 
(i.e., score below 1) errors were separated. To overcome this issue, the scores were 
first subtracted by 1 (i.e., varying between -1 and 1) and then squared (i.e., varying 
between 0 and 1). Afterward, to achieve the real error rate, rather than its squared 
value, the squared root of the previous score was used (i.e., still varying between 0 
and 1). The short block had an error rate of .52 (SD = .27), the medium-length block 
of .35 (SD = .24), and the long block of .48 (SD = .28). None of the comparisons 
using a repeated measures ANOVA were significant, F(2) = 1.20, p=.32.  
Interestingly, using the provided estimation divided by the real duration, 
without any further modification, it showed that the participants tended to 
underestimate long block (M = .66, SD = .43) while they had an accurate estimation 
of the short and medium blocks (respectively, M = 1.04, SD = .60 and M = .92, SD 
= .42). When comparing these results through the same analysis as the error rate, 
the results were significant F(2) = 14.44, p<.001. The Bonferroni correction showed 
that the long block was significantly more underestimated than the short and 
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medium blocks (p=.002 and p<.001 respectively) while there was no significant 
difference between these two blocks (p=1.00). 
Concerning the control variables included in this experiment which could 
affect the time perception of the participants (e.g., depression and attention), their 
effects on the temporal estimation in this experiment were explored through a 
correlational analysis. As Tables 6.7, 6.8, and 6.9 show, none of the correlations 
explored affected the estimations of the participants.  
Table 6.7. Correlation between the DST variable and the time estimation 
  
DST forward 
score 
DST backward 
score 
DST 
subtraction 
DST global 
score 
Short estimation  
(n = 11) 
.326 .371 -.029 .028 
Medium 
estimation  
(n = 35) 
.268 .319 -.021 .038 
Long estimation  
(n = 41) 
.027 .018 .009 .001 
Total estimation 
(n = 40) 
.166 .277 -.094 -.031 
Note. *Correlation is significant at the p<.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Table 6.8. Correlations between stress, anxiety, depression, and impulsiveness 
with time estimations 
  
Short 
estimation 
(n = 14) 
Medium 
estimation 
(n = 38) 
Long 
estimation 
(n = 44) 
Total 
estimation 
(n = 43) 
Stress (DASS) -.255 -.155 .002 -.245 
Anxiety (DASS) -.114 .043 -.098 -.013 
Depression (DASS) -.155 .037 -.153 -.069 
Positive urgency (UPPS-P) -.364 .042 .002 -.024 
Negative urgency (UPPS-P) -.293 -.110 .007 .037 
Premeditation (UPPS-P)1 -.284 .006 -.146 .193 
Perseverance (UPPS-P)1 -.064 -.082 -.157 -.158 
Sensation seeking (UPPS-P) -.090 -.105 .076 .008 
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 1Lack of perseverance/premeditation 
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Table 6.9. Correlation between the ANT-R variables and time estimation 
  
Short 
estimation 
(n = 14) 
Medium 
estimation  
(n = 38) 
Long 
estimation  
(n = 44) 
Total 
estimation 
 (n = 43) 
Global RT -.009 .042 -.012 -.055 
Single arrow RT .051 ..095 -.004 -.024 
Multiple arrows RT -.053 -.002 -.021 -.079 
Multiple congruent arrows 
RT 
-.010 .062 -.007 -.055 
Multiple incongruent arrows 
RT 
-.076 -.060 -.028 -.111 
Informative cue1 RT -.037 -.010 -.037 -.089 
Dual cue2 RT .069 .078 -.013 -.005 
Central cue3 RT -.031 .089 .030 -.043 
Global accuracy -.346 -.012 .068 .045 
Single arrow accuracy .057 -.024 -.145 -.092 
Multiple arrows accuracy -.479 -.188 -.056 -.001 
Multiple congruent arrows 
accuracy  
-.283 -.131 -.196 -.189 
Multiple incongruent arrows 
accuracy  
-.457 -.144 .104 .179 
Informative cue1 accuracy .064 -.136 -.133 -.227 
Dual cue2 accuracy -.432 .060 -.019 .181 
Central cue3 accuracy -.430 -.196 -.108 .006 
Note. *Correlation is significant at the p<.05 level (2-tailed). RT = Reaction time; 1Single cue 
appearing either below or above the fixation cross; 2Two cues appearing both below and above 
the fixation cross; 3Cue appearing at the same location than the fixation cross. 
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6.4.3. Gamers’ time perception 
To analyse the difference in terms of baseline time perception between the 
gamers and non-gamers, the corrected estimations (i.e., without the outliers – see 
the preliminary statistics section for more details) provided by the participants were 
compared between the two groups using a t-test. None of the comparisons violated 
the homogeneity of variances assumption (p>.30) and the participants’ age was 
controlled in the following analyses. The gamers estimated the short block to last 
62.86s (SD = 18.35) compared to 85.71s (SD = 13.78), the difference being non-
significant, t(12) = 1.00, p=.34. Similarly the duration estimation of the medium 
block by the gamers (M = 173.68s, SD = 88.64) did not significantly differ from 
the estimation provided by the non-gamers (M = 185.53s, SD = 77.33), t(36) = .44, 
p=.66. Finally, the same trend was observed for long block as there was no 
significant difference between the gamers’ estimation (M = 228.41, SD = 160.08) 
and the non-gamers’ one (M = 225.00, SD = 142.75), t(42) = -.08, p=.94.  
In addition, the gaming variables explored in the survey have been 
compared to the time estimation provided by the gamers. Since the number of 
participants presenting at least five IGD criteria was too low (i.e., two participants), 
no t-test was conducted on this population. However, the two continuous variables 
(i.e., POGQ scores and IGD criteria) have been analysed through a correlational 
approach (see Table 6.10 for details), no significant results being found. 
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Table 6.10. Correlations between time perception and gaming questionnaires 
  
Short 
estimation 
Medium 
estimation 
Long 
estimation 
Total 
estimation 
Total score (POGQ) -.260 -.093 .177 .054 
Preoccupation (POGQ) .096 .274 .149 -.111 
Overuse (POGQ) .046 -.105 .060 .070 
Immersion (POGQ) -.359 -.175 .288 .170 
Social isolation (POGQ) -.695 -.119 -.068 .073 
Interpersonal conflicts 
(POGQ) 
.114 -.039 .251 .069 
Withdrawal (POGQ) -.241 -.148 .099 -.068 
IGD criteria -.566 -.259 -.124 .152 
Time spent gaming (weekly) -.350 -.024 .099 -.005 
*Correlation is significant at the p<.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
Furthermore, the impact of the favoured genres by the gamers on their time 
perception has been observed. Since some genres were underrepresented, a 
preliminary frequency analysis has been led to find out which games’ genres would 
allow a t-test. One of the gamers played real-time strategy (RTS) games, three first-
person shooters (FPS) games, two massively multiplayer online role-playing games 
(MMORPG), seven role-playing games, one multiplayer online battle arena 
(MOBA) games, three race games, and four sport games. Therefore, only the RPG 
allowed the performing of a t-test which was inconclusive for the three durations 
(p>.24 for all the durations).  
6.4.4. Comparison of the gamers’ and non-gamers’ scores on the LDT 
The two main variables compared for the LDT are the RT and the accuracy, 
which both are subdivided into the global mean, the score for real words, and the 
score for non-words. For clarity’s sake, RT and accuracy will be explored in 
separate tables. Table 6.11 exhibits the descriptive statistics compared between the 
gamers and non-gamers and Table 6.12 shows the t-test details for these 
comparisons. 
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Table 6.11. Mean and SD of the LDT reaction times in ms.  
 Gaming N Mean SD 
Global RT 
Non-gamers 22 584.04 54.67 
Gamers 22 529.94 55.31 
Word RT 
Non-gamers 22 575.70 56.16 
Gamers 22 528.09 56.45 
Non-word RT 
Non-gamers 22 592.94 55.61 
Gamers 22 531.83 55.78 
     
Table 6.12. t-test on the LDT reaction times in ms 
 t Df p-value 
Mean 
difference 
Global RT1 3.26 42 .002 54.11 
Word RT1 2.80 42 .008 47.61 
Non-word 
RT1 
3.64 42 .001 61.11 
Note. 1Equal variances assumed 
 
 Concerning reaction times, the gamers exhibited a systematic faster RT than 
the non-gamers for both words and non-words, which is directly reflected by a 
global faster RT. In order to observe whether their processing speed affected the 
RT difference between the word and non-word conditions, a repeated measures 
ANOVA has been conducted to observe the interaction between gaming and the 
task conditions. The ANOVA showed a main effect of words, the participants 
having a slower RT for the non-words (M = 551.38, SD = 63.13) than the word (M 
= 551.90, SD = 60.63), F(1) = 10.37, p=.002. The ANOVA also showed a 
significant interaction between the type of stimuli and the gaming use, F(1) = 4.30, 
p=.04. To further explore this interaction, the difference of RT between words and 
non-words was observed separately between the gamers and non-gamers. While the 
non-gamers exhibited a slower reaction time for the non-words (M = 592.94, SD = 
55.61) than the words (M = 575.70, SD = 56.16), t(21) = 3.30, p=.003; the gamers 
showed no such difference between the non-words RT (M = 531.83, SD = 55.78) 
and words RT (M = 528.09, SD = 56.45), t(21) = .96, p=.347.  
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Table 6.13 exhibits the descriptive statistics for the accuracy of the gamers 
and non-gamers in the LDT based on the different conditions while Table 6.14 
shows the t-test results for the comparisons between gamers and non-gamers. The 
only difference observed in terms of error rate concerns global accuracy where the 
gamers exhibited a slightly inferior accuracy compared to the non-gamers.   
Table 6.13. Mean and SD of the LDT accuracy in percentage.  
 Gaming N Mean SD 
Global accuracy 
Non-gamers 22 98.59 1.14 
Gamers 22 97.23 2.45 
Word accuracy 
Non-gamers 22 96.05 6.64 
Gamers 22 97.64 2.13 
Non-word 
accuracy 
Non-gamers 22 97.32 3.63 
Gamers 22 97.43 2.04 
 
Table 6.14. t-test on the LDT accuracy in percentage 
 t df p-value 
Mean 
difference 
Global accuracy2 2.37 29.71 .025 1.36 
Word accuracy1 -1.01 42 .29 -1.59 
Non-word 
accuracy1 
-.128 42 .90 -.11 
Note. 1Equal variances assumed. 2Equal variances not assumed. 
  
6.5. Discussion 
 It was hypothesized that the gamers would not exhibit globally impaired 
time perception, but rather an impairment solely occurring in front of gaming cue – 
or of course while gaming. The purpose of this experiment was to observe the 
baseline temporal abilities of gamers compared to non-gamers and showed that 
there was no difference between these two groups. Additionally, correlational 
analyses showed that there was no association between the POGQ scores, or the 
IGD criteria, and the time estimations provided by the gamers. Neither was there 
any difference in terms of time perception between the RPG gamers and the other 
gamers of this sample. In conclusion, Experiment 2 validated the first half of the 
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hypothesis and further justified the third and final experiment in this thesis (i.e., 
observing the impact of gaming cues and attention on time perception among 
gamers). Additionally, correlations were led between the non-temporal variables 
explored in this study (i.e., impulsiveness, depression, stress, anxiety, attention, and 
working memory) and the time estimation provided by the participants. These 
analyses systematically exhibited the same trend of results, that is, no significant 
correlation.  
 Regarding the lexical abilities, several differences were observed between 
the gamers and the non-gamers. First, in the LDT, a trade-off was observed between 
reaction time and accuracy, showing that the gamers sacrificed part of their 
accuracy in order to answer faster. However, while the non-gamers were slower to 
answer when it came to non-words compared to words, the gamers did not exhibit 
such a speed reduction between the two conditions. This, coupled with their overall 
faster reduction, shows that the gamers had a higher lexical decision ability than the 
non-gamers. These results support one of the hypotheses that gamers would have 
faster RTs on the LDT.  
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Chapter 7: Experiment 3 – Effect of cognition and emotion on gamers’ time 
perception 
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7.1. Experiment 3 background 
In Chapter 3, it was noted that since gamers had a better attentional focus 
and an improved working memory, they should have a better prospective time 
perception. This hypothesis was partially supported by the preliminary results 
observed within Experiment 1 (i.e., more accurate prospective estimation of the 
gamers). Consequently, it was decided to only explore retrospective time perception 
(RTP) in Experiments 2 and 3. It was also noted that the gamers would exhibit an 
impaired RTP due to their enhanced reactivity to the gaming cues, rather than a 
globally impaired RTP. In the second experiment, the RTP of gamers and non-
gamers was compared, without any influence of either emotional or cognitive 
processes, showing that there was no difference in their baseline time perception. 
These results further supported the hypothesis that the gamers were not suffering 
from a globally impaired time perception, their time loss resulting from another 
factor. Accordingly, Experiment 3 explored whether the observed impaired time 
perception of the gamers was due to a cognitive process (i.e., difficulty of the task), 
an emotional one (i.e., gaming cues), or an interaction of both these factors.  
7.2. Aim and hypotheses  
As mentioned in the previous section, the main aim of this thesis is to 
explore the interactive effect of cognition and emotion on the gamers’ time 
perception. In this experiment, half the participants saw neutral pictures (i.e., the 
same pictures than the first experiment) and the other half saw gaming pictures (i.e., 
pictures from popular videogames at the time of the experiment). Furthermore, for 
half the participants, the non-words were simply strings of consonants (e.g., 
“GKJF”) while for the other half, the non-words looked like real words (e.g., 
“CORI”).  
The first hypothesis is that under the emotional condition, the gamers would 
underestimate the duration of the temporal task compared to the non-emotional one, 
while this effect would not be observed among the non-gamers. Second, there 
would be no main effect of cognition for both groups because attention should only 
affect prospective time perception, this experiment focusing on the retrospective 
one. Nevertheless, it was hypothesized that there would be a joint effect of cognition 
and emotion because the complicated version of the task should force the gamers 
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to focus more on it. An increased focus on the task should result in more attention 
to the gaming pictures, therefore, enhancing its deleterious effect. Finally, it was 
expected that the same trend of results as the two previous experiments would be 
observed, that is an improved RT for the Lexical Decision Task (LDT) among the 
gamers.  
7.3. Method 
7.3.1. Design 
A between-group comparison design was used in this experiment. The three 
independent variables were the gaming habits of the participants (i.e., gamers vs. 
non-gamers), the complexity of the task (i.e., strings of consonants vs. non-words), 
and emotional factors (i.e., neutral vs. gaming pictures). These three dichotomous 
variables led to eight groups, although two of these groups were already tested in 
the second experiment (i.e., easy non-emotional condition, gamers and non-
gamers). The dependent variable was the temporal estimation of the participants. 
This between-group design was coupled with a correlational exploration of several 
variables which may affect time perception (i.e., attentional process, working 
memory, gaming use/abuse, impulsiveness, depression, stress, anxiety, and 
demographic data).  
7.3.2. Participants 
A sample of 94 participants (19 males) was included in this experiment. 
Their average age was 20.98 years (SD = 4.71) and was between 18 and 47 years. 
They were recruited mainly through the recruitment system offered by Nottingham 
Trent University (NTU) in which the psychology students could participate in 
diverse experiments in exchange for credits. In order to recruit more participants, 
students from the research methods classes at NTU were asked to participate in 
exchange for research credits. Finally, as the recruitment of the gamers through 
these conventional systems was not progressing, a chance to win one of five ten-
pounds Amazon or Steam (depending on the gamers’ preference) vouchers was 
offered. It is important to note that for most of the analyses, the participants from 
the second experiment will be integrated in this sample. The reason behind it is that 
one of the conditions of this study (i.e., the easy non-emotional one) used exactly 
the same protocol and task than the second experiment. Out of the whole sample 
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(i.e., n = 138), 56 mentioned that they were playing videogames for 10.63 hours per 
week on average (SD = 8.55, range = 0.5-35).  
7.3.3. Materials 
7.3.3.1. Self-reported measures 
The self-reported measures in Experiment 3 were identical to those in 
Experiments 1 and 2. 
7.3.3.2. Behavioural measures 
Both the Attentional Network Task – Revised (ANT-R) and the Digit Span 
Test (DST) remained unchanged as they provided the desired results in the previous 
experiments. Due to the exploration of emotional and cognitive processes, the LDT 
stimuli for two of the conditions were modified. The selection of the emotional 
stimuli was achieved in two principal steps. First, the most popular games at the 
time of the research were identified (i.e., Assassin Creeds Odyssey, Fortnite, God 
of War, Player Unknown Battleground, Detroit Becomes Human, Red Dead 
Redemption II, Marvel's Spider-Man, and Fallout), also, the main genres played 
worldwide were identified through different scientific papers (i.e., First-Person 
Shooter – FPS, Sport games, Real-Time Strategy – RTS, Role-Playing Game – 
RPG, Massively Multiplayer Online Role-Playing Game – MMORPG, Race 
games, Multiplayer Online Battle Arena – MOBA, Gestion games, and Fighting 
games). Through an extensive search, the most popular games were selected for 
each of the categories, even if they were not part of the most popular games at the 
time of the research. Finally, a series of at least three pictures by specific game were 
selected which led to a total of 137 pictures.  
In order to select the most suited pictures for the experiment, gamers from 
the researcher’s personal acquaintances were contacted and all given the pictures 
and an Excel sheet. The Excel sheet contained a table with the code name of all the 
pictures in the first column, as well as three extra columns named respectively 
“Arousal” (i.e., how excited they were feeling about the pictures), “Valence” (i.e., 
how positive did they feel about the pictures), “Gaming” (i.e., how related to 
gaming were the pictures), and “Play” (i.e., how much did the pictures make them 
want to play). The gamers were provided with the definitions of the columns’ titles 
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and were asked to provide a score varying between 1 (i.e., not at all) to 9 (i.e., 
totally). After two weeks, the answers provided by the gamers who responded (n = 
9) were collated, summed, and averaged. On average, the pictures had an arousal 
score of 4.86 (SD = 1.04), a valence score of 4.89 (SD = 0.97), were judged as 
related to gaming (M = 6.36, SD = 1.03), and showed a central tendency for the 
playing desire (M = 4.70, SD = 1.14). To select the pictures, only the ones exhibiting 
one SD above the average in each of the four measures were selected, leading to 40 
potential pictures. As this total was still higher than the number of pictures desired 
(i.e., 24 as the number of neutral pictures), pictures from the overrepresented genres 
(i.e., eight pictures for the fighting games, eight for the FPS, four for the MMORPG, 
and nine for the RPG) were removed. Basically, the pictures differing the most from 
the average on the four scales compared to the other pictures in the same category 
were selected. At the end of the selection process, the following pictures were 
retained: Assassin’s Creed: Odyssey (1), Detroit Becomes Human (1), Fallout (3), 
Red Dead Redemption II (1), Fighting games (4), FPS (3), Simulation games (3), 
MMORPG (3), RPG (3), RTS games (1), and race games (1). 
Regarding the complicated version of the LDT, only the non-words were 
changed as mentioned earlier. For this purpose, instead of strings of consonants 
(e.g., “XKGJ”), the non-words needed to look like potential real words in order to 
confuse the participants (e.g., “CORI”). For the creation of the non-words, the ARC 
Nonword Database from the Macquarie University (Sydney, Australia; Rastle et al. 
[2002]) was used. The words had to be constituted of only orthographically existing 
onsets and bodies (i.e., to create words following the grammar rules of the English 
language), they could be both monomorphemic or polymorphemic (i.e., be 
constituted from one or several meaningful morphemes), and had to match real 
words in term of number of letters and vowel/consonant organisation (e.g., “CORI” 
vs. “COZY” – four letters; Consonant, vowel, consonant, vowel). A total of 100 
non-words matching the real words were created using this method varying between 
three and seven letters. The words and non-words were split between the three 
blocks to ensure that they would all share the same average number of letters per 
block (Short block = 4.92, mid-length block = 4.84, long block = 4.68, p>.05).  
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7.3.4. Procedure 
Participants could either subscribe through the university system to a 
specific date and time, or on a piece of paper with the same options if recruited in 
a research method class. When coming to the laboratory, they were given a code 
name to ensure their anonymity based on the first letter of their first name, the first 
letter of their mother’s maiden name, and the two last digits of their birth year (e.g., 
FD92, AA94). The mother’s maiden name was preferred to the participants’ second 
name because the use of their initials would allow the experimenter, or any other 
researcher implicated in the study, to find the participants’ real identity when they 
were recruited in classes (i.e., through the university database).  
After reading the information sheet and giving their fully informed consent, 
the participants were introduced to the first task, the LDT. The participants were 
first introduced to the functioning of the task which only varied depending on its 
difficulty. The instruction for the easier version remained identical from the second 
experiment; they were told that words or string of consonants would appear in the 
centre of the screen and that they would be asked to press the right key (i.e., “n”) if 
it was a word, and the left key (i.e., “z”) if it was not a word. Concerning the 
complex version, the only difference is that instead of mentioning the string of 
consonants, the participants were told that they would be asked to decide whether 
the string of letters appearing in the middle of the screen were a word (by pressing 
“n” – e.g., “COZY”) or a non-word (by pressing “z” – e.g., “CORI”). After 
confirming that they understood the functioning of the task, the participants were 
asked to perform a first training block which was monitored by the experimenter to 
ensure a proper completion of the task afterward.  
The experimenter let the participants know that they would be monitored 
for the training block and that they would not be observed for the testing blocks. 
Once the training block completed, the participants could start the real task 
composed of three separate blocks. After completing the three testing blocks (i.e., 
in a fully random order), the participants were asked to provide their time estimation 
for each of the three blocks. They were allowed to use any time measure they 
preferred (i.e., minutes or seconds) and were told that they could be as accurate as 
they wanted (e.g., one minute and thirty seconds, three minutes and ten seconds). 
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After completing the LDT, the participants were introduced to the DST. 
This order was chosen to allow the participants to stop fixating the computer screen 
and rest their eyes for a few minutes. They were told that they would first be asked 
to repeat the digits dictated by the experimenter in the exact same order (i.e., 
forward test) with increasing difficulty until they could not do it anymore. 
Secondly, they would be asked to repeat the digits recited by the experimenter in 
the opposite order (i.e., backward test) with increasing difficulty until they could 
not do it anymore. Furthermore, the participants were reassured that the task was 
virtually limitless, and that getting stuck did not mean that they failed the test in 
order to prevent as many negative feelings as possible.  
Once the participants were done with the DST, they were introduced to the 
ANT-R. Since the task was quite complex, participants were offered examples on 
top of the text instructions. In these examples, each type of cues and arrow were 
shown to the participants and the researcher took some time to explain what these 
types of cues and arrows meant in the task. Once the participants confirmed that 
they understood the functioning of the ANT-R, they completed a first short training 
blocks including 16 trials with at least one representation of each clue and arrow. 
As for the LDT, the participants were warned about the monitoring of this specific 
block and that the experimenter would not monitor the whole task. Afterwards, the 
participants completed three different testing blocks with 48 trials each. In order to 
assure that the participants would not try to estimate the duration of the task, and 
get distracted, the duration of the task was revealed at the beginning of the testing 
blocks.  
Finally, after completion of the ANT-R, the participants fulfilled the survey 
in the following order: demographic data, DASS-21, gaming use3, UPPS-P, 
POGQ1, ERS, and the IGD criteria1. The participants were told that they could ask 
any question to the experimenter in case they did not understand any part of the 
survey. At the end of the survey, they were also given the option to share an email 
address to participate to further studies organised by the experimenter. Afterwards, 
they were fully debriefed, especially when they were deceived about the time 
perception aspect of this study and thanked. 
 
3 These questionnaires were not included if the participants reported not playing videogames.  
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7.3.5. Ethics 
This research was approved by the College Research Ethics Committee 
(CREC) prior to the data collection and this study design and procedure is consistent 
with the Declaration of Helsinki. Only two parts of this experiment could have 
caused minor harms to the psychological wellbeing of the participants. The first one 
is the disappointment of the participants in their own performance in the DST which 
was compensated by the experimenter reassuring each participant with their own 
score. The second one lies within the method of this experiment, as the participants 
did not know about the time perception aspect of this study (i.e., RTP). Since the 
participants were deceived on the true purpose of this experiments (i.e., they were 
told that the variable of interest was their lexical decision-making abilities), they 
were properly debriefed at the end of the experiments, explaining the reason behind 
the deception. 
7.4. Results 
7.4.1. Preliminary statistics 
Time perception: Regarding the participants from this specific experiment, 
their time estimation in seconds greatly fluctuated, similarly to the previous 
experiment (i.e., SD = 104.12, SD = 103.51, SD = 151.93 for the short, medium, 
and long estimation respectively). Therefore, the same exclusion criteria were 
applied to their estimations (i.e., deletion of the estimation greater than twice the 
real duration – 72s, 192s, and 338s). This greatly reduced the variance of both the 
short and medium blocks (i.e., SD = 33.89 and SD = 74.00 respectively) but had a 
lesser impact on the long block variation (i.e., SD = 121.20).  
Concerning the entirety of the participants (i.e., including the samples of 
both the second and third experiments), the mean and standard deviation of these 
estimations (i.e., with the same outliers’ rules) are provided in Table 7.1. However, 
since only 59 participants’ estimations remained for the shortest block (i.e., against 
124 for the medium and 134 for the longest), the total duration will be the sum of 
the medium and long block rather than the sum of the three estimations. 
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Table 7.1. Descriptive statistics of the duration estimation for the whole 
sample 
 Remaining sample Mean SD 
Short block 59 85.17 36.31 
Medium block 124 206.17 78.50 
Long block 134 283.73 137.03 
 
ANT-R: When calculating the average RT of each participant, two factors 
were taken into account. First, none of the trials where the participants answered 
wrongly were included in the calculation. From this modification, a first average 
and SD were calculated and used to further sort the RT of the participants. Any RT 
differing from more than two SD from the mean (i.e., either above or below) were 
excluded. Afterward, the real RT means of the participants were calculated (i.e., 
global RT, RT based on the different cues, and RT based on the number and 
congruence of the arrows). The descriptive statistics of both the RT and the 
accuracy of the ANT-R for the whole sample can be seen in Table 7.2. 
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Table 7.2. Descriptive statistics of the ANT-R 
 Mean1 SD 
Global RT 449.76 63.18 
Single arrow RT 426.08 58.34 
Multiple arrows RT 474.77 69.88 
Multiple congruent arrows RT 448.33 66.74 
Multiple incongruent arrows RT 503.76 74.98 
Informative cue2 RT 434.63 62.87 
Dual cue3 RT 467.27 67.93 
Central cue4 RT 463.07 64.86 
Global accuracy 93.87 2.65 
Single arrow accuracy 94.49 2.64 
Multiple arrows accuracy 93.56 3.44 
Multiple congruent arrows accuracy 96.54 2.97 
Multiple incongruent arrows accuracy 95.17 5.35 
Informative cue1 accuracy 94.42 2.51 
Dual cue2 accuracy 97.16 3.86 
Central cue3 accuracy 89.80 3.85 
Note. 1The RT value are in ms and the accuracy values in percentage; 2Single cue appearing 
either below or above the fixation cross; 3Two cues appearing both below and above the 
fixation cross; 4Cue appearing at the same location than the fixation cross.  
 
LDT: The participants RT in the LDT went through the same type of process 
as for the ANT-R. First, all the RTs occurring after a wrong answer were deleted 
from the calculation. From this first series of RT an average and SD were calculated, 
and all the values differing more than two SD from the average were suppressed. 
Afterward, an average RT was calculated for each participant and separated as well 
between the word and the non-word trials. The descriptive statistics of the whole 
sample can be observed in the Table 7.3. 
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Table 7.3. Descriptive statistics of the LDT 
 Mean1 SD 
Global RT 596.36 87.86 
Real word RT 574.27 78.29 
Non-word RT 620.79 105.44 
Global accuracy 95.32 8.68 
Real word accuracy 97.01 8.49 
Non-word accuracy 93.63 10.20 
Note. 1The RT value are in ms and the accuracy values in 
percentage 
 
DST: The DST does not need any real prior modification before its analysis 
because the result analysed is simply the maximum number of digits remembered 
by the participants either forward (i.e., short-term memory) or backward (i.e., 
working memory). However, two extra variables were created to attain a deeper 
exploration of the working memory. First, the number of digits recalled backward 
by the participants was subtracted to the number of digits recalled forward by the 
participants. The purpose of this modification was to take into account the basic 
short-term memory of the participant in the calculation of the working memory 
score (i.e., the bigger the difference, the worse the working memory). The limitation 
of this calculation is that a participant with two low score could end up with the 
same global score than a participant with two higher scores (e.g., five digits forward 
and three backward – Score of 2; ten digits forward and eight backward – Score of 
2). To overcome to this limitation, a second calculation was added, the previous 
results were multiplied by the total number of digits recalled by the participants 
(i.e., the sum of the backward and forward results). Interestingly, this calculation 
can be summarised as the square score on the forward task subtracted by the squared 
score on the backward task. With this method, a participant repeating more digits 
overall would have a better global score (e.g., to take back the previous example; 
16 vs. 36). The descriptive statistics of the DST, including the newly calculated 
variables, is available in Table 7.4. 
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Table 7.4. Descriptive statistics of the DST 
 Mean SD 
Forward score (F) 7.84 1.18 
Backward score (B) 5.75 1.17 
Subtraction score  
(F-B) 
2.08 1.21 
Multiplication score 
(F-B) * (F+B) 
28.31 17.20 
 
Questionnaire: For clarity’s sake, the results from the gaming 
questionnaires were separated from the questionnaires not related to gaming. Apart 
from this fact, no modification has been brought upon the survey results and the 
guidelines offered by the authors of the scales have been followed. The descriptive 
statistics of the global questionnaires can be found in Table 7.5 (n = 137) and the 
gaming questionnaires in Table 7.6 (n = 55). 
Table 7.5. Descriptive statistics of the questionnaires not related to gaming 
 Minimum Maximum Mean SD 
Stress (DASS) 7 27 13.56 4.10 
Anxiety (DASS) 7 22 11.44 3.65 
Depression (DASS) 7 26 12.15 4.25 
Negative urgency (UPPS-P) 4 16 9.75 3.33 
Positive urgency (UPPS-P) 7 15 10.69 1.82 
Premeditation (UPPS-P)1 4 13 7.45 2.21 
Perseverance (UPPS-P)1 4 14 8.07 2.37 
Sensation seeking (UPPS-P) 4 16 10.83 1.97 
Emotional reactivity (ERS) 12 95 49.79 19.71 
Note. 1Lack of perseverance/premeditation. 
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Table 7.6. Descriptive statistics of the questionnaires related to gaming 
 Minimum Maximum Mean SD 
IGD criteria 0 6 1.73 1.51 
Preoccupation (POGQ) 2 8 4.65 1.70 
Overuse (POGQ) 3 9 4.98 1.75 
Immersion (POGQ) 4 19 11.11 3.45 
Social isolation (POGQ) 2 8 4.00 1.45 
Interpersonal conflicts 
(POGQ) 
2 9 2.76 1.40 
Withdrawal (POGQ) 4 14 6.33 2.53 
Total POGQ score 19 63 33.84 9.55 
 
7.4.2. Time perception 
A first analysis performed on the temporal estimation was to compare the 
error of estimations between all the participants. For this purpose, the estimation of 
each participant was first divided by the real duration of the block, giving a number 
theoretically varying between 0 and 2 (i.e., the estimation over twice the real 
duration being removed previously). Since this calculation was not sufficient 
because the overestimation (i.e., scores above 1) and underestimation (i.e., score 
below 1) errors were separated. To get rid of this issue, the scores were first 
subtracted by 1 (i.e., varying between -1 and 1) and then squared (i.e., varying 
between 0 and 1). Afterward, to achieve the real error rate, rather than its squared 
value, the squared root of the previous score was used (i.e., still varying between 0 
and 1). The short block had an error rate of .48 (SD = .23), the medium-length block 
of .34 (SD = .20), and the long block of .35 (SD = .24). The repeated measures 
ANOVA between these three variables was significant, F(1) = 4.661, p=.035. 
According to the Bonferroni post-hoc analysis, this significance was due to a 
significant difference between the short and medium block’s error rates (p=.002), 
no other difference being significant. 
Interestingly, using the provided estimation divided by the real duration, 
without any further modification, it showed that the participants tended to 
underestimate long block (M = .83, SD = .39), had an accurate estimation of the 
medium block (M = 1.06, SD = .39), and tended to overestimate the short block (M 
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= 1.21, SD = .49). When comparing these results through the same analysis as the 
error rate, the results were significant F(2) = 55.357, p<.001. The Bonferroni 
correction showed that the long block was significantly more underestimated than 
the short and medium blocks (p<.001 for both comparisons) while the short block 
was significantly overestimated compared to the medium block (p=.003). 
Concerning the control variables included in this experiment which could affect the 
time perception of the participants (e.g., depression and attention), their effects on 
the temporal estimation in this experiment were explored through a correlational 
analysis. As Tables 7.7, 7.8, and 7.9 show, none of the correlations explored 
affected the estimation of the participants.  
Table 7.7. Correlation between the DST variable and the time estimation 
  
DST 
forward 
score 
DST backward 
score 
DST 
subtraction 
DST global 
score 
Short estimation  
(n = 55) 
-.035 -.055 .022 -.011 
Medium estimation  
(n =120) 
.154 .025 .127 .146 
Long estimation  
(n = 129) 
-.018 -.082 .062 .036 
Total estimation 
(n = 129) 
.046 -.080 .122 .110 
Note. *Correlation is significant at the p<.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
179 
Table 7.8. Correlations between stress, anxiety, depression, and impulsiveness 
with time estimations 
  
Short 
estimation 
(n = 58) 
Medium 
estimation 
(n = 123) 
Long 
estimation 
(n = 133) 
Total 
estimation 
(n = 133) 
Stress (DASS) -.086 -.028 .071 .000 
Anxiety (DASS) .010 .024 .028 .091 
Depression (DASS) .050 -.021 .085 .003 
Positive urgency (UPPS-P) -.103 .078 .061 -.034 
Negative urgency (UPPS-P) .166 .054 .052 .069 
Premeditation (UPPS-P)1 -.188 .054 .075 .078 
Perseverance (UPPS-P)1 -.235 -.068 .011 -.073 
Sensation seeking (UPPS-P) -.120 -.095 -.004 -.101 
Emotion reactivity (ERS) .003 .042 .109 -.098 
*Correlation is significant at the p<.05 level (2-tailed), 1Lack of perseverance/premeditation. 
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Table 7.9. Correlation r between the ANT-R variables and time estimation 
  
Short 
estimation 
(n = 57) 
Medium 
estimation  
(n = 122) 
Long 
estimation  
(n = 131) 
Total 
estimation 
 (n = 131) 
Global RT -.111 -.041 -.089 -.026 
Single arrow RT -.083 -.026 -.082 -.024 
Multiple arrows RT -.131 -.052 -.09 -.026 
Multiple congruent arrows 
RT 
-.115 -.020 -.087 -.009 
Multiple incongruent 
arrows RT 
-.145 -.086 -.105 -.049 
Informative cue1 RT -.085 -.044 -.082 -.034 
Dual cue2 RT -.139 -.032 -.083 -.018 
Central cue3 RT -.130 -.043 -.101 -.017 
Global accuracy -.077 .081 .051 .027 
Single arrow accuracy .006 .083 -.009 .011 
Multiple arrows accuracy -.119 .049 .044 -.015 
Multiple congruent arrows 
accuracy  
-.053 .080 .061 -.004 
Multiple incongruent 
arrows accuracy  
-.116 .052 .047 .008 
Informative cue1 accuracy -.067 .031 .007 -.029 
Dual cue2 accuracy -.052 .071 .070 .053 
Central cue3 accuracy -.064 .090 -.018 -.030 
Note. *Correlation is significant at the p<.05 level (2-tailed). RT = Reaction time. 1Single cue 
appearing either below or above the fixation cross; 2Two cues appearing both below and above 
the fixation cross; 3Cue appearing at the same location than the fixation cross. 
7.4.3. Comparison of the gamers’ and non-gamers’ scores on the LDT 
Compared to the previous experiment, the LDT results (i.e., both the RT and 
accuracy) cannot be explored through a simple t-test. This is due to the multiple 
conditions in this experiment compared to the single condition in the previous one. 
In this study, the gamers and non-gamers were split equally into four different 
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conditions differing in terms of emotional levels (i.e., gaming pictures vs. neutral 
pictures) and difficulty (i.e., easy vs. hard task). To analyse the different interactions 
between these three variables, a general linear model multivariate was run with the 
gaming habits, difficulty, and pictures types as independent factors. The dependent 
factors were the RT and accuracy for the words, the non-words, as well as the 
entirety of the trials. The model was significant for the words RT (F[7] = 2.212, 
p=.037, η2 = .106), the non-words RT (F[7] = 10.745, p<.001, η2 = .367), and the 
global RT (F[7] = 5.830, p<.001, η2 = .239). Concerning the accuracy levels, the 
model was only significant for the non-word accuracy (F[7] = 3.321, p=.003, η2 = 
.152), the other variables not being significant (p=.515 for the words accuracy and 
p=.075 for the global accuracy).  
There was a main effect of gaming on the global RT (F[7] = 6.303, p=.013, 
η2 = .046) although this would probably be due to the effect on the non-words RT 
(F[7] = 10.943, p=.001, η2 = .078), the effect for the words RT being non-
significant (p=.127). Regarding the non-words RT, the gamers were faster than the 
non-gamers (647.28 vs. 595.51), the same trend being observed for the global RT 
(614.93 vs. 579.74). There was an expected main effect of cognition on almost all 
the variables, to the exception of the word accuracy (p=.369), these results being 
described in Table 7.10 for clarity’s sake. There was no other significant main effect 
or any significant interaction between any of the other variables.  
Table 7.10. Task difficulty effect on the LDT variables 
 Mean 
difference1 
F(7) p 
Global RT 71.02ms 25.66 <.001 
Words RT 37.90ms 7.840 .006 
Non-words RT 108.26ms 49.756 <.001 
Global accuracy 3.93% 6.705 .011 
Words accuracy 1.37% .814 .369 
Non-words accuracy 6.49% 14.286 <.001 
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7.4.4. Gamers’ time perception 
To analyse the difference in time perception between the gamers and non-
gamers, the corrected estimations (i.e., without the outliers – see ‘Section 7.4.1. 
Preliminary statistics’ for more details) provided by the participants were compared 
using a General Linear Model. It is important to note that the number of participants 
presenting five or more IGD criteria was too low to be included in this model (i.e., 
two participants). These analyses were run separately between the gamers and non-
gamers for clarity’s sake. The two independent variables were the difficulty of the 
task (i.e., easy vs. hard) and the type of pictures (i.e., gaming vs. neutral). The 
dependent variables included were the short, medium, long, and total durations. 
Furthermore, the age of the participants was controlled in both models. 
First, the model was explored for the non-gamers with a sample of 35 
participants (i.e., the remaining being excluded due to some data missing), showing 
no significant prediction on any of the variable (i.e. p-value varying between .156 
and .447). Second, the gamers were explored separately with 22 participants (i.e., 
due to the deletion of the outlying data), showing significant effect of the model on 
both the medium and long duration (i.e., F[3] = 4.122, p=.022, η2 = .407 and F[3] 
= 6.801, p=.003, η2 = .531, respectively), a near-significant effect on the total 
duration (i.e., F[3] = 2.715, p=.075, η2 = .312), and no significant effect on the short 
duration (i.e., F[3] = .465, p=.711).  
When exploring the model among gamers, it appeared that there was a main 
effect of emotion on both the medium and total duration (i.e., p=.005, η2 = .367 and 
p=.023, η2 = .256; respectively) with no other significant effect (i.e., p=.939 for 
short duration and p=.216 for long). According to the Bonferroni correction, the 
gamers underestimated the medium duration by 93.07s and the total duration by 
91.85s when gaming pictures were included compared to neutral pictures. Finally, 
there was also a significant interaction between cognition and emotion on the long 
duration (p=.001) and a near-significant one for the medium duration (p=.068), and 
both the short and total duration were not significant (p=.769 and p=.117 
respectively). When exploring this interaction for the long duration (i.e., the only 
really significant one), it appeared that when performing the easy task, the 
participants tended to overestimate the duration when emotional pictures were 
included (i.e., 228.41s vs. 295.83s), the opposite trend being observed while 
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performing the complicated task (i.e., 360.00s vs. 267.00s). It is noteworthy that 
none of these comparisons was significant after correction.  
7.5. Discussion 
It was hypothesized that the gamers would underestimate time when 
exposed to gaming pictures, this effect being strengthened when more attention was 
brought upon the task (i.e., complicated version). For this purpose, half the 
participants undertook an LDT with gaming pictures and the other half with neutral 
pictures. On top of that, half the participants performed a simple version of the task 
(i.e., consonants strings) while the other half were asked to take on a complicated 
version (i.e., non-words). To explore the isolated effect of emotion and attention, 
as well as its interaction, a general linear model multivariate was conducted using 
the difficulty of the task and the type of pictures as predictors. For the non-gamers, 
the model was not significant for any of the duration, while it was significant for 
the medium and long duration among the gamers. This significance was explained 
by a main effect of emotion for the medium duration (i.e., underestimation of about 
90s in front of gaming pictures) and the total duration (i.e., underestimation of about 
90s in front of gaming pictures). Furthermore, despite the lack of effect of the task 
difficulty, there was an interaction between the difficulty and type of pictures. This 
interaction showed that in the easy setting, the gamers tended to give longer 
estimation when confronted with gaming pictures compared to neutral pictures; the 
opposite trend being observed for the complicated setting. This could indicate that 
flow plays a crucial role in the interaction between emotion, time perception, and 
gaming even if these comparisons were not significant post-correction. Indeed, in 
the complicated task, the gamers would find a challenge fitting their skills, which 
would require their full attentional focus. In this case, the gamer would fully process 
the pictures and underestimate time. In the easy setting, the gamers would be bored 
due to the task being too easy, and the gaming pictures would then distract them 
even more from the task, enhancing the boring effect (i.e., overestimation of time).  
In brief, it appears that gamers can exhibit an impaired time perception when 
exposed to gaming cues. The hypothesis postulating that emotion would disrupt the 
gamers’ time perception is thus confirmed, although it was hypothesized that 
attention would strengthen this effect which was not observed. In addition, 
correlations were calculated between the non-temporal variables explored in this 
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study (i.e., impulsiveness, depression, stress, anxiety, attention, and working 
memory) and the time estimation provided by the participants. These analyses 
systematically exhibited the same trend of results, that is no significant correlation.  
 Concerning the LDT, a general linear model multivariate was run to explore 
how the different factors (i.e., gaming habits, difficulty, pictures type) would affect 
the different variables (i.e., RT and accuracy for the words and non-words) 
assessed. The model was significant for the RT of the words, the non-words, and 
the average RT. It was also significant for the non-word accuracy, the other effects 
being non-significant. Regarding the RT, there was a main effect of gaming for the 
global RT probably due to the strong effect of gaming on the non-words RT as there 
was no effect on the words RT. Basically, the gamers were faster by more than 
100ms when they were processing non-words compared to non-gamers. Finally, 
there was an expected main effect of difficulty on the task, all the variables, to the 
exception of the words’ accuracy, were worse in the complicated task than the easy 
task, with no interaction with any other variable.   
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Chapter 8: Inter-experimental study results 
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8.1.  Chapter overview 
 This chapter separately explores the common data which were collected in 
the three different experiments of this thesis. These data comprise the survey which 
was identical in all the experiments as well as the Attentional Network Task–
Revised (ANT-R) and the Digit Span Test (DST). These two tasks are included in 
this section to compare the results of the gamers and non-gamers.  
 The chapter is divided based upon the measures explored. First, the 
subscales from the Depression, Anxiety, and Stress scale 21 items (DASS-21) are 
studied in comparison to the other scales from the survey. Second, the subscales 
from the UPPS-P short version (s-UPPS-P) go through the same analyses (i.e., 
excluding the associations with the DASS-21 already explored). Third, the effect 
of gaming on all the survey scales as well as the ANT-R and DST are discussed. 
Finally, the demographic data (i.e., education levels, age, and gender) is examined 
in relation with the survey results. 
 Although the survey analysis was mainly exploratory, some hypotheses 
were formulated. First, it was hypothesized that the level of gaming disorder, 
whether assessed by the Problematic Online Game Questionnaire (POGQ) or 
defined by the Internet Gaming Disorder (IGD) criteria, would be directly 
associated with higher levels of stress, anxiety, and depression. It was also 
hypothesised that higher scores on the POGQ or IGD criteria would lead to higher 
scores on the short UPPS-P Impulsive Behavior Scale (s-UPPS-P). Finally, it was 
hypothesized that the impulsivity measure (s-UPPS-P) would correlate with the 
depression, anxiety, and stress scale variables on the DASS-21. Concerning the 
comparisons between the gamers and non-gamers, it was expected that the gamers 
would exhibit better performance on both the DST and the ANT-R.  
8.2. Participants 
 Due the promotion of the survey on social media and online forums (i.e., 
dedicated to gaming), 437 individuals started the survey (i.e., 226 of these 
completed the survey as part of the three previously described experiments). From 
these data, 94 participants were deleted due to non-completion of it. After deleting 
these incomplete data, a total of 343 participants remained. This sample included 
113 males and was on average 22.50 years (SD = 5.92). Furthermore, 170 of these 
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343 participants said that they played videogames for 13.89 hours per week on 
average (SD = 11.77).  
8.3. Depression, anxiety, and stress 
Descriptive statistics 
The DASS-21 (Antony et al., 1998) includes three subscales assessing 
depression, anxiety, and stress levels within a non-clinical population. On top of 
providing a continuous score for each of these variables, the DASS-21 includes cut-
off scores designating different levels of depression, stress, and anxiety. For all the 
subscales, the participants can be categorized in normal levels (i.e., under 9 for 
depression, 7 for anxiety, and 14 for stress), mild levels (i.e., between 10 and 13 for 
depression, 8 and 9 for anxiety, and 15 and 18 for stress), moderate levels (i.e., 
between 14 and 20 for depression, 10 and 14 for anxiety, and 19 and 25 for stress), 
severe levels (i.e., between 21 and 27 for depression, 15 and 19 for anxiety, and 26 
and 33 for stress), and finally extremely severe levels (28 or above for depression, 
20 or above for anxiety, and 34 or above for stress). Within the sample, participants 
on average showed normal levels of stress (M = 13.47, SD = 3.99), mild levels of 
depression (M = 12.37, SD = 4.60), and moderate levels of anxiety (M = 11.21, SD 
= 3.58). According to the cut-off scores, the participants were mostly categorized 
as mildly or moderately stressed and anxious, and normally depressed (i.e., see 
Table 8.1 for details). 
 
 
 
 
Table 8.1. Frequency table of the depression, stress, and anxiety levels 
 
Normal Mild Moderate Severe 
Extremely 
severe 
Depression 252 49 38 3 0 
Anxiety 31 100 151 52 8 
Stress 51 141 128 22 0 
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Consequently, this scale allowed two types of analysis: (i) correlational 
analysis (i.e., when using the continuous score, the sum of all the questions) and (ii) 
ANOVA (i.e., when using the groups formed by the cut-off scores). While the 
correlational approach gives a rough idea of how these disorders are associated with 
other variables, the ANOVA allows an in-depth exploration of these associations. 
For example, an ANOVA could show that only participants with the highest level 
of depression exhibit higher levels of anxiety, while the others would not exhibit 
any difference. In this case, the correlation could be significant, but would lack this 
level of precision. Importantly, since only eight of the participants reported 
extremely severe anxiety levels and three reported severe levels of depression, their 
results will not be included in the analysis due to their outlying nature. 
Correlations 
First, the scores of the DASS-21 subscales were correlated with the 
impulsivity levels from the s-UPPS-P questionnaire, showing numerous significant 
correlations which were then verified through the Benjamin-Hochberg correction. 
Of all the significant correlations, only the ones between the positive urgency and 
both the anxiety and depression levels lost their significance. For more details see 
Table 8.2.  
Table 8.2. Correlations between the DASS-21 and the UPPS-P-s subscales 
 Stress Anxiety Depression 
Negative urgency  .348* .239* .228* 
Positive urgency  .172* .113a .115a 
Global urgency .316* .214* .208* 
Lack of 
premeditation  
.070 .064 .105 
Lack of 
perseverance  
.203* .261* .355* 
Sensation seeking  -.221* -.289 * -.278* 
Note. aSignificant pre-correction, *significant post-correction 
Second, the DASS-21 scores were correlated with the Problematic Online 
Game Questionnaire (POGQ) measures which, similarly to the UPPS-P measures, 
showed several significant correlations. After the Benjamin-Hochberg correction, 
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only two correlations lost their significance levels (i.e., between interpersonal 
conflicts and both stress and anxiety levels). See Table 8.3 for detailed correlations.  
Table 8.3. Correlations between the POGQ and DASS-21 subscales 
 Stress Anxiety Depression 
Total POGQ score .269* .287* .339* 
Preoccupation .143 .215* .237* 
Overuse .219* .202* .306* 
Immersion .142 .165a .126 
Social isolation .194* .217* .283* 
Interpersonal conflicts .154a .166a .279* 
Withdrawal .320* .310* .330* 
Note. aSignificant pre-correction, *significant post-correction 
ANOVA 
Concerning the ANOVAs, the same variables have been explored and, for 
clarity’s sake, only the significant results are discussed in this section. Additionally, 
the results are divided based on the DASS-21 subscales. First, the ANOVA based 
on the depression scores is explored, followed by the ones based on anxiety, and 
finally, the ones based on stress levels. Depression levels were associated with 
significantly different levels of impulsivity (i.e., negative urgency, lack of 
perseverance and sensation seeking) and problematic gaming (i.e., total score, 
preoccupation, overuse, social isolation, interpersonal conflicts, and withdrawal). 
Overall, these associations showed that with a higher level of depression came a 
higher level of impulsivity or more problematic gaming. The opposite trend of 
results was shown for the sensation seeking scores which were lower when the 
participants exhibited signs of depression. For more details on these analyses, see 
Table 8.4.  
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Table 8.4. ANOVA on the impulsivity and problematic gaming based 
on the depression levels 
 
Normal 
level (i) 
Mild 
level (j) 
Moderate 
level (k) 
(i-j)  
p-value 
(i-k)  
p-value 
(j-k)  
p-value 
Negative 
urgency** 
9.21 10.33 10.84 .076 .011 1.000 
Lack of 
perseverance*** 
7.56 8.92 9.47 <.001 <.001 .787 
Sensation 
seeking** 
10.91 9.86 9.32 .041 .003 1.000 
POGQ total 
score*** 
33.68 37.55 42.79 .214 <.001 .199 
Preoccupation** 4.50 5.10 5.67 .261 .007 .685 
Overuse** 5.15 6.31 7.04 .086 .003 .894 
Social  
isolation*** 
4.14 4.24 5.88 1.000 <.001 .003 
Interpersonal 
conflicts** 
2.93 3.14 4.17 1.000 .006 .103 
Withdrawal** 6.31 7.24 8.71 .343 .001 .185 
Note. *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 
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Anxiety levels were also associated with significant different levels of 
impulsivity (i.e., positive urgency, negative urgency, lack of perseverance, and 
sensation seeking) and problematic gaming (i.e., total score, overuse, and 
withdrawal). Overall, these associations showed that with a higher level of anxiety 
the higher the level of impulsivity and increased problematic gaming. The opposite 
trend was shown for the sensation seeking scores. For more details on these 
analyses, see Table 8.5. Stress levels led to significant different levels of impulsivity 
(i.e. negative urgency and sensation seeking) and problematic gaming (i.e., total 
score, interpersonal conflicts, and withdrawal). Overall, these associations showed 
that with a higher level of anxiety came a higher level of impulsivity or increased 
problematic gaming. For more details on these analyses, see Table 8.6. 
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Table 8.5. ANOVA on the impulsivity and problematic gaming based on the anxiety levels 
  
 
Normal 
level (i) 
Mild 
level (j) 
Moderate 
level (k) 
Severe 
level (l) 
(i-j)  
p-value 
(i-k)  
p-value 
(i-l)  
p-value 
(j-k)  
p-value 
(j-l)  
p-value 
(l-k)  
p-value 
Negative urgency ** 8.00 9.15 9.69 10.54 .474 .044 .003 1.000 .066 .582 
Positive urgency ** 9.00 10.29 10.32 11.00 .048 .028 .001 1.000 .468 .431 
Lack of perseverance ** 7.00 7.39 8.21 8.63 1.000 .050 .012 .037 .011 1.000 
Sensation seeking *** 11.39 11.32 10.46 9.29 1.000 .488 .004 .082 < .001 .040 
POGQ total score ** 30.33 33.10 36.64 41.68 1.000 .127 .004 .357 .008 .272 
Overuse * 4.28 5.25 5.80 6.68 .973 .142 .019 1.000 .165 .913 
Withdrawal ** 5.50 6.31 6.80 8.91 1.000 .490 .001 1.000 .002 .014 
Note. *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 
  
193 
Table 8.6. ANOVA on the impulsivity and problematic gaming based on the stress levels 
  
 
Normal 
level (i) 
Mild 
level (j) 
Moderate 
level (k) 
Severe 
level (l) 
(i-j)  
p-value 
(i-k)  
p-value 
(i-l)  
p-value 
(j-k)  
p-value 
(j-l)  
p-value 
(l-k)  
p-value 
Negative urgency *** 7.90 8.84 10.79 11.23 .365 <.001 <.001 <.001 .005 1.000 
Sensation seeking ** 10.88 10.96 10.29 8.73 1.000 1.000 .014 .287 .003 .088 
POGQ total score ** 30.41 35.18 37.42 41.92 .204 .014 .005 1.000 .201 .939 
Interpersonal conflicts * 2.38 3.18 3.30 4.00 .201 .101 .032 1.000 .761 1.000 
Withdrawal *** 5.34 6.63 7.30 9.00 .208 .010 .001 1.000 .036 .292 
Note. * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001 
  
194 
8.4. Impulsivity 
The s-UPPS-P comprises five subscales exploring impulsivity within a non-
clinical population (i.e., positive and negative urgency, lack of perseverance, lack 
of premeditation, and sensation seeking). Compared to the DASS-21, there is no 
official cut-off score to determine high levels of impulsivity compared to lower 
levels, which only allows correlational analyses to be used. Table 8.7 includes the 
descriptive statistics for all the subscales of the UPPS-P.  
Table 8.7. Descriptive statistics of the UPPS-P 
 Minimum Maximum Mean SD 
Negative urgency 4 16 9.58 3.27 
Positive urgency 4 16 10.29 2.40 
Global urgency 4 16 9.94 2.46 
Lack of premeditation 4 14 7.41 2.27 
Lack of perseverance 4 15 7.98 2.39 
Sensation seeking 4 16 10.55 2.80 
 
 First, correlations within the UPPS-P variables were explored and showed 
that both the urgency scores, lack of premeditation, and lack of perseverance highly 
correlated with each other, even after the Benjamin-Hochberg correction. However, 
sensation seeking, a more motivational measure, did not correlate at all with 
negative urgency and lack of premeditation, and only correlated with positive 
urgency and lack of perseverance after the correction. See Table 8.8 for the details. 
The other correlations observed were run with the POGQ measures. The 
correlations show associations between positive urgency and the measures of 
problematic gaming; the other measures of impulsivity either not correlating post-
correction or only showing a few correlations. Table 8.9 includes the detailed 
correlations.  
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Table 8.8. Correlations between the UPPS-P variables 
 Positive 
urgency 
Global 
urgency 
Lack of 
premeditation 
Lack of 
perseverance 
Sensation 
seeking 
Negative 
urgency 
.490* .905* .435* .169* -.071 
Positive 
urgency 
 .815* .407* .179* .284* 
Global 
urgency 
  .488* .200* .092 
Lack of 
premeditation 
   .449* .023 
Lack of 
perseverance 
    -.247* 
Note. aSignificant pre-correction, *significant post-correction. 
 
Table 8.9. Correlations between the UPPS-P and the POGQ variables 
 
Negative 
urgency 
Positive 
urgency 
Global 
urgency 
Lack of 
premeditation 
Lack of 
perseverance 
Sensation 
seeking 
POGQ total score .238* .352* .336* .100 .243* -.079 
Preoccupation .161a .225* .221* .152a .224* -.171a 
Overuse .217* .313* .303* .086 .135 .028 
Immersion .115 .335* .246* .031 .178a .085 
Social isolation .178a .215* .227* .112 .343* -.206* 
Interpersonal 
conflicts 
.200* .151a .210* .020 .037 -.046 
Withdrawal .209* .251* .266* .078 .185a -.155a 
Note. aSignificant pre-correction, *significant post-correction. 
8.5. Gaming 
Introduction 
This section is separated into three main parts: (i) Regression on hours spent 
gaming weekly, (ii) t-test based on the Internet Gaming Disorder (IGD) criteria (i.e., 
healthy vs. disordered), and (iii) t-test based on gaming habits (i.e., gamers vs. non-
gamers). As mentioned in the Participants section, 170 of the participants 
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considered themselves gamers and played on average 13.89 hours per week. Of 
these 170 gamers, 26 met the IGD criteria (i.e., presenting five or more of the 
symptoms). To avoid comparing the 26 IGD participants to the 144 remaining 
healthy gamers, it was decided to handpick 26 healthy gamers matching IGD 
participants in terms of age, gender, and level of education. In some cases, a perfect 
match could not be found (e.g., a 20-year-old male IGD and a 20-year-old female 
healthy gamer) due to these data not existing. Even though some adaptations had to 
be made, the two groups did not differ in level of education (t[50]=1.12, p=.270), 
gender (t[50]=.00, p=1.000), or age (t[50]=-.03, p=.976).  
Regression 
One important variable of interest in this thesis is the amount of time spent 
gaming per week. In this section, the variables affecting this association were 
explored first through a correlational analysis, and the significant ones (i.e., post-
correction) were included in a regression analysis. Among the personality 
questionnaires (DASS-21, s-UPPS-P), only the depression levels and lack of 
perseverance significantly correlated with weekly gaming post-correction; lack of 
premeditation, sensation seeking, and anxiety levels being significant pre-
correction. Regarding the problematic or disordered gaming variables, all the 
measures of the POGQ except immersion and overuse, as well as the IGD criteria, 
significantly correlated with weekly gaming post-correction. Overuse was 
significant pre-correction. Therefore, all these variables were included in the 
regression analyses. The model was significant overall and explained 20.40% of the 
variance, r = .452, p<.001. Within this regression model, only the preoccupation 
subscale of the POGQ was significantly associated with weekly hours (p=.005). 
The coefficients and p-values of all the variables can be found in Table 8.10.  
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Table 8.10. Regression coefficients on weekly hours spent gaming 
 Beta t p-value 
Depression .148 1.327 .138 
Lack of perseverance .010 .105 .916 
Preoccupation .270 2.837 .005 
Social isolation .032 .318 .751 
Interpersonal conflicts -.037 -.370 .712 
Withdrawal .026 .247 .805 
IGD criteria .148 1.327 .187 
 
IGD criteria t-test 
As aforementioned, 26 IGD participants were compared to 26 healthy 
gamers matched in terms of age, gender, and level of education. The 52 participants 
were included in t-test analyses on the DASS-21, POGQ, and UPPS-P variables. 
The results were systematically significant except for stress levels and the 
immersion subscale of the POGQ. For more details, see the Table 8.11 which 
includes the means of both groups and the statistical data.  
Table 8.11. t-test based on the IGD criteria cut-off score 
 Healthy gamers mean IGD mean t(46) p-value 
Preoccupation  4.69 6.27 3.517 .001 
Overuse  5.77 9.00 4.659 <.001 
Social isolation 4.42 6.69 4.634 <.001 
Interpersonal conflicts 3.12 5.23 3.920 <.001 
Withdrawal  6.38 10.35 5.338 <.001 
Negative urgency 8.85 11.31 2.942 .005 
Positive urgency 9.04 11.54 3.988 <.001 
Lack of premeditation 6.50 8.38 2.799 .007 
Lack of perseverance 8.08 10.12 3.103 .003 
Anxiety 10.77 13.12 2.520 .015 
Depression 12.62 17.35 4.103 <.001 
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Gamers and non-gamers 
The 170 gamers from the sample were compared to the 173 non-gamers on 
the survey questionnaires non-related to gaming, since the non-gamers could not 
complete the gaming questionnaires. The results showed that the gamers had a 
higher level of depression but lower levels of negative urgency, positive urgency, 
and global urgency than the non-gamers. The full results are shown in Table 8.12.  
Table 8.12. t-test on the gaming habits  
 Gamers Non-gamers t(243) p-value 
Depression 12.94 11.82 2.256 .025 
Negative urgency 9.12 10.05 -2.652 .008 
Positive urgency 9.94 10.64 -.2737 .007 
Global urgency 9.53 10.34 -3.112 .002 
 
In addition to comparing the survey results between the gamers and non-
gamers, the two common tasks between all of the experiments (i.e., DST and ANT-
R) were also analysed. Only the 229 participants (38 males, 20.71 years old, SD = 
4.32) who took part in the laboratory experiments were included. Seventy-five of 
these participants reported playing videogames for an average of 10.53 hours per 
week (SD = 8.44), 28 of these being males. When comparing the gamers and non-
gamers on the different DST variables using a t-test, there was no significant 
difference for the number of digits repeated forward (t[223]=-.73, p=.468) and 
backward (t[223]=-1.11, p=.268) or the difference between these two score 
(t[223]=.30, p=.769) or the multiplicative score (t[223]=.31, p=.759).   
However, the analyses run on the ANT-R yielded significant results on the 
reaction times (RTs) which are displayed in Table 8.13. Globally, the gamers were 
faster than the non-gamers in all the conditions. To verify whether it was due to an 
improved attentional focus rather than a faster processing speed, four extra 
variables were calculated. The first one was to measure the effect of the multiple 
arrows, were the participants’ RT when confronted with a single arrow was 
subtracted from the multiple arrows’ RT. The second one was to measure the effect 
of congruence, where the RT when seeing congruent arrows (i.e., all directed the 
same way) was subtracted to the RT when seeing incongruent arrows (i.e., flanking 
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arrows oriented differently than the target one). The final two explored the effect of 
informative cueing, where the RT from an informative cue (i.e., indicating where 
the arrows were going to appear) were subtracted from the non-informative cues 
(i.e., either appearing both above and below, or appearing in the middle of the 
screen). When comparing these variables between the gamers and non-gamers, the 
effect of flanking (i.e., multiple arrows), congruence, and middle-cueing (i.e., cue 
appearing at the same position than the cross) were far from being significant (i.e., 
respectively t=1.40, p=.162; t=.60, p=.551; and t=1.29, p=.200 – df=227) while the 
effect of having two cues was almost significant (t[227]=1.88, p=.062). In the case 
of dual-cueing, it appears that the gamers lost less time (30.33ms) compared to the 
non-gamers (36.51ms), but a difference of about 30ms would be negligible even if 
it was significant. 
Table 8.13. t-test on the ANT-R between the gamers and non-gamers 
 Non-gamer Gamer t(227) p-value 
Mean RT 452.00 430.31 2.628 .009 
Single arrow RT 427.17 407.81 2.550 .011 
Multiple arrows RT 478.37 454.18 2.626 .009 
Multiple congruent arrows RT 452.44 429.15 2.665 .008 
Multiple incongruent arrows RT 507.19 481.68 2.575 .011 
Informative cue1 RT 435.04 416.10 2.273 .024 
Dual cue2 RT 467.19 443.23 2.821 .005 
Central cue3 RT 471.55 446.43 2.884 .004 
Note. 1Single cue appearing either below or above the fixation cross; 2Two cues 
appearing both below and above the fixation cross; 3Cue appearing at the same location 
than the fixation cross. 
 
8.6. Demographic data 
The demographic data (i.e., the age, gender, and level of education) were 
explored through three different types of analysis. First, age being a continuous 
variable, its association with the different psychometric scales were explored using 
correlational analysis. Second, as gender is a dichotomous variable, a t-test was 
used. Finally, educational level was explored using an ANOVA due to its ordinal 
aspect.  
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The correlations between age and the different variables explored within the 
survey showed six significant correlations prior to any correction applied for 
measures of the s-UPPS-P and anxiety levels. After the Benjamin-Hochberg 
correction, only the correlations with the s-UPPS-P remained significant at p<.05. 
Age correlated significantly with negative urgency (r = -.196), positive urgency (r 
= -.223), global urgency (r = -.239), and lack of premeditation (r = -.168). 
Concerning the t-test based on gender, several comparisons were significant and 
shown in Table 8.14.  
Table 8.14. t-tests on the survey variables between the males and females 
 Males Females t(243) p-value 
Anxiety 10.41 11.60 3.127 .002 
Stress 12.81 13.80 2.149 .032 
Negative urgency 8.64 10.04 3.947 <.001 
Positive urgency 9.56 10.64 3.991 < .001 
Global urgency 9.10 10.34 4.762 < .001 
Lack of premeditation 6.97 7.62 2.496 .013 
Note. 1Single cue appearing either below or above the fixation cross; 2Two cues appearing both below and 
above the fixation cross; 3Cue appearing at the same location than the fixation cross. 
 
Finally, the last set of analyses explored the effect of education level on the 
other survey variables. First, all the participants who replied “other” when asked 
about their education level were not included in these analyses, as nothing was 
known on their actual education level. In this sample, 53 of the participants had a 
secondary school degree, 178 a college level, 56 had a Bachelor’s degree, 21 a 
Master’s degree, and eight a PhD or equivalent. Since only eight participants 
indicated having a PhD, they were not included in the ANOVA analysis4. Several 
comparisons were significant (e.g., stress levels, negative urgency, and immersion), 
but prior to observing these results a modification was brought upon the sample. 
Indeed, participants with completed secondary school and college levels shared 
similar scores as testified by the systematically very high p-value (i.e., p=1.000 
 
4 The reason these data have been excluded rather than merged with the Master’s as a 
“postgraduate” group is due to the older age of the Ph.D. participants. 
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systematically). The same kind of observation was true for the difference between 
Bachelor’s and Master’s degree, the p-value being very high as well. For this 
reason, instead of an ANOVA on these scores, the secondary and college levels 
were united in pre-university and Bachelor’s and Master’s degree in university. 
Based on these two groups, t-tests were run on all the variables again, the significant 
results being included in Table 8.15.  
Table 8.15. t-test on the self-reported measures between the pre-university and post-
university education levels.  
 Pre-university University df t p-value 
Anxiety 11.60 10.49 306 2.345 .020 
Negative urgency 10.02 8.70 306 3.087 .002 
Positive urgency 10.63 9.61 306 3.289 .001 
Global urgency 10.32 9.16 306 3.659 <.001 
Lack of premeditation 7.65 6.97 306 2.242 .026 
Total score POGQ 37.34 33.13 147 2.442 .016 
Overuse 6.04 4.98 147 2.457 .015 
Immersion 11.54 9.93 117 2.794 .006 
 
8.7. Discussion 
DASS-21 scores were closely related to the s-UPPS-P scores as 
hypothesized, although lack of premeditation did not show any association with the 
DASS-21 subscales and positive urgency only exhibited one significant correlation 
with stress levels. POGQ measures mainly correlated with the depression and 
anxiety measures, with stress also showing significant correlations, including one 
with the total POGQ score. The only measure of the POGQ not significantly 
correlated with any of the DASS-21 measures was immersion, which indicates that 
a high immersion score would not necessarily be negative or lead to negative affect.  
Interestingly, the DASS-21 cut-off score determining different levels of 
psychopathological symptoms (i.e., normal, mild, moderate, severe, and extremely 
severe) allowed deeper analyses of the association between these symptoms and 
impulsivity and gaming disorder. First, in the case of depression, most of the 
differences observed occurred when comparing normal levels of depression to 
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moderate levels (i.e., the two extreme groups within this sample). These differences 
indicated that a higher level of depression was associated with a higher level of 
urgency (i.e., negative urgency and lack of perseverance), and overall problematic 
gaming symptoms as well as subcomponents (i.e., preoccupation, overuse, social 
isolation, and interpersonal conflicts). Concerning the sensation seeking component 
of impulsivity, the opposite trend was observed with a lower score associated with 
higher levels of depression.  
Concerning anxiety and stress, the interpretation is slightly more complex 
due to the higher number of groups present within the sample. Despite this fact, the 
results can be compared to the previous ones because the differences mainly 
occurred when comparing two notably different groups (i.e., normal level vs. 
moderate level, moderate level vs. severe level, and normal level vs. severe level). 
These results showed that for higher levels of anxiety, the participants exhibited 
more impulsive behaviours (i.e., negative and positive urgency, and lack of 
perseverance) as well as higher total problematic gaming and its subcomponents 
(i.e., overuse and withdrawal) scores. Higher stress levels were associated with 
higher level of negative urgency and problematic gaming (i.e., total score and 
interpersonal conflicts and withdrawal subscales). Similar to the depression scores, 
higher levels of anxiety and stress were associated with lower levels of sensation 
seeking. This opposite association reflects the motivational aspect of this 
component compared to the other factors of the UPPS-P model which refers to self-
control (Billieux et al., 2014; d’Acremont & Van der Linden, 2007). 
Interestingly, the only facet of the problematic online gaming not associated 
with the depression, anxiety, and stress scores was the immersion variable. 
Although it was globally expected that higher levels of problematic gaming would 
be observed with these three variables, the lack of difference for immersion fits the 
previous literature indicating that this variable is an indicator of passion rather than 
an addiction (e.g., Charlton & Danforth, 2007; Deleuze, Long, Liu, Maurage, & 
Billieux, 2018). Indeed, immersion (i.e., being an integrative part of the game) can 
be seen as both a coping mechanism (i.e., playing to avoid everyday life hassles) or 
a healthy motivation to play videogames (i.e., wanting to be part of the game to 
experience the game universe). 
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Concerning the s-UPPS-P, it was first shown that while urgency (i.e., both 
positive, negative, and global), lack of premeditation, and lack of perseverance 
highly correlated with each other, sensation seeking did not correlate with these 
measures as much. This is probably due to sensation seeking being a motivational 
measure compared to the other measures of the UPPS-P being related to self-
control. When exploring the associations between the s-UPPS-P and the POGQ, it 
appeared that the two main measures correlating with the POGQ were the urgency 
measures and lack of perseverance, lack of premeditation not correlating at all with 
any of the POGQ measures and sensation seeking only correlating negatively with 
social isolation.  
The exploration of gaming was done in three ways. First, a multiple linear 
regression was performed to find the best predictors of the weekly hours spent 
gaming, including multiple variables which significantly correlated (i.e., post-
correction) with time spent gaming. The regression significantly explained 20.40% 
of the variance, preoccupation being the only significant predictor. Second, the 
different variables from the survey were compared based on IGD criteria, where 26 
IGD participants were compared to 26 healthy gamers matched in terms of age, 
gender, and education levels. When comparing these two groups, the IGD 
participants scored significantly higher on most of the POGQ variables with the 
exception of immersion, which again appears to indicate that immersion tendencies 
are not related to a disorder or problematic use. Furthermore, the IGD participants 
also exhibited a significant difference with the s-UPPS-P measures and both anxiety 
and depression. The final analysis simply compared gamers and the non-gamers on 
the survey measures, only showing a difference in terms of depression, positive 
urgency, negative urgency and global urgency. Interestingly, while the IGD 
participants exhibited higher levels of urgency, the gamers showed lower levels of 
urgency when compared to non-gamers.  
When observing the effect of gaming on the task performed during the 
laboratory experiments, it appeared that there was no effect on any of the calculated 
DST variables. However, it appeared that the gamers were systematically and 
significantly faster than the non-gamers on the ANT-R which would result from an 
improved processing speed rather than an enhanced attentional focus (whether top-
down, spatial, or bottom-up). Indeed, when analysing the differences between the 
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conditions to observe how increased difficulty would affect the participants’ RT, 
no significant difference was observed between the gamers and non-gamers. This 
indicates that none of the conditions affected the non-gamers more than the gamers, 
and that the faster RT of the gamers has nothing to do with attention.  
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Chapter 9: Discussion of key findings 
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9.1. Chapter overview 
 The principal aim of this thesis was to explore the potential underlying 
mechanisms of the time loss effect (i.e., underestimation of time spent on an 
activity) observed among gamers. For this purpose, eight chapters were written, 
first exploring the theoretical explanations behind time loss, and then describing the 
experiments performed to explore these theories. The first theoretical chapter 
explored time perception and the variables affecting it, the second chapter the 
cognitive skills affected by gaming (i.e., whether positively or negatively), and the 
third one explored how time perception and gaming may be related.  
 Regarding the results chapters, the first experiment explored a new model 
of time perception, the Dual Process Contingency Model (DPCM), which would 
have been the basis of this thesis. Afterwards, the second and third experiments 
studied both the baseline time perception of gamers and how this time perception 
may be affected by attentional skills and emotional affect. Finally, the eighth 
chapter explored the common data between the three experiments (i.e., Attention 
Network Task – Revised [ANT-R] and Digit Span Test [DST]) as well as the survey 
data completed by the experiments’ participants as well as additional participants 
recruited on gaming forums. 
 This chapter, the final discussion, first summarizes the key points 
highlighted in the theoretical chapters and then the key findings from the three 
experiments. Afterward, the limitations from the methodology and the materials 
will be discussed before the implications and the contribution to knowledge of this 
thesis. Finally, this chapter will be concluded with the final remarks.  
9.2. Summary of the theoretical chapters 
The first chapter of this thesis defined time perception, which is basically 
the ability to estimate a time duration. According to the theory, time perception is 
currently divided into two separate paradigms, namely retrospective time 
perception (RTP) and prospective time perception (PTP) (Levin & Zakay, 1989). 
The first one is unconscious and post-hoc, a participant estimating a duration a 
posteriori without any prior warning of time estimation. The second one is ad-hoc, 
the participants being warned that they will have to estimate a duration prior to the 
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interval to evaluate. Due to their different natures, it has been postulated that they 
would rely on different cognitive skills (Block & Zakay, 1997).  
Due to its unconscious nature, RTP appears to be more fitting for models 
based on the memory and the way memories are stocked. According to the 
Contextual-Change Model (CCM; Block & Reed, 1978), a retrospective estimation 
would be based on the events (i.e., contextual changes) happening in the interval 
evaluated. This theory postulated that the more changes can be observed in a time 
interval, the longer it will be estimated retrospectively. Regarding the PTP, it is 
better explained by models based on a timer and attentional resources such as the 
Attentional-Gate Model (Zakay & Block, 1995). This model postulates a central 
mechanism (i.e., the pacemaker) emitting a regular pulse which is gathered in the 
accumulator before being compared to previously memorized durations. Two other 
parts of the model regulate the pulse flow, first a switch operating in an on/off 
design (i.e., open when measuring time, closed otherwise) and second a gate which 
opens more or less based on attention (i.e., the more attention brought upon time, 
the more it is open).  
To identify the potential variables affecting an individual’s time perception, 
an extensive literature search has been performed on four different databases (e.g., 
Google Scholar, PubMed) using terms specific to the field of time perception as 
well as potential variables which could affect it (e.g., “executive function”, 
emotion). After deleting the papers not fitting the different inclusion/exclusion 
criteria, two main sections were extracted, namely “emotional interference” and 
“time perception and cognition”. For more details on the paper search method, see 
‘Section 1.4. General Method’.  
Emotional interference was studied through the scope of different stimuli 
(i.e., emotional expressions, visual stimuli, and auditory stimuli). The visual stimuli 
lasting between 200 and 1600ms appeared to lead to an arousal effect which 
increased the pulse rate, leading to an overestimation of time (e.g., Fayolle et al., 
2014; Gil & Droit-Volet, 2012). On the other hand, shorter or longer visual stimuli 
led to a shortening effect due to respectively an attention effect (Smith et al., 2011) 
and a fight or flight effect (Angrilli et al., 1997). The attentional effect would be 
due to the stimuli being recognized as “threatening” and being processed faster to 
allow a proper reaction. The fight-or-flight effect indicated that attention would be 
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diverted from threatening stimuli for longer durations which would result in more 
attention brought on time and an elongation of estimation. On the other hand, if the 
stimulus is pleasant, it will drag the attentional resources, limiting the attention 
remaining on time, hence the underestimation. The case of emotional expression is 
simpler to interpret, as it systematically led to an overestimation of duration (e.g., 
Droit‐Volet et al., 2004; Lee et al., 2011), with the dynamism of the stimuli (i.e., 
static vs. animated pictures) enhancing this effect (e.g., Fayolle & Droit-Volet, 
2014) and an averted gaze nullifying it (e.g., Doi & Shinohara, 2009). The last type 
of stimuli explored were auditory (e.g., a music or a sound) and led to both 
underestimation and overestimation of duration. However, due to the lack of studies 
on that specific field, no conclusion could be reached. 
Concerning the effect of cognition on time perception, the results are mostly 
clear and were discussed in four different sections (i.e., coding simplicity, cognitive 
load, attention, and executive functions). Affecting only the RTP due to its effect 
on memory, it appears that a more complex coding of a stimulus will lead to an 
overestimation of duration (Macar, 1996; Ornstein, 1969). On the contrary, 
cognitive load (i.e., the amount of cognitive resources required to achieve a task) 
appears to solely affect conscious time perception, due to the importance of 
attention in PTP. The results showed that when the task was more complicated, the 
participants tended to underestimate duration (Baldauf et al., 2009; Marshall & 
Wilsoncroft, 1989). This previous effect appears to be attentional, the participants 
focusing more on the complicated task, which would reduce attention brought on 
time. This hypothesis was corroborated by studies showing that participants 
underestimate time in a dual-task paradigm (Burle & Casini, 2001; Macar et al., 
1994). These dual-task studies also pointed out that time perception may be an 
executive function, as the participants exhibited a bidirectional interference when 
performing a task evaluating an executive function at the same time as a temporal 
task (Brown et al., 2013; Brown & Perreault, 2017).  
The second chapter of this thesis explored how gaming, whether disordered 
or healthy, could affect cognition both positively and negatively. First, gaming 
disorder was briefly discussed, mentioning the inclusion of Internet Gaming 
Disorder in the fifth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (DSM-5; American Psychiatric Association, 2013) and the inclusion of 
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Gaming Disorder (terminology used within this thesis) in the 11th revision of the 
International Classification of Diseases (ICD-11; World Health Organization, 
2018). Despite the variety of videogames and their associated structural 
characteristics, the research mainly focused on Massively Multiplayer Online Role-
Playing Games (MMORPG) when studying gaming disorder and First-Person 
Shooter (FPS) games when exploring the cognitive improvement among gamers. 
Globally plaid videogame genres such as the Multiplayer Online Battle Arena 
(MOBA) or Real-Time Strategy (RTS) games were not considered previously. To 
observe which cognitive skills have been explored among gamers, the same method 
as the previous chapter was used for the literature search, with the exception of the 
keywords used (e.g., videogame, decision-making). The results of this search, after 
the exclusion of non-fitting papers, led to two main sections exploring the positive 
and negative impact of gaming on cognition. For more details on this method, see 
‘Section 2.3. General method’. 
All the studies in the section on the positive impact of gaming included 
healthy gamers. The first positive impact of gaming discussed was the task-
switching skill which is the ability to switch between two different tasks over a 
same stimulus without losing in terms of speed and accuracy (Miyake, 2000). What 
has been found is that the gamers had superior switching abilities compared to non-
gamers, especially when the participants were cued before the switching (Colzato, 
2010; Green et al., 2012). The improved switching abilities exhibited by gamers 
could result from the numerous different “inputs” required in videogames (e.g., 
reloading a weapon, capturing a base, shooting enemies). Interestingly, it appeared 
that RTS games were associated with higher levels of cognitive flexibility (i.e., 
ability to switch between different tasks) compared to FPS games (Dobrowolski et 
al., 2015). This would make sense, as RTS games often require the gamer to switch 
between several crucial tasks in order to win a game (e.g., commanding a group of 
units, constructing a building, and building new units). As indicated by the cueing 
effect (i.e., improved flexibility amongst gamers following a cue; Karle et al., 
2010), it is possible that gamers would exhibit a better attentional focus compared 
to non-gamers which tends to be supported by attentional studies (e.g., Cain & 
Mitroff, 2011; Chisholm et al., 2010; Mishra et al., 2011).  
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The studies on attention based their thoughts on three different models of 
attention, namely the Attentional Network Task (ANT; Fan et al., 2002), the Theory 
of Visual Attention (TVA; Bundesen, 1990), and the bottom-up/top-down split of 
attention (Desimone & Duncan, 1995). Although these models differ in their 
interpretation of attention, they all split attention into a controlled process (i.e., top-
down, control of the attention by the individual) or uncontrolled process (i.e., 
bottom-up, attention being captured by the salient stimuli). The results in this 
section mainly indicated improved processing speed (i.e., faster reaction-time [RT]; 
Cain & Mitroff, 2011; Castel et al., 2005), improved top-down attention (i.e., 
controlled allocation of attention; Cain et al., 2014; Chisholm et al., 2010), and a 
couple of studies showed improved bottom-up attention (Cain & Mitroff, 2011; 
Mishra et al., 2011). Enhanced top-down attention could be linked to the constant 
focus required while playing action games, the slightest lapse of attention 
potentially leading to a death in-game. Potentially improved bottom-up attention 
could be related to the stimuli randomly appearing in videogames which requires 
the gamers to react promptly (e.g., enemy appearing, and important items). Finally, 
it appeared that gamers had better sub-second time perception, which is mainly 
related to reflexes, even though more research would be required (Donohue et al., 
2010).  
The second part of this chapter examined the negative impact of gaming on 
cognition, which was only observed with disordered gamers. First, basing their 
thoughts on loss of control (i.e., the inability to not play videogames) research has 
been conducted on the association between gaming disorder and inhibition. The 
results of the different studies on this topic contrasted, some showing an impairment 
(Ko et al., 2015; Littel et al., 2012) while others showed no such results (Chen et 
al., 2015; Colzato et al., 2013). The lead explanation for such contrasting results 
lies within emotion. Indeed, Ko et al. (2015) as well as Liu et al. (2014) showed 
that the gamers’ inhibition would worsen when confronted with gaming pictures. 
These results indicate that an emotional state induced by gaming pictures among 
disordered gamers interferes with their cognitive skills. Finally, the last cognitive 
skill explored was decision-making which can be split into three categories (i.e., 
risky decision-making, decision-making with learning process, and delay 
discounting). The studies on this topic systematically showed that gamers exhibited 
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impaired risky decision-making (Pawlikowski & Brand, 2011; Wang et al., 2016), 
that is a difficulty to make a cautious decision in a risky situation (e.g., preferring 
50% chance of winning £10 instead of 100% chance of winning £7). Furthermore, 
the gamers also discounted their rewards more steeply (Nuyens et al., 2016; Yao, 
Chen, et al., 2015), that is they preferred smaller immediate rewards over larger 
delayed rewards (e.g., preferring £5 now rather than £10 in a week). Importantly, 
only one study showed significant results with a task requiring the participants to 
learn the rules of the task (Nuyens et al., 2016). Interestingly, this study showed 
impaired decision-making only after the gamers understood the rules of the task 
(i.e., the risk of the decision) which indicates that their impairment lied within risky 
decision-making, confirming the prior results.  
The third chapter of this thesis was a bridge between the two first chapters, 
exploring how time perception and gaming are related. The objective of the chapter 
was to guide the research conducted within this thesis. The variables potentially 
explaining the time loss effect observed among gamers were explored within this 
thesis as much as possible within a thesis timeframe. A first common point between 
time perception and gaming is attention which is mainly important within PTP (i.e., 
through the AGM; Zakay & Block, 1995). First, it appears that gamers exhibited 
both a better top-down and bottom-up attention. Interestingly, having a better 
attentional focus should lead to better conscious time perception, as the individual 
should be able to better focus on time. Similarly, working memory, an important 
aspect of time perception (i.e., when comparing the current duration estimation with 
previously stored interval durations; Zakay & Block, 1995) appears to be improved 
among the gamers, mainly regarding the visual sketchpad (Lau-Zhu et al., 2017; 
Seya & Shinoda, 2016). These two points appear to indicate that not only should 
gamers not exhibit impaired PTP, but they should actually show the opposite trend 
(i.e., an improved conscious time perception) which does not fit the observed time 
loss effect in two ways. First, time loss supposes an impaired time perception rather 
than an improved one. Second, it is unlikely that the gamers consciously try to 
perceive time while gaming, they would indeed try to estimate their session duration 
a posteriori. These two points indicated that the time perception implicated in the 
time loss effect would be the RTP.  
  
212 
When exploring which aspect could affect the gamers’ time perception, 
emotion stood out. First, gamers exhibit a stronger brain reactivity when confronted 
with gaming stimuli compared to non-gamers (Ahn et al., 2015; Zhang et al., 2016), 
which makes sense as non-gamers should not react strongly to gaming stimuli. 
Nonetheless, it appeared that disordered gamers reacted even more strongly than 
healthy gamers (Ko et al., 2013; Thalemann et al., 2007). Concerning time 
perception, although the section on emotion showed that some emotional stimuli 
(i.e., sound, music, emotional expression) would lead to overestimation of duration 
(i.e., opposite effect than time loss), an underestimation effect was achieved in some 
cases (i.e., for longer duration with emotional pictures; Smith et al., 2011). In 
addition, studies exploring the effect of enjoyment showed that it could lead to an 
underestimation of time (Campbell & Bryant, 2007; Gable & Poole, 2012), which 
would fit the time loss effect (i.e., gamers having fun would underestimate the 
session duration). Interestingly, as disordered gamers exhibit stronger reaction than 
healthy gamers it could be hypothesized that the effect of videogames on their time 
perception would be stronger than for healthy gamers, explaining the extreme time 
loss effect observed. However, it is important to note that the interference of 
emotion on time perception can be managed through emotion regulation. For 
example, in the case of time perception, when experimenters virtually increased the 
perceived level of control over negative stimuli, the overestimation caused by these 
stimuli disappeared (Buetti & Lleras, 2012; Mereu & Lleras, 2013). This is of 
interest when considering that while videogames can be used to regulate emotion 
(Villani et al., 2018) and have been used as a therapeutic tool (Kuosmanen, 
Fleming, Newell, & Barry, 2017), it appears that in the case of gaming disorder, 
this regulation would be disrupted (Seo et al., 2012; Wichstrøm et al., 2018). 
Therefore, while healthy gamers would exhibit a normal reactivity to gaming 
stimuli and would be able to regulate it, disordered gamers would exhibit a stronger 
reactivity which they could not properly regulate. This interaction between 
emotion, time perception, and emotion regulation could explain the time loss effect 
observed among gamers, whether healthy or disordered.  
A final consideration within the interaction between gaming and time 
perception is flow state (i.e., the loss of self-awareness when fully focused on a task 
where the level of difficulty matches the individual’s skills; Csíkszentmihályi, 
  
213 
1975). Indeed, according to Zakay (2014), flow is on a continuum with boredom, 
the first one leading to underestimation while the second one would lead to 
overestimation. While the overestimation effect created by boredom has been 
certified by several studies (Danckert & Allman, 2005; Watt, 1991), the direct effect 
of flow on time perception lacks studies. Nonetheless, when considering that a flow 
state would lead to underestimation of time due to the full attentional pool being 
requested by the task at hand, numerous studies support an underestimation linked 
to a flow state (Burle & Casini, 2001; Macar et al., 1994). According to these 
studies, attention diverted from time due to the task at hand would lead to the 
attentional gate closing (Zakay & Block, 1995), resulting in less pulses accumulated 
and compared, hence the underestimation.  
Concerning the methodology chapter, it started by stating that this thesis is 
in line with the positive pragmatism philosophical assumption due to its quantitative 
approach of research. The quantitative approach has been preferred due to the 
continuous aspects of the main variable of this thesis (i.e., temporal estimation). 
Regarding the temporal estimation, or time perception, several tasks exist 
measuring this phenomenon (e.g., reproduction task, and comparison task). Several 
were excluded as they did not fit retrospective time perception (i.e., production, 
generalization, and bisection tasks), or simply allowed single testing in RTP (i.e., 
reproduction task and comparison task). Consequently, the only viable option to 
allow multiple testing in a retrospective setting was the estimation task (i.e., 
presenting a duration to participants and asking him to evaluate it). The second most 
important variable in this thesis was gaming disorder. The primary objective of this 
thesis was to compare gamers and non-gamers, which does not need any 
questionnaire. However, this thesis was also the opportunity to test how gaming 
disorder may impact time perception. For this purpose, two approaches have been 
selected based on the work from King et al. (2013) which identified 19 scales 
measuring gaming disorder associated with 16 different facets of this variable (e.g., 
preoccupation, and deception). Based on these thoughts, this thesis used two 
different gaming disorder scales to cover 13 of the 16 aforementioned criteria of 
gaming disorder: the IGD criteria (American Psychiatric Association, 2013) and the 
Problematic Online Gaming Disorder Questionnaire (POGQ; Demetrovics et al., 
2012).  
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The other variables explored within this thesis were selected based on their 
interaction with both gaming and time perception. Basically, any personality trait 
or cognitive skill which was known to be affected by gaming and could impact the 
participants’ time perception were controlled within this thesis either through a task 
or a questionnaire. First, as aforementioned, both working memory and attention 
are crucial within time perception and are known to be related to gaming. Therefore, 
two tasks assessing these concepts have been included in the experiments, namely 
the Attention Network Task–Revised (i.e., ANT-R; Fan et al., 2002) and the Digit 
Span Test (DST, measuring working memory; Weschler, 2008). The other variables 
measured within this thesis have not been mentioned in this section yet and will 
thus be discussed briefly. First, it is known that gaming disorder is associated with 
elevated levels of impulsivity (Billieux et al., 2011; Ko et al., 2017), despite the 
measures varying between the studies (e.g., Barratt Impulsiveness Scale–BIS, 
UPPS). It is noteworthy that higher impulsivity was associated with a faster 
cognitive tempo (i.e., faster pacemaker rate within the AGM, leading to 
overestimation; Zakay & Block, 1995) and that pathologies associated with higher 
impulsivity (e.g., Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder, borderline disorder) are 
associated with overestimation of time (Stanford & Barratt, 1996).  
Like impulsivity, depression is a common comorbidity with gaming 
disorder even if it is unsure whether gaming disorder is the cause or consequence 
of depression disorder (Bargeron & Hormes, 2017; Männikkö et al., 2020). 
According to the longitudinal studies, it is likely that their relationship is a vicious 
circle because it appeared that a higher depression level leads to more severe 
gaming disorder, and that gaming disorder would in turn increase depression levels 
(Gentile et al., 2011).  
Concerning time perception’s relationship with depression, it appears that 
patients suffering from depression report that time is slowed down during 
depressive episodes, which tended to indicate impaired time perception associated 
with depression (e.g., Gallagher, 2012; Msetfi et al., 2012). However, it has been 
argued that these observations are related to time experience rather than time 
perception per se (Oberfeld et al., 2014; Thönes & Oberfeld, 2015). While time 
perception is the accurate estimation of a duration, time experience is the subjective 
feeling of time passing by. This concern arose from the inconsistent results on the 
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interaction between time perception and depression, some studies showing that 
depressed participants tended to overestimate time (e.g., Biermann et al., 2011), 
other showing the opposing result (e.g., Gil & Droit-Volet, 2009), or failing to find 
any effect (e.g., Thönes & Oberfeld, 2015). It is possible that for longer durations 
than the ones tested (i.e., below one minute), time perception would be affected too 
due to impaired sustained and selective attention (Gualtieri et al., 2006) which is 
crucial within long duration estimation (Zakay & Block, 1995).  
Finally, gaming disorder is associated with higher levels of stress and 
anxiety (Bargeron & Hormes, 2017; Wartberg et al., 2017), although no conclusion 
can be drawn concerning the direction of this associations (i.e., whether gaming 
disorder causes stress and anxiety or the opposite). However, several variables 
appear to alter the association between these two variables such as favourite game 
genre (Bonnaire & Baptista, 2019), the gamers’ motivations to play games (Király 
et al., 2015), and mindfulness levels (Yu et al., 2018). This if of interest because 
anxiety and stress are known to negatively affect time perception, leading to 
systematic overestimation of time (Bagana & Raciu, 2012; Campbell & Bryant, 
2007).  
However, it is important to note that in the case of anxiety, lengthened time 
perception was observed among anxious individual when confronted with the 
object of their anxiety. For example, in the case of social anxiety, the participants 
overestimated the duration of angry or fearful faces compared to neutral faces (e.g., 
Yoo & Lee, 2015); or arachnophobe participants overestimated time when 
observing a spider (e.g., Buetti & Lleras, 2012). Importantly, this last study showed 
that perceived control over the situation played a crucial role in the interaction 
between anxiety and time perception because an increased sense of control inhibited 
the effect of anxiety on time perception (Buetti & Lleras, 2012).  
Due to these reasons, these variables (i.e., working memory, attention, 
impulsivity, depression, anxiety, and stress) were controlled in all the experiments 
of this thesis, results which will be explained in detail in the section “9.4. Key 
experimental findings”.  
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9.3. Implications and contribution to knowledge 
Not gaming-related, the first experiment of this thesis aimed to validate a 
model of time perception which would have unified both the retrospective and 
prospective time perception in a single cognitive model. This model, created by 
Thomas and Weaver (1975), postulates that both time perception paradigms rely 
differently on two variables. The first one, attention, is based on the timer’s model 
of time perception such as the AGM, where the more one thinks about time, the 
longer the interval will be estimated and vice-versa. According to the second 
variable, segmentation, the more contextual changes happen within an interval (e.g., 
4 x 4 words from different semantic groups vs. 16 words from a same semantic 
group), the longer the interval would be estimated (i.e., based on the memory-based 
model of time perception such as the contextual-change model). According to these 
authors, while PTP would mainly relies on attention and timing mechanisms, being 
barely affected by segmentation levels, RTP relies on segmentation levels. Thomas 
and Weaver (1975) validated this model for extremely short duration (i.e., 
maximum 100ms), and later on this model was validated for longer durations (i.e., 
up to 15 seconds, Zakay 1993). However, since 1993 this model has never been 
tested, and remained solely validated for relatively short durations while this thesis 
aimed to explore longer durations. Indeed, the main point of this thesis was to 
explore the underlying mechanisms of the time loss effect (i.e., underestimation of 
time while playing) observed among gamers. Therefore, since a gaming session will 
systematically exceed minutes, even an hour, a model validated upon duration 
shorter than 15 seconds was not valid. This thesis thus aimed to revalidate this 
model with longer durations, which allowed the unification of both paradigms 
which were until then studied separately.  
To understand this thesis’ contribution to knowledge, previous studies 
exploring time perception among gamers need to be summarised. First, Rivero et 
al. (2012) explored time perception of gamers for durations up to 60s in a 
prospective setting, using both an estimation task and a production task. This study 
failed to find any result between frequent and occasional gamers in prospective time 
perception, but, as aforementioned, the gamers should only exhibit impaired 
retrospective time perception and not a prospective one. When it comes to 
retrospective time perception, three studies were conducted in this domain, most of 
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these not showing any convincing results. First, Rau et al. (2006) compared experts 
and novice gamers on a famous videogame (i.e., Diablo II), making them play for 
30, 60 or 90 minutes and asking them to estimate the duration of their gameplay. 
The authors did not find any significant results, which could be due to the method 
used, as the novice players were simply gamers who did not play Diablo II before. 
As a matter of fact, when comparing the percentage of internet-addicted participants 
within the two groups, the numbers were similar (i.e., 30% in the expert group and 
35 in the novice one). And when one knows that gaming disorder is particularly 
prominent within internet addiction, it is highly possible that the “novice” gamers 
were actually normal gamers who just happened to play other games.  
The next studies exploring RTP aimed to obtain several estimations from 
their participants (Woods and Griffiths, 2007). Importantly, instead of waiting until 
the end of the whole experimental session to ask the participants to estimate the 
three tested intervals (i.e., 13, 37, and 45 minutes), the authors required the 
participants to provide an estimation at the end of each interval. As a result, while 
the first tested duration was systematically estimated retrospectively, the two 
following durations were estimated prospectively. This fact could have greatly 
affected the non-significant results the authors got. Finally, the only study finding 
a significant difference in terms of temporal estimation was conducted on both RTP 
and PTP, although the authors did not separate their analyses for the two paradigms 
(Tobin & Grondin, 2009). The main findings from these authors are that gamers 
tend to underestimate time spending playing videogames compared to reading (for 
an eight-minute duration) and that regular gamers (i.e., more than seven hours per 
week) tended to underestimate a 24-minute session on a videogame compared to 
more occasional gamers (i.e., between one and six hours per week).  
From observing the previous studies, a clear exploration of gamers’ time 
perception was missing compared to non-gamers. Indeed, these studies compared 
different types of gamers (i.e., mostly regular and non-regular) which could limit 
their results. Another way these studies explored the effect of gaming on time 
perception is by comparing the estimation of gamers while doing a random activity 
compared to estimations of a gaming session. However, observing that gamers tend 
to underestimate the time spent gaming compared to reading does not mean that 
there is a time perception impairment among the gamers. It is possible that if the 
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authors put non-gamers in front of a videogame for the first time, they would have 
underestimated time compared to reading a book as well. In conclusion, the first 
contribution to knowledge brought by this thesis is a clear comparison of gamers 
and non-gamers on exactly the same activities, to avoid any confounding variables.  
 Furthermore, this thesis was built on a strong rationale, beyond the fact that 
gamers tend to exhibit time loss (i.e., underestimating time spent gaming). This 
rationale led to the deletion of prospective time perception to solely focus on 
retrospective estimations, which appeared to be more adequate. As observed in the 
previous studies (i.e., Rau et al., 2006; Rivero et al., 2012; Tobin & Grondin, 2009; 
Wood et al., 2007), only one experiment properly explored retrospective time 
perception, yet the groups compared were inadequate, an issue which was corrected 
as aforementioned (i.e., comparison of gamers and non-gamers in this thesis). Also, 
this rationale led to the integration of two potential variables which would explain 
why gamers tend to exhibit time loss, instead of simply showing it. These two 
variables (i.e., attention and emotion) were never explored in previous studies 
observing gamers’ time perception and constitute a major update in the field.  
9.4. Key experimental findings 
Before testing gamers’ retrospective time perception, the first study aimed 
to validate a new model of time perception which would unify both retrospective 
and prospective time perception (i.e., the DPCM; Thomas & Weaver, 1975). This 
model is based on two main variables (i.e., segmentation and a timer) which affects 
both time paradigms (i.e., RTP and PTP) differently. Conscious time perception 
relies more on the timer while unconscious one is more affected by the 
segmentation variable. This model has first been validated with durations shorter 
than 100ms (Thomas & Weaver, 1975), then with durations between 12 and 15s 
(Zakay, 1993). Based on this, the rationale behind this study was to assert whether 
RTP and PTP were related within longer durations (i.e., longer than one minute), 
as testing only RTP among gamers would become irrelevant if that was the case. If 
that model was to be validated for longer durations, a triple interaction should be 
observed between the segmentation, timing, and time perception paradigm, which 
was the hypothesis behind this experiment.  
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To test time perception of participants, a non-temporal task was created, as 
the group of participants performing the estimation retrospectively had to remain 
“busy” for the same duration as the prospective group without knowing about the 
time perception aspect of the experiment. For this purpose, a Word Recalling Task 
(WRT) was created in which participants were presented random words in three 
blocks varying in terms of duration (i.e., 55s, 155s, & 355s). The reason why none 
of the durations represented an exact number of minutes (e.g., 360s being exactly 6 
minutes) was to avoid participants guessing the exact duration by rounding up to 
the minute. To affect the timing mechanism, it was decided to vary the difficulty of 
the task, the higher the difficulty, the less attention brought upon time. To fluctuate 
the segmentation levels, the words were either split by one celebrity name (i.e., in 
the middle of the block) or by three celebrity names (i.e., at each fourth of the task). 
The only difference between the prospective and retrospective groups was that the 
first one was told that they would have to estimate the duration of each block at the 
end of the task, while the second was not. Consequently, the second group (i.e., the 
retrospective one) was convinced that the experiment aimed to test short-term 
memory, hence the WRT. On top of the WRT, which was the main task of this 
experiment, the participants performed tasks measuring the attentional resources 
and working memory, as well as completed questionnaires measuring the 
confounding variables aforementioned.  
The first analysis run on the estimation provided by the participants was to 
delete the outliers which were considered as any estimation twice as long as the real 
duration (i.e., over 110s for the short duration, 310s for the medium duration, and 
710s for the longest one). This barely affected the medium and long duration, but 
numerous short duration estimations had to be deleted from the sample (i.e., 25 out 
of 98 participants). Post-deletion of the outliers, the error rate of the estimations 
(i.e., how much the estimations differed from the real duration) were compared 
between the three blocks, which showed that the longest block had the highest 
variability. This result fit the Scalar Expectancy Theory (SET; Gibbon et al., 1984) 
which states that the longest the duration, the higher the lack of precision in the 
estimation provided.  
The most important part of this experiment was to test whether this model 
was valid for durations over one minute, as the shorter durations used to first 
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validate it were not viable to test gamers. A model including the three dichotomous 
variables (i.e., timing, segmentation, and the time paradigm) was tested through a 
General Linear Model Multivariate with the three durations (and the total duration) 
as the dependent variables. The results were unilateral, as none of the durations 
were correctly predicted by the model, and none of the variables significantly 
affected the participants’ estimation. Accordingly, the DPCM appears to not fit 
longer durations (i.e., over one minute) despite its previous validation with short 
durations (i.e., under one minute). This was of importance for this thesis, as its 
global aim was to assess the gamers’ time perception in order to understand why 
they tend to underestimate the time spent on videogames and even if a gaming 
session can last less than an hour, it will never last less than a minute. Therefore, 
using a model of time perception which would only work for durations under one 
minute (i.e., longest duration validated being 15s) would not be viable. 
Furthermore, it is important to note that the level of difficulty, which should at least 
affect the PTP due to the lack of attentional resources available for time estimation, 
did not exhibit any significant result. It was thus hypothesized that even the simple 
task was too complicated to allow any attentional resources to focus on time. This 
hypothesis led to the creation of a new simpler task for the rest of the thesis.  
The only significant result observed on time perception within this 
experiment is the overestimation of the long block by the gamers compared to the 
non-gamers. Interestingly, when splitting the prospective and retrospective 
estimations, and comparing the longest estimation between the gamers and non-
gamers, the results remained significant only for the prospective setting. More 
importantly, observing the actual estimation changed the interpretation of the 
results drastically. Indeed, the estimation provided by the gamers (i.e., around 360s) 
was much closer to the real duration of the longest block (i.e., 355s) compared to 
the non-gamers’ estimation (i.e., 240s). Both the lack of results in the RTP and the 
more accurate time perception among the gamers in the PTP tend to support the 
hypothesis formulated at the end of the third chapter. Indeed, it was hypothesized 
that improved attention and working memory observed among the gamers may 
impact their prospective time estimation positively. It was also hypothesized that 
the gamers’ affected RTP would result from a hyper-reactivity to gaming cues, and 
that when not confronted with these stimuli, their RTP would remain accurate.  
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Based on the theory and these results, the following studies explored only 
the RTP to study the time loss effect observed among gamers. First, it was decided 
to compare the gamers’ and non-gamers’ baseline time perception (i.e., temporal 
estimation provided without any external variable). As the participants had to 
provide estimations retrospectively, a non-temporal task had to be used similarly to 
the previous experiment. However, as the previous task was deemed too 
complicated even in its simplest setting, a new task was created so that difficulty 
would not alter the results. To keep using word stimuli, to avoid including any new 
confounding variables, it was decided to create a Lexical Decision Task (LDT) in 
which participants were asked to decide if a string of letters was a real word (e.g., 
SHIRT) or a string of consonants (e.g., KSTRF). This task included three blocks of 
varying durations (i.e., 72s, 192s, & 336s), again, none of these durations was close 
to an exact minute duration (e.g., 72s was preferred over 60s which is an exact 
minute). To measure eventual confounding variables, the same tasks and 
questionnaires as in the first experiment were used, even though none of these 
variables affected the estimation provided by the first experiment’s sample.  
As for the first experiment, any estimation at least twice as long as the real 
duration (i.e., 144s, 384s, and 772s) was excluded from the analyses, which led to 
an important decrease of the sample for the shortest duration (i.e., only 14 remaining 
out of 44). Consequently, for this experiment, the total duration was based only on 
the medium and long block. Compared to the first experiment, the error rate of the 
estimation provided did not differ between the three different durations, which is 
expected as the Scalar Expectancy Theory was observed for PTP, this experiment 
measuring RTP. The main analysis of this experiment was a t-test comparing the 
three estimations provided by the gamers and non-gamers, which did not show a 
single significant difference. Interestingly, the hypothesis behind this study was the 
absence of results, as it was expected that the gamers would exhibit an impaired 
time perception only when observing gaming stimuli. The only extra analysis led 
based on gaming habits was comparing the players of Role-Playing Games (RPG) 
to the other gamers, which again did not show any significant result. Based on these 
non-significant results, the third and last experiment of this thesis could be 
conducted.  
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The purpose of this last experiment was to not only compare the gamers’ 
and non-gamers’ time perception, but also to observe the separate and conjoint 
effect of attention and emotion on their RTP. Despite the hypothesized lack of effect 
of attention on RTP (i.e., due to the unconscious aspect of this cognitive skill), it 
was still included for two reasons. The first and most important reason was that an 
increase of attention on the task meant an increase of attention on the stimuli 
included within the task. These stimuli being gaming pictures, it was hoped that an 
increased attention toward these would increase their effect on the gamers’ time 
perception. The second reason lies within the dual-process models of addiction 
(D’Hondt & Maurage, 2017; Noël, Brevers, & Bechara, 2013) which postulates that 
addiction would emerge from an imbalance between an affective system (i.e., based 
on associative learning, related to motivation and emotion) and a reflective system 
(i.e., based on memory and executive functions). Therefore, it would be possible 
that while attention itself would not affect the gamers’ RTP, its interaction with 
emotion would have an impact. To affect the attention brought upon the task, a more 
complicated version of the LDT was created where instead of comparing words to 
strings of consonants, the participants were comparing words to non-words. These 
non-words were selected through a careful process (i.e., see section “7.3.3.2. 
Behavioural measures” for more details on the process) to look like potential real 
words and confuse the participants. Concerning the gaming pictures, a selection 
was made based on the most popular games and game genres at the moment of the 
experiment, the final 24 pictures being selected based on real gamers preferences 
(i.e., see ‘Section 7.3.3.2. Behavioural measures’ for more details).  
The blocks’ durations were identical to the first experiment, and the same 
process was applied to delete the outlying estimation provided by the participants. 
As for the second experiments, a lot of the short duration estimation had to be 
deleted, leading to only 59 estimations remaining out of 134 participants. The only 
significant difference observed in term of error rates between all the duration was 
between the medium and short block, the latest being less accurate than the medium 
block, which could be due to the number of estimations lost. Concerning the 
gamers’ time perception, it could not simply be explored through a t-test as both the 
type of pictures and the task difficulty had to be included in the analysis. For this 
reason, a General Linear Model Multivariate was used, the three durations as well 
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as the total duration being included as dependent variables. This analysis was run 
separately between the gamers and non-gamers, and while it was not significant for 
any of the durations for the non-gamers, it was significant for both the medium and 
long durations among the gamers. When exploring the significant effect, it appeared 
that the difference for these durations was a main effect of the picture type, where 
the gamers underestimated the duration when observing gaming pictures compared 
to neutral pictures. Furthermore, there was a significant interaction between 
attention and picture type. This interaction showed that while the gaming pictures 
would lead to a longer estimation in the easy task, the opposite effect was observed 
in the complicated setting of the task. This could indicate an effect of flow, where 
the easy task would be too simple for the gamers based on their skills, leading them 
to find it boring and not fully focus on the task. On the other hand, when the task 
difficulty matched the gamers’ skills, the gamers would remain focused on the task, 
as in a state of flow, which would allow a proper effect of the gaming pictures. Of 
course, this is only speculation, and more research should be conducted on this 
interaction.  
Although this is only a hypothesis, the results on the LDT corroborate it. 
Indeed, when exploring the performance of the gamers compared to the non-gamers 
on this task, including both the pictures included and the difficulty as independent 
variables, a significant effect emerged. While the global RT of the gamers were 
shorter, indicating a better processing speed, it appeared that this difference was 
due to a difference of performance for the non-words. Indeed, while there was no 
significant difference for the real words, the gamers reacted faster than the non-
gamers for the non-words. The higher performance of the gamers compared to the 
non-gamers could explain that they indeed got “bored” in the easier task compared 
to the non-gamers, which could potentially support the previous hypothesis about 
the interaction between picture type and difficulty.  
The final analyses of this thesis concerned the data common to all the 
experiments (i.e., the ANT-R, DST, and the survey data). The reason for gathering 
all these data together was to increase the sample and the amount of data instead of 
analysing smaller groups separately. Some results were expected, such as a better 
performance of the gamers on the ANT-R or correlations between the gaming 
variables and self-reported measures (e.g., depression, impulsivity). In summary, it 
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appeared that when participants exhibited higher levels of depression, they were 
also more impulsive and were more prone to exhibit higher levels of gaming 
disorder. Concerning stress and anxiety levels, similar results were observed where 
higher levels were associated with more impulsivity and gaming disorder. It is 
noteworthy that only the groups differing in term of symptoms showed multiple 
significant differences on these variables (e.g., normal level of depression compared 
to severe level of depression). The most interesting result regarding these 
differences, was that the only POGQ variables not related to depression, stress, and 
anxiety was immersion, which was only correlated with the urgency score in the 
UPPS-P. It would then appear that a high immersion score is not problematic as it 
is not related to any negative outcome. Inversely, the only POGQ variable to be 
related to the three negative outcomes measured in this thesis was withdrawal, 
which was systematically higher in the stressed, anxious, and depressed groups. On 
the other hand, interpersonal conflicts was higher among the depressed and stressed 
groups and overuse was higher among the depressed and anxious groups. This 
different interaction among the POGQ variables is of interest when considering it 
in the context of the work of Charlton and Danforth (2007) who differentiated high 
engagement from addiction. According to these authors, several constructs used 
within the definition of behavioural addiction would indicate a high engagement 
rather than an addictive behaviour. These peripheral criteria include cognitive 
salience (i.e., thinking regularly about the game), tolerance (i.e., needing to spend 
more time gaming), and euphoria (i.e., positive mood change when gaming). On 
the other hand, the core criteria include conflicts (e.g., with work or the loved ones), 
withdrawal symptoms (i.e., negative mood when not playing), relapse (i.e., inability 
to stop playing), and behavioural salience (e.g., skipping meals or sleeping less to 
play more). Although the authors made no mention of the immersion construct 
explored within this thesis, Deleuze et al. (2018) indicated in their study that while 
escapism (i.e., avoiding reality to cope with negative emotions) may be related more 
strongly to addictive use rather than high-engagement, it was not the case for 
immersion. Therefore, this lack of association between depression, anxiety, and 
stress with immersion tends to support the idea that immersion belongs to the 
peripheral criteria and indicates high engagement rather than disordered use.  
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With regards to gaming itself, three types of analysis have been performed. 
First, the variables correlating with weekly time spent gaming were entered into a 
linear regression in order to observe which were the best predictors of this gaming 
habit. It was observed that the whole model explained 20.40% of weekly time spent 
gaming, the only remaining significant predictor being preoccupation. It is 
important to note that nothing can be said about the direction of this relation, as it 
is possible that an individual spending a lot of time on gaming would be passionate 
about videogames, which could result in a lot of thoughts about this hobby. Again, 
this relates to the results obtained by Charlton and Danforth (2007) observing that 
the time spent gaming, as well as preoccupation (i.e., thoughts directed towards 
gaming when not playing) are not core items of addiction. It is therefore possible 
that the participants in this study presenting disordered gaming use (i.e., according 
to the POGQ) spend more time playing games and thinking about their videogames 
more often than participants with healthier use. Furthermore, it is important to note 
that the participants in the studies in this thesis were recruited within a community 
sample, and that none of the participants presented a score high enough to be 
considered “disordered” (i.e., based on Demetrovics et al., 2012, cut-off score of 
65). This means that although preoccupation and time spent gaming predicted the 
POGQ total score, this was among a healthy population, thus not necessarily 
indicating an association between disordered use and these variables.  
 The second analysis compared gamers and non-gamers, showing lower 
levels of urgency among non-gamers, which is surprising as most of the studies on 
the topic tended to find the opposite results (e.g., Billieux et al., 2015b; Ryu et al., 
2018). However, these studies mainly recruited disordered gamers, which could 
explain the differences of results compared to this study. Therefore, it was decided 
to compare the disordered gamers within this sample (i.e., any participants with an 
IGD score above 5) to the healthy gamers. Due to the small number of IGD 
participants (i.e., 26), a selection of 26 healthy gamers matched on their education 
levels, gender, and age was made. When comparing these two groups, it appeared 
that the gamers indeed had higher urgency levels, as well as global impulsivity 
levels and depression and anxiety scores. Again, when comparing IGD to healthy 
gamers, almost all the POGQ scores differed significantly to the exception of the 
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immersion score, which would further indicate that high immersion levels are not 
systematically associated with problematic experiences.  
Finally, when comparing the scores of the gamers and non-gamers from all 
the three experiments on the ANT-R, a global faster reaction time was observed for 
the gamers which indicates a better processing speed. These results do not 
necessarily indicate that the gamers within this sample had better attention levels, 
as it could solely be due to their overall faster RT. To observe this effect, new 
variables were created, comparing the conditions between them (e.g., the difference 
of RT between a single arrow or multiple arrows to observe the flanking effect). 
When comparing these new variables between the gamers and non-gamers, none of 
the differences reached significance. These results indicate that the previously 
observed results were due to a better processing speed rather than a better 
attentional focus from the gamers. Finally, when comparing the gamers to the non-
gamers on the DST, there were no significant results between any of the variables. 
This could be due to a ceiling effect, as most of the participants performed very 
similarly on this task. 
9.5. Limitations 
9.5.1. Methodological 
 The quantitative approach to research preferred for this thesis, due to the 
main variable (i.e., time perception) being continuous, comes with limitations. First, 
the human mind is extremely complex, and no viable experimental model of a 
behaviour could possibly account for all the variables influencing the aforesaid 
behaviour despite the numerous controlled variables included in this experiment. 
For example, in the field of time perception and its emotional interference, the 
participants’ emotion regulation, positivity and negativity, or simply their current 
mood (i.e., not the depression level which was controlled) could greatly affect the 
observed interaction.  
The strength of such a method is its objectivity, replicability, and 
adaptability. Indeed, modifying this thesis’ method would allow another researcher 
to observe how this change affects the results and deepen the understanding of the 
interaction between time perception and gaming. For example, replacing the scales 
which did not correlate with time perception by scales measuring the 
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aforementioned constructs (e.g., emotion regulation, and positivity) would allow 
researchers to explore new concepts with a previously validated method. In 
addition, the quantitative method can struggle to explain the reason behind a 
behaviour. For example, while the last study showed that gamers tended to 
underestimate durations when confronted with gaming pictures, the reasons behind 
this fact remain unclear. The previous literature can help providing several 
explanations (e.g., the arousing effect of pictures–Angrilli et al., 1997; the stronger 
brain reactivity–Wang et al., 2017), but these would then need to be further tested 
in extra experiments.  
 Furthermore, a laboratory approach of emotion is always complicated 
especially when it comes to the concept of enjoyment or, put simply, “having fun”. 
Although it is easy to achieve a reaction from a participant with emotional stimuli, 
that does not mean that the participant is enjoying the activity at hand (i.e., in this 
case, the lexical decision task). Interestingly, studies on inhibition used a similar 
method (i.e., including gaming pictures in their inhibition task) to disrupt disordered 
gamers’ inhibition (Ko et al., 2015; Liu et al., 2014). These studies showed that 
even if the participants did not exhibit any impaired inhibition in the neutral task, 
they showed impairment when confronted with gaming pictures, supporting this 
thesis’ method. Importantly, while in real gaming activities the gamers will be 
confronted with multiple complex input (e.g., videos, animation, and sound), this 
study only included static emotional pictures. The interest of such a basic method 
is to reduce the amount of potentially confounding variables. With this study, the 
specific effect of simple visual stimuli was explored and mostly understood (i.e., 
leading to an underestimating effect). The following studies could then focus on 
other types of gaming cues, such as the game sounds or music, to try understanding 
within which type of stimulus the time loss effect is the most prominent. Finally, 
once the most important type of gaming sensory input (e.g., video, and music) has 
been explored, the actual input of the gamers should be broached. For example, 
comparing time estimation of gamers while watching someone play a videogame 
they enjoy to their time estimation while playing for the same duration could bring 
interesting knowledge on time loss.  
 Specific to this thesis method, some matters arose from the participants 
recruited. To begin with, the first and last study lacked participants even if it reached 
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the minimum requirement to run the analyses (i.e., at least 10 participants per group 
for both study). For the last experiment, this issue arose from the difficulty to recruit 
gamers during recruitment period for this thesis, as most of the participants who 
subscribed to this experiment considered themselves as non-gamers. Despite the 
numerous contacts established with different gaming societies, gaming forums, or 
gaming Facebook groups, the experiment had to come to an end with a low number 
of gamers. Furthermore, to allow the inclusion of more gamers, the definition of 
gaming (i.e., gaming inclusion criteria) was widened. For example, the participants 
who stated mainly playing on their mobile phone were included in the gaming 
group. This was decided due to a study showing that playing videogames on a 
smartphone was leading to improved cognitive skills to the same extent as console 
or computer gaming (Huang et al., 2017). The last limitation from this study’s 
samples concerns gaming disorder. This thesis aimed to explain time distortion 
observed among disordered gamers, yet the only measure of gaming disorder lied 
within two questionnaires, most of the participants not fitting the criteria. Therefore, 
instead of comparing disordered gamers, healthy gamers, and non-gamers, this 
thesis focused on the comparison of gamers and non-gamers in order to broach a 
first comparison and maybe open the door for more research exploring the specific 
effect of gaming disorder on time perception.  
Finally, the second and third experiment samples mainly comprised female 
participants (i.e., n=6 and n=19 respectively). This poses a limitation in two main 
aspects: (i) most of the previous studies on the cognitive impact of gaming mainly 
recruited male participants (e.g., Colzato et al., 2013; Dobrowolski et al., 2015), (ii) 
it appears that videogames do not affect male and female gamers’ cognitive skills 
to the same extent (Sariyska et al., 2017). Concerning the first point, there is 
currently a preconception that most of the gamers are male, which therefore led 
researchers to mainly include these in their studies. However, according to recent 
statistics (e.g., Statista, 2019; Interactive Software Federation of Europe, 2019), it 
appears that the percentage of male and female gamers are roughly similar (i.e., 
54% of male in Europe and in the United States of America). Concerning the second 
point, it appears that while the measures of gaming disorder were negatively 
associated with male gamers’ decision-making and positively with their impulsivity 
(i.e., according to the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale; Patton et al., 1995), these 
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associations were absent among female gamers. Although decision-making, to the 
best of the author’s knowledge, has not been associated with time perception, it has 
been shown that impulsivity directly affects time perception. However, it is 
important to note that this effect of time perception was only observed 
prospectively, while the second and third experiment of this thesis explored time 
retrospectively. Therefore, although the samples used represent a limitation 
concerning the generalisation of the results to male gamers, this does not go against 
the previous literature on the association between gaming and time perception. 
9.5.2. Stimuli 
 The stimuli selected within the three experiments were all chosen through a 
careful process. In the first experiment, familiar and simple words were compared 
to unfamiliar and complex words to observe how the difficulty of the task would 
affect the participants’ time estimation. To select these two words categories, the 
MRC Psycholinguistic Database from the University of Western Australia 
(Coltheart, 1981) was used, especially the following variables: familiarity, number 
of syllables, and number of letters. Controlling these variables made sure that the 
complicated words would actually be harder to recall for the participants compared 
to the familiar words. As a matter of fact, when comparing the number of words 
recalled between the two conditions, it appeared more words were recalled in the 
easy condition than the complicated one. The reason why the easy task remained 
too complicated to not affect time estimation of the participants prospectively was 
not related to the words being overly complicated. Indeed, the reason behind this 
overwhelming difficulty to remain focused on the task is most likely due to the 
amount of words the participants had to recall (i.e., 113 words spread out between 
three blocks). When changing the non-temporal task into a Lexical Decision Task, 
it was decided to keep the simple stimuli, as the difficulty varied with the non-words 
rather than the words. The non-words were either strings of consonants (i.e., easy 
task) which did not need further control, or non-words resembling real words (e.g., 
“CORI”) which required further inclusion and exclusion criteria. To make the non-
words eligible, they needed to include only grammatically existing onsets (i.e., the 
beginning of a word) and bodies (i.e., the other parts of the words). With these two 
conditions, all the non-words included in the LDT were grammatically correct, in 
other words, these non-words could potentially be real words. Furthermore, on top 
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of controlling the bodies and onsets, the order of the letters (i.e., consonants and 
vowels) were controlled as well, every single word having its own matched non-
word (e.g., “SHIRT” vs. “PSIGN”). Therefore, the words and non-words from this 
study were highly controlled and should not be considered a liability in these 
experiments.  
However, some limitations exist within the pictures used in the third 
experiments which only affect the gaming pictures. First, although the pictures were 
tested among real gamers, there was still a first selection made by the experimenter. 
Indeed, pictures extracted from the most famous games and game genres at the 
moment the experiments were selected by the main experimenter, leading to a first 
list of 137 pictures. The issue with these pictures is that they were personally 
selected by the main experimenter which can be deemed subjective. Nonetheless, 
to select the 24 gaming pictures used in the third experiments, the 137 pictures were 
sent to gamers. These gamers had to evaluate these pictures on four different scales 
(i.e., valence, arousal, will to play, and gaming relatedness). Only the pictures two 
standard deviation above the average score on the four scales were first selected, 
leading to 40 potential pictures, from which 24 pictures were selected based on a 
careful observation of their score. Therefore, even though the 137 first pictures were 
arbitrary selected, the careful process used afterward counterbalanced that issue, 
making the process more objective. Unfortunately, due to the short amount of time 
available to select these pictures, only a small number of the gamers contacted 
managed to send back the evaluations on time. Consequently, these analyses were 
based on only nine gamers’ evaluations, which could have biased the results. For 
example, some gaming genres were not represented at all after deleting the pictures 
not over two standard deviations from the mean score. This could be due to the 
small sample of gamers not playing these games and not being affected by these 
pictures.  
9.5.3. Measurements 
In the first experiment, the analyses showed that the Dual-Process 
Contingency Model of time perception did not work for the selected durations (i.e., 
longer than one minute). It was concluded that this model was simply not suited for 
longer duration than the one tested in the past (i.e., maximum 15s; Zakay, 1993) 
even if this could also be due to the way this model was tested in this thesis. Indeed, 
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this model is based on two separate variables, first the attention brought upon time 
and second, the amount of contextual changes occurring within an interval (Thomas 
& Weaver, 1975). To fluctuate the amount of attention brought upon time, the 
recalling task used in the experiment had two levels of difficulty, the point being 
that for a higher level of difficulty, the participants could not properly focus on time 
compared to the easy condition. However, what the experiment showed is that even 
in the prospective, conscious, setting, the difficulty of the task did not affect the 
participants’ time perception. Even more, there was no overall difference between 
the retrospective and the prospective time perception. It was thus hypothesized that 
the easy condition was already too demanding for the participants who could 
already not focus properly on their time estimation.  
Referring to another model of time perception, the Attentional Gate Model 
(i.e., see ‘Section 1.2. Models of time perception’ for more details on this model), 
it can be postulated that the attentional gate would be entirely closed due to the lack 
of attentional resources left for the timing exercise (Zakay & Block, 1995). 
Therefore, if no pulses are going through the gate, a prospective estimation would 
be impossible, leading the participants to evaluate time in a retrospective setting, 
explaining this lack of difference between retrospective and prospective setting. 
The second variable of this model, segmentation (i.e., the separation of a group of 
stimuli in several smaller groups), did not affect the participants’ estimation either. 
This is surprising as most of the models of retrospective time perception support an 
effect of segmentation on time perception, even outside the DPCM (Block & Reed, 
1978; Block & Zakay, 1997). A potential reason for this lack of effect is the way 
segmentation was implemented within the experiments, that is through the inclusion 
of celebrity names at regular intervals. The point of these celebrity names was to 
include a “surprising” stimulus at regular intervals which separated the flow of 
words in small groups (i.e., either two groups or four groups depending on the 
condition). It is thus possible that the participants did not perceive this segmentation 
effect, and that a clearer separation of the stimuli should be used in further studies 
(e.g., different semantic groups, or different background colours).  
The final point about this first experiment’s main task concerns the duration 
included for the shortest and longest blocks (i.e., 55 and 355 seconds). The idea 
behind not using exact durations (i.e., in this case, one and six minutes) was to avoid 
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the participants rounding up their estimations and ending up being extremely 
accurate. However, the durations used for these two blocks were close to an exact 
duration. Therefore, if some of the participants rounded up their estimations to the 
closest minute, it could have virtually improved their precision. Although this was 
a risk, when observing the data of the participants, their estimations were not 
deemed too close to the real duration to consider this methodological aspect an 
issue. Even though the previous experimental durations did not cause any trouble 
for the participants’ estimations, the durations within the second and third 
experiments were changed to be further from round durations (i.e., 72s, 192s, and 
338s). Furthermore, learning from the previous experiment’s results concerning 
difficulty, the task changed from a recalling task to a lexical decision task, making 
it simpler. Finally, as the segmentation of variables was not explored within the two 
last experiments, all the methodological limitations from the first temporal task got 
corrected for in the last experiments.  
In the third experiment, when including the gaming cues (i.e., the pictures), 
a methodological choice was made to include gaming pictures as primer (i.e., a 
priming stimulus before the main stimulus) instead of including the gaming cues as 
the main stimulus. In other words, the participant did not have to actively process 
the gaming cues, but they actually had to ignore them while processing the words 
or non-words. Although this could be a limitation from this experiment, three 
arguments support this methodological approach. First, this method has shown 
interesting results in diverse studies (Bai, Chen, Zhou, Liu, & Hu, 2019; Deleuze et 
al., 2019), even though most of these studies explored the effect of a priming picture 
on a following stimulus (e.g., including an emotional picture before a word and 
observe if it affects the participant’s RT). In this thesis, the purpose of the priming 
stimuli was not to affect the following stimuli (i.e., the words or non-words) but to 
induce a mood change among the participants which would affect their temporal 
estimation. The second point supporting this method was that previous studies 
exploring the emotional reactivity of gamers in front of gaming cues used pictures 
rather than words or other stimuli (Ahn et al., 2015; Liu et al., 2014). Indeed, it is 
more likely that gaming pictures will elicit an emotional response from gamers 
instead of words, which is the processed stimulus in the lexical decision task. 
Besides, while there exist millions of gaming pictures online, there are less possible 
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words usable in an experimental setting, especially because an important part of 
these words are game genres specific (e.g., Raid in Massively Multiplayer Online 
Role-Playing Games or Ganking5 in Multiplayer Online Battle Arena games). This 
game specificity prevents some gamers from understanding part of the words used, 
limiting the impact of that word on their emotion. Finally, the results showed that 
the gaming pictures actually impaired the gamers’ time perception, showing that 
this design had the expected results.  
 With regards to the controlled variables (i.e., the other non-temporal tasks 
and the survey), two limitations were noted. First, gaming disorder was measured 
through the nine dichotomous items created by Petry and et al. (2014) which has 
greatly been criticized within its own field (Griffiths et al., 2016) despite its wide-
ranging use in diverse studies. It is noteworthy that most of these criticisms concern 
the concept of Internet Gaming Disorder developed in the DSM-5, rather than the 
measure of it. Therefore, most of these criticisms remain true no matter the 
measurement used. A limitation specific to the IGD criteria used is that newer 
measurements of the IGD with a better structure were developed since then (e.g., 
Ten-Item Internet Gaming Disorder Test – IGDT-10; Király et al., 2019). Also, 
since the completion of this thesis’ studies, Pontes et al. (2019) published a self-
report diagnostic tool based on the ICD-11 criteria which represents another 
interesting option to replace the IGD criteria used within this thesis. Even though 
the assessment of IGD within this thesis could be improved, it generated interesting 
results regarding the measures from the UPPS-P-s, POGQ, and DASS-21 scores. 
These significant results tend to indicate that even if the measure of gaming disorder 
can be improved for future research, the measure used in this thesis brought the 
expected results, even if it did not affect time perception. The second issue with 
regards to the survey is that it did not include a single measure of flow, which 
appears to be a crucial variable within the interaction between gaming and time 
perception. However, most of the studies which included a measure of flow did not 
measure the flow state of the participants per se but a measure of flow proneness 
(i.e., how likely an individual will experience flow states in their life). Although it 
could have been interesting to analyse the associations between time spent gaming 
 
5 Ganking is a term peculiar to the Multiplayer Online Battle Arena games. This term refers to the 
action of helping a team-mate on another side of the map to take the advantage.  
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weekly and flow proneness scores, how likely one can experience flow in one’s life 
should not affect that person’s time perception in the task at hand. Indeed, it is not 
because someone is more likely to experience flow that they will experience flow 
during the experiment.  
9.6. Final remarks 
The main objective of this thesis was to study a potential underlying 
mechanism of the time loss effect observed among gamers, namely impaired time 
perception. This variable was deemed of interest due to its main consequence, time 
spent gaming. Even though time spent online is not considered a criterion for 
gaming disorder, as one can spend time gaming without presenting a disorder, it is 
directly associated with the negative consequences in a gamer’s life. Therefore, 
understanding this concept allows a direct intervention regarding time spent online, 
hence limiting potential negative consequences on one’s life. After a theoretical 
exploration of the impact of gaming on cognition and the potential factors affecting 
time perception, a theory emerged. It appeared that gamers did not exhibit impaired 
prospective (i.e., conscious) time perception due to their improved attention and 
working memory. Instead, they exhibited impaired retrospective (i.e., unconscious) 
time perception only when confronted with emotional cues. Based on these results, 
gamers could be helped by redirecting their attention towards time, shifting their 
time perception from retrospective to prospective. Indeed, the studies in this thesis 
have shown that while gamers appear to demonstrate a biased retrospective time 
perception when confronted with gaming cues, their prospective time perception 
appears to be more accurate than that of non-gamers. A potential way to shift time 
perception would be a timer appearing in front of the game (e.g., in the corner of 
the screen), constantly reminding the participants of the time. This could potentially 
help the participants to adjust their time control.  
However, even though the main aim of this thesis was thus retrospective 
time perception of gamers, the first study still tried to unify both time perception 
paradigms (i.e., retrospective and prospective) within a single cognitive model (i.e., 
DPCM) for long durations. Indeed, if the model was to be significant, studying only 
the RTP among gamers would become irrelevant, as the PTP would be of 
importance too. Two main results emerged from this study; first, the model was not 
significant for any of the durations explored. Beyond the several limitations 
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discussed within this experiment which could explain such non-significant results, 
it was hypothesized that the lack of results was due to this model only being viable 
for shorter durations. The second important result observed was improved 
prospective time perception among gamers who were more accurate for the longest 
block compared to non-gamers who clearly underestimated the duration. This point 
is of interest when referring to the prior hypothesis that gamers could potentially 
exhibit an improved PTP due to their improved attention and working memory. 
Furthermore, the lack of results in the RTP paradigm was expected as it was 
hypothesized that it would be a result from an emotional effect.  
The second and third study used a different temporal model (i.e., AGM) 
than the previous experiment as the previous model did not appear to be fit for 
measuring longer durations required within this thesis. The second study first aimed 
to explore the gamers’ baseline RTP, that is, their unconscious time perception 
without any external variable, even though it was hypothesized that no difference 
would be observed with the non-gamers. The only key result emerging from this 
experiment is a confirmation of the hypothesis, as the gamers performed as well as 
the non-gamers for their time estimation. This further confirmed the theory upon 
which the first three chapters of this thesis are built, that the reason behind the 
gamers’ impaired time perception lies in an external variable rather than their global 
time perception.  
The third study then aimed to explore two potential external variables which 
could directly affect their time perception, namely attention and emotion. Although 
attention should not lead to an underestimation effect in RTP, it was decided to 
include it based on the prior dual-process model of addiction which explores 
cognitive processes through the scope of a reflective (i.e., cognitive) and an 
affective (i.e., emotional) system. To elicit an emotional answer from the gamers, 
gaming pictures first validated in a pilot study were included in the experiment and 
to fluctuate the level of attentional resources available, the gamers could either 
perform an easy or complicated task. First, the study confirmed this thesis’ main 
hypothesis, that is, an impaired time perception in front of gaming stimuli, and this 
only for the gamers who underestimated the duration in the emotional condition. 
Second, there was a significant interaction between the task difficulty and the 
picture type, where the gamers would underestimate time when seeing gaming 
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pictures in the complicated task contrasting with an overestimation when observing 
these in the easy task. This second result could indicate an effect of flow, the easy 
task being too easy for the gamers (i.e., not matching their skills) which would lead 
them to get bored and not properly focus on the pictures. However, when the task 
was more complicated, it matched their skill level, allowing a proper focus on the 
task and leading to the desired effect of the gaming pictures.  
Several points of this thesis require more exploration in order to confirm the 
interpretation of the results. First, improved prospective time perception was based 
on a small gaming population and requires a proper study of gamer’s prospective 
time perception to confirm this hypothesis. Second, the flow hypothesis is based on 
a single significant interaction, and although this is a viable interpretation, more 
studies are required. Furthermore, flow has been shown to directly affect time 
perception, whether prospective or retrospective, and is also prominent within the 
gaming population. Therefore, it appears crucial to explore the triple interaction 
between gaming, retrospective time perception, and flow in order to fully grasp the 
time loss effect observed among gamers. Third, it is important to mention that this 
study aimed to bring a first observation of gamers’ time perception, and that for this 
purpose it was preferred to use three shorter durations rather than a single longer 
one. Therefore, the durations explored within these experiments are not fully 
representative of the durations experienced within a gaming session (i.e., maximum 
six minutes compared to sometimes few hours of gaming). It would thus be of 
interest to lead further studies exploring longer durations. Finally, while this study 
used gaming pictures to elicit an emotional response from the gamers, other types 
of gaming cues exist, such as music, videos, or simply playing a game. The pictures 
were preferred over other stimuli for the sake of controlling the confounding 
variables, but further studies should explore these different stimuli to observe how 
gamers’ time perception is affected in these cases.  
In conclusion, it appears that gamers have a better prospective time 
perception due to their improved attentional skills and an impaired retrospective 
time perception which only occurs when confronted with gaming cues. 
Theoretically, this is due to the arousing effect of the gaming pictures based on the 
research on gaming and on time perception. In the field of time perception, it 
appeared that, in PTP, the more arousing pictures (e.g., mutilation pictures) lead to 
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more time perception impairment than the less arousing ones (e.g., disgusting 
detritus) (Gil & Droit-Volet, 2012). Concerning the gamers, their stronger brain 
reactivity to gaming pictures compared to non-gamers could indicate an arousing 
effect from gaming cues. This is of interest when one knows that the disordered 
gamers tend to react even stronger to gaming cues compared to healthy gamers, 
which can explain the stronger time loss effect observed alongside gaming disorder. 
These results could be of crucial interest for clinical work with disordered gamers. 
Indeed, knowing that observed time loss within this population is due to an 
emotional response to gaming cues could help reducing this impaired time control. 
As it was mentioned earlier in this thesis, a strong emotion regulation can disrupt 
the deleterious effect of emotion on time perception, leading to an accurate 
estimation. Since gaming disorder has been related to impaired emotion regulation, 
it would be of particular interest to help this population regulating their emotions, 
which could directly reduce the effect of gaming on their time estimation. In turn, 
this limited effect of emotion on their time perception would allow them to spend 
less time gaming, hence reducing the negative impact of videogames in their life.   
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